Comparative
Civilizations
& Multiple
Modernities

A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS BY
S.N. EISENSTADT

BRILL

REFLECTIONS ON MULTIPLE MODERNITIES

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REFLECTIONS ON MULTIPLE MODERNITIES

European, Chinese and Other Interpretations

EDITED BY

DOMINIC SACHSENMAIER AND JENS RIEDEL

WITH

SHMUEL N. EISENSTADT

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PREFACE

Bolko von Oetinger

The Strategy Institute of The Boston Consulting Group is pleased to have hosted a Multiple Modernities Conference of leading international social scientists in the Berlin Wissenschaftszentrum on May 20-21, 2001. This publication makes the conference papers available to the public and especially to researchers and students who did not have the opportunity to attend the meeting.

The attention that we in The Strategy Institute have given to the field of multiple modernities grows out of our broad interest in the nature of strategy. Cooperation with academic researchers from various disciplines enables us to develop a richer understanding of strategy and of the social, cultural, and political environment for business. The Berlin conference contributed substantially to that goal. It is our intention to make our findings available through publications.

The idea that we live in a world of different modernities, Western and non-Western, is a challenge to typical economic thinking, which tends to homogenize the economic environment by defining generally accepted, universally applicable "laws" and "rules" and by generally ignoring the noneconomic factors influencing economic decisions. The Berlin conference provided substantial insights into the complexities of a global economy. The general interest of the business world in the publications of Francis Fukuyama (*The End of History and the Last Man*) and Samuel Huntington (*The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*) is a sign of an increasing focus on noneconomic matters. Although all major Western companies try to exploit — in the best meaning of the word — all global opportunities that are economically advantageous to them, they are becoming increasingly aware that different societies require different questions, different answers, and different approaches. Unfortunately, the search for the right questions, answers, and approaches has not yet yielded practical, useful consequences for business and public policy. So far the World

Economic Forum, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization have failed to provide useful guidance. Clearly, we are only at the beginning of a complex dialogue.

Of course, the gap between a high-level sociological interpretation of history and the mundane daily decisions of a business struggling to survive or expand cannot be bridged by a few simple rules or concepts. The gap needs to be explored. The distance is too great and simple solutions are nonexistent. But looking into various aspects of multiple modernities in search of a road map of understanding should be worth the effort. Such was the purpose of the Berlin Conference. As the papers indicate, there is no master solution for dealing with a world of multiple modernities or even a list of questions that pin down the problems. The purpose of the conference was to elicit a broad spectrum of interpretations and begin a dialogue among them. Therefore, the papers offer hunches, ideas to be explored, and weak signals that can be pursued to arrive at a better explanation of the complexities of our global economy.

We do not exactly know what reality is, because reality remains subject to cultural interpretation. Multiple modernities is one of many competing interpretations of history and of our current reality, of our globalizing world and the cultures in it. It helps us think through today's global world by providing a new forum in which to seek answers. At this early stage, however, we expect first to find new questions.

We encourage readers with a strong interest in economic affairs to embrace the world of multiple modernities because it clearly broadens one's economic horizon. We hope readers with an explicit sociological or historical interest will engage in the field because we must all have a vital interest in the analysis of our societies and the meaning of history, where we are, where we are coming from and, in particular, where we are going. If readers merge the economic, sociological, and historical interests in their minds, they may have the best starting point for a richer interpretation of today's world and its future development.

PART A

INTRODUCTION

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THE CONTEXT OF THE MULTIPLE MODERNITIES PARADIGM

Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Jens Riedel, and Dominic Sachsenmaier

In Winter 2000 *Daedalus* published an issue on Multiple Modernities,[1] which followed an issue on Early Modernities.[2] Since then, the term multiple modernities has spread rapidly in the social sciences.[3] Major research projects have been set up, and conference seminars and some books already use the term, which is becoming established as part of the social sciences' *lingua franca*.[4] Judging from its rapid acceptance, one can expect that the complex questions and problems implicit in the concept will be the object of major intellectual discussions.[5]

The core of multiple modernities lies in assuming the existence of culturally specific forms of modernity shaped by distinct cultural heritages and sociopolitical conditions. These forms will continue to differ in their value systems, institutions, and other factors. For example, structural differentiation is a typical feature in the institutions of modern societies, ranging from family patterns to socioeconomic institutions and mass communication. Differentiated structures, modes of openness, and ways of questioning the basic premises vary greatly, however, across cultures and historical periods. Unique forms of modernity are created by different activists and social movements that hold distinct views of what makes a society modern. In other words, even though distinctively modern structures, institutions, and

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[1] *Daedalus. Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 129-1 (2000): *Multiple Modernities*.

[2] *Daedalus. Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 127-3 (1998): *Early Modernities*.

[3] A publication in German carrying a similar title is Eisenstadt 2000a.

[4] Examples of research projects, which use the term Multiple Modernities, are the *Multiple Modernities Project* at the Center of Transcultural Studies (Montreal) headed by Charles Taylor and Benjamin Lee, and *Multiple Modernities* at the European University in Florence. Recent books referring to the multiple modernities paradigm span a wide geographical area. Examples are Roniger and Waisman 2001; Taylor 1999. An article using the paradigm is Hefner 1998.

[5] See Wagner 1999.

cultural systems have spread around the globe, different equally mod-
ern societies have appropriated them in a variety of forms. They have
done and continue to do so in reference to each other but particularly
in reference to the European and later the American dynamisms of
modernity.

   In significant respects, multiple modernities breaks with the classic
approaches in Western sociology that, despite their divergent
approaches, all tended to equate modernization with the homoge-
nization of world cultures. The notion of multiple modernities devel-
oped against the background of recent events and developments,
especially the process of globalization and the downfall of the Soviet
regime, which have sharpened the problem of the nature of the mod-
ern, contemporary world. Indeed, at the beginning of the twenty-first
century, new visions or understandings of modern civilization have
spread beyond the West — Europe and the United States, where the
first cultural program of modernity developed — to Asian, Latin
American, and African societies. Moreover, the increasing globaliza-
tion in the contemporary world poses even more radical questions —
namely, whether the end of the twentieth century signals an end of
modernity, of the modern project as it has developed in the last two
centuries.

   Is the contemporary world one of withdrawal from the modern
program in the direction of either the end of history or the clash of
civilizations?[6] The "end of history" announced the ahistorical homog-
enization of the world, in which the ideological premises of modernity
with all their tensions and contradictions have become almost irrele-
vant, enabling, paradoxically, an increase in the number of multiple
postmodern visions. The opposite view of the end of the modern pro-
ject sees the contemporary world dominated by a retreat to antimod-
ern, fundamentalist, and anti-Western movements and civilizations in
which Western civilization, the seeming epitome of modernity, is con-
fronted, often in hostile terms, with other examples of modernity,
especially the Muslim and so-called Confucian ones.

   Whatever one's view of these various interpretations, it is obvious
that they call out for a far-reaching reappraisal of modernity and
modernization. Opposing these visions, it is the major contention of
the notion of multiple modernities that the best way to understand the
contemporary world, indeed the history of modernity, is to see it as a

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   [6] See Fukuyama 1992; Huntington 1996.

story of continual development and formation, constitution, and reconstitution of multiple, changing and often contested and conflicting modernities.

The very notion of multiple modernities goes against some of the explicit and implicit assumptions of the classic sociological tradition and above all of the theories of modernization that predominated in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as some of the major themes dominant today.

The classic theories of modernization, from the 1950s, identified the core of modernity, of modern social structure, as the decomposition of older "closed" formations and, as Karl Deutsch says, of the growing potential for social mobilization, and the concomitant development of new structural, institutional, and cultural features. The most important structural dimension of modernity attesting to the decomposition of relatively narrow formations was the growing tendency to structural differentiation, most apparent in the growth of urbanization and a market economy and in the continual development of distinctive channels of communication and agencies of education. On the institutional level such decomposition gave rise to the development of new forms — such as the modern state, modern national collectivities, new and capitalist-political economies — which were perceived or defined at least to some extent as being autonomous and were indeed regulated by distinct mechanisms. Concomitantly, modernity was seen as comprising a distinct cultural program, and as shaping distinct types of individual personalities.

The theories of modernization prevalent during the 1950s and '60s, as well as classic sociological analyses by Marx, Durkheim, and to a large extent even Weber,[7] at least in one reading of him, have implicitly or explicitly conflated the major dimensions of modernity as it developed in the West. They assumed that even if these dimensions were analytically distinct, they had become historically inseparable. A very strong — even if implicit — assumption of the earlier studies of modernization was that its cultural dimensions — the basic cultural premises of Western modernity, the "secular" rational worldview, including a strong individualistic view of man — are inherently interwoven with the structural ones. Concomitantly, most of the classics of sociology, as well as the studies of modernization in the decades after World War II, and the closely related studies of the convergence

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[7] See Kamenka 1983; Weber 1978; Weber 1968a; Weber 1968b; Durkheim 1973.

of industrial societies, assumed that the basic institutional constellations, the definitions of the institutional arenas and the modes of their regulation and integration that developed in European modernity, as well as the cultural program of modernity as it developed in the West would "naturally" be absorbed by all modernizing societies, possibly with local variations. It was further assumed that this project of modernity, with its hegemonic and homogenizing tendencies, would not only continue in the West, but also prevail throughout the world.

But the reality that emerged proved to be radically different. The developments in the contemporary era did not bear out the assumption that industrial societies would converge. The actual developments in the various institutional arenas, such as the economy, the polity, the education system, and the family, were defined and regulated and came together in different ways in different societies and periods. The great diversity of modern societies, even those whose economic development has been similar, such as Europe, the United States, and Japan, became more apparent. Sombart's old question: "Why is there no socialism in the U.S.?" formulated in the first decades of the twentieth century attests to the recognition of this fact. Far-reaching variability developed even within the West — within Europe itself, and above all between Europe and the Americas.[8]

These tendencies were even more evident in the relation between the cultural and structural dimensions of modernity. Although the dimensions of the original Western project constituted the crucial starting and reference points for the processes that developed in the modern era among different societies, these societies have gone far beyond the homogenizing and hegemonic dimensions of the original cultural program of modernity, and far beyond the concrete contours and many of the initial premises of that project and the institutional patterns that developed in Europe.

Although modernity has spread to most of the world, it has not given rise to a single institutional pattern or a single modern civilization. It has, however, influenced the development of several modern civilizations, or at least civilizational patterns, i.e., of societies or civilizations that share some core characteristics, but have developed different ideological and institutional dynamics.

Some scholarly approaches claimed the best way to understand the dynamics of different modernizing societies is to see them as continua-

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[8] See Sombart 1976 (1906).

tions of traditional institutional patterns and dynamics — a view that has been to some extent revived in writings about the clash of civilizations. But contrary to this approach, the institutional formations that have developed in most societies have been distinctively modern even if their dynamics have been greatly influenced by distinctive cultural premises, traditions, and historical experiences. It is important in this context that the social and political movements in modernizing societies, such as the nationalistic ones, even while propagating strong anti-Western or even antimodern views, have been distinctively modern, promulgating unique ways to interpret modernity. This is true not only of the various reformist, socialist, and nationalist movements that developed between the middle of the nineteenth century and the end of World War II, but also of contemporary fundamentalist movements.

The Complexity, Variability, and Changeability of Modernity

Concomitantly with the growing recognition of the complexity and variability of modern and contemporary societies, there developed a much more complex evaluation of modernity. From the very beginning of the attempts to understand modernity two opposing evaluations developed, attesting to the inherent contradictions of modernity. One, implicit also in theories of modernization and those of convergence, saw modernity as a positive, emancipating, progressive force promising a better, more inclusive, world. The other, which developed first in Europe and later found resonance in the non-Western world, viewed modernity as a morally destructive force, and emphasized the negative effects of some of its core characteristics, such as technology, egotism, or hedonism.

The classic scholars in the field of sociology — Tocqueville, Marx, Weber, and Durkheim — were very conscious of these contradictions, and their attitude toward modernity was ambivalent. Such ambivalence intensified in the 1920s and '30s with the rise of fascism and the confrontation with it, which, with Communism, constituted one of the major concerns of European sociology. After World War II, in the various studies of modernization and convergence of industrial societies, paradoxically perhaps, the new optimistic view of modernity prevailed, in both the "liberal" pluralistic and the communist versions.

This optimistic view of modernity gave way to greater pessimism

with the intellectual rebellion and protest in the late 1960s and early
'70s, the waning of the cold war, and the rise of postmodernism. The
contradictions and tensions inherent in modernity again came to the
forefront in the debates about modernity and the future of the world.
The earlier critical themes and ambivalent attitude toward modernity
reemerged, emphasizing again the threatening and negative aspects
of technology and science, such as the threat posed by nuclear
weapons and the destruction of the environment.

Moreover, it became more and more recognized that the processes
of modernization, the continual expansion of modernity throughout
the world, were not necessarily benign or peaceful; that they did not
constitute the continual progress of reason or necessarily deliver on
their promise. The fact that these processes existed concurrently with
wars, violence, genocide, repression, and dislocation of populations
gained increasing recognition. In the optimistic view of modernity,
wars, genocide, and repression were often portrayed as being against
the basic grain of the program of modernity, mere remainders of pre-
modern attitudes.

But there was growing acknowledgement that the forms of violence
and control were radically transformed and intensified by being inter-
woven both with the ideological premises of modernity, and with the
specific patterns of institutionalization in modern societies and
regimes, generating specifically modern barbarism. The most impor-
tant manifestation of such transformation was now seen as the ten-
dency to make violence, terror, and war a matter of ideology, seen
vividly in the French Revolution and later in various romantic and
national movements. Ideology became a central component of the
constitutions of nation-states, with those states becoming the most
important agent of and arena for the constitution of citizenship and
symbols of collective identity. Ideology played an increasingly impor-
tant role with the crystallization of the modern European state sys-
tem, with European expansion beyond Europe, and with the rapid
development of technologies of communication and war. The Holo-
caust became a symbol of the negative, destructive potentialities of
modernity, of the barbarism lurking within the core, with more recent
ethnic and religious wars and genocides attesting to the persistence of
these destructive potentialities. Concomitantly it was more and more
emphasized in the public and scholarly discourse that the crystalliza-
tion of modernity in Western and Central Europe and its later expan-
sion, especially under the aegis of imperialism and colonialism, were

continually interwoven with wars, with exclusions, with repressions and dislocations — which were often legitimized in terms of some of the components of the cultural programs of modernity.

The Development of the Concept of Multiple Modernities

It is against this background that the concept of multiple modernities developed. This notion became loosely related to different developments in the social sciences — among others, the so-called cultural turn.[9] With the rise of cultural history and cultural studies in general, the master narratives that treated historical processes as variations of one structural or ideational norm came under attack from a wide array of positions. As a result, scholars in both sociology and history have now become far more sensitive to the culturally specific character of historical phenomena and societal processes.[10] Increasingly, historians are also trying to deal with the world's growing interconnectedness in multilateral ways, an effort shared by some theorists in international relations, which previously tended to reduce collective and individual actions to a ubiquitous and uniform self-interest that was not thought to be embedded in wider value systems.[11] In subfields such as world history, international history, and global history, one can observe a parallel effort to get beyond Western-centric models in the study of transcultural exchanges, contacts, and linkages.[12] The same is true for psychology, where scholars are starting to emancipate themselves from Euro-American approaches that have dominated even cross-cultural psychology. One is increasingly aware of the lack of findings from non-Western societies presented by indigenous psychology in psychological models.[13]

All in all, scholarly voices celebrating global Westernization and homogenization[14] have become relatively few — and heavily contest-

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[9] See, for example, Chaney 1994.

[10] For an overview of the debates, see Spohn 1998.

[11] Compare Buzan and Little 2000.

[12] For international history see Loth and Osterhammel 2000. For global history see Mazlish 1993. For world history see McNeill 1995, who argues that uniformity will never emerge, since intensified cross-cultural contacts might foster change, however such change is often guided by the spirit of cultural self-preservation and the defense of local particularities.

[13] After Spering 2001.

[14] For example, Friedman 1999 and Fukuyama 1992.

ed since the 1990s. With the upsurge of globalization, new types of
convergence models reappeared, albeit by emphasizing that any
social grouping will be ground down by globalization and its driving
forces, so that the world will end up as a set of relationships between
the individual and the world.[15] But at the same time the relatively
new field of globalization studies emphasizes the mutual interplay
between global and local, universal and particular forces, which are
seen as mutually dependent.[16] Here one tends to see globalization not
as imposing uniformity but as strengthening the binary relations
between its parts and through this strengthening process affirming the
relevance of each part.[17]

Even the field of economics is shifting away from its classic univer-
salizing models, which were drawn exclusively from the Western
experience. As early as the 1980s, a tendency to accept the validity of
other possibilities of the modern economy underlay a wealth of publi-
cations encouraging the West to adopt various distinctively Japanese
social and economic features.[18] In general, economics has recently
witnessed the appearance of a wealth of culturally sensitive studies
that draw on a wide variety of approaches. In addition, the institu-
tionalization of fields such as cross-cultural economics indicates the
beginning of a major revision of the grand narratives and universaliz-
ing models.

Many comparative studies of human interactions have been devel-
oped, ranging from decision making and trust building to the nature
of hierarchical relations and negotiation styles.[19] It has turned out that
even the major economic players that are commonly regarded as the
driving forces of homogenization do not operate in a realm beyond
cultural pluralism. Studies have shown that even global corporations
such as IBM not only cater to regional markets, but that their inner
workings vary profoundly by country, region, and culture.[20] On an

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[15] The surviving versions of convergence models are discussed in Wagner 1999. A
related view not discussed by Wagner is presented by Bauman 1998, 2ff.

[16] See, for example, Robertson 1992.

[17] See Jameson 1998.

[18] For example Rehfeld 1990; Abegglen and Stalk 1985; Dyer and Ouchi 1993.

[19] For example for trust: Fukuyama 1996. For decision making processes and tol-
erance of ambiguity: Geletkanycz 1997. Taking a similar direction: Chattopadhyay
1999. For hierarchical relations: Beetham 1991.

[20] For the IBM example see Hofstede 1991 – a study of IBM or IBM subsidiary
employees in more than 50 countries showing that essential working processes are
driven by divergent, culturally-specific value-systems.

institutional level, a number of studies focus on different structural conditions such as ownership patterns or business-government relations. The divergent structural conditions and value systems in which the economic realm is embedded let economists increasingly depart from the notion of one homogenous realm in which the business world supposedly operates.[21] By contrast, some scholars are starting to assume the existence of various business cultures or multiple capitalisms.

Reflections on Multiple Modernities

Given the parallel effort of many academic fields to modify dominant models and approaches, it is safe to conclude that throughout the social sciences the diversification of previously homogenizing theories and models has become an imminent task. It can be expected that the open, diversified character of modernity will continue to be the object of major academic disputes.[22] *Reflections on Multiple Modernities. European, Chinese, and Other Perspectives* contributes to the emerging debate by bringing together a number of disciplinary and regional perspectives that are important for a better understanding of this paradigm. The book does not attempt to present all relevant approaches and experiences, but rather gives the reader a selection of approaches that are not sufficiently engaged in dialogues with each other. In this manner it seeks to stimulate exchanges and mutual inspiration among academic fields and regions. The book contains contributions by sociologists, historians, area studies experts, and economists, and it is structured as a matrix of topical and regional chapters. In the topical chapters a range of theoretical issues and approaches related to the multiple modernities *problematique* is expounded. The authors focus on general theoretical considerations surrounding multiple modernities, observations of movements contesting Western hegemony, the potential for prolific discourse among different forms of the modern, and divergent business cultures. For the regional debates, Europe and China serve as examples of culturally specific encounters with modernity that currently face different problems in identity formation. Whereas for Europe one of the main challenges is to extrapolate a

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[21] For example: Hall and Soskice 2001a; Whitley 1999.
[22] A point shared by Wagner 1999.

distinctively European self-understanding from previously universalistic claims, China from the very beginning has had to confront modernity as an exogenous force.

In the first section of this book Shmuel Eisenstadt, Dominic Sachsenmaier, and Bruce Mazlish convey insights into the parameters of the discussion when theorizing about multiple modernities.

Following Max Weber, Eisenstadt defines the core of modernity as the deconstruction of a God-ordained worldview held by all axial age civilizations. Since modern societies are no longer embedded in meaningful transcendental orders, they are in principle open to continuous transformation and adaptation. Thus for Eisenstadt modernity is characterized by features such as open political arenas and changing collective identities that are subject to continuous competition between the center and the periphery; the autonomy of man in relation to any form of authority; and the multiplicity of often competing visions of the public good. Its structural openness and continual contestation make any form of modernity thus a dynamic system of development and reformation.

Eisenstadt maintains, however, that modernity does not dissolve traditions, but rather that they serve as resources for modernity's perpetual constitution and reconstitution. In this sense, various cultures, when they are undergoing modernization, develop distinctive reaction patterns, conceptions of the good, and institutions. Whereas the first form of modernity emerged in Europe, the North and Latin American experiences are not fragments of the Old World, but rather the crystallization of a new civilization. According to Eisenstadt, the ensuing other crystallizations all share the central structural and ideational core of modernity, and even the modern movements contesting modernity leave this core intact. Furthermore, Eisenstadt discusses the role of trust as a common bond between the relevant units inside a particular modern civilization and between the various manifestations of modernity. Like other modern features, trust is not transcendentally anchored in modern societies but rather has to be constituted in a continuing process. Starting from this assumption, Eisenstadt reflects on the central question of generalizing trust beyond narrow, particularistic settings that are not seeking to contribute to an overarching common good.

Following Eisenstadt's contribution, Dominic Sachsenmaier discusses the potential of the multiple modernities paradigm to stimulate and

inform a wider public debate. Looking at various world regions, he underlines the ambivalence of understanding modernity as a homogenizing force. According to Sachsenmaier, for whole world regions, convergence models implied degradation to the status of a latecomer, but they also contained hope for dignity and a better future. He points out that one can also observe this ambivalence in the history of many countries during the past one or two centuries. For example, a significant number of societies tended to transform themselves according to universal Western standards, but did so to preserve some newly constructed but allegedly primordial inner core that carried undeniably modern features. Even though reformist movements aimed for peaceful manifestations of the modern, this ambivalent constellation contributed to severe imbalances in identity building that sometimes led to undeniably modern, but aggressive, exclusivist movements.

In a second step Sachsenmaier discusses the implications of the sovereign nation-state's loosening grip on societal structures and identity formations for the future of the international order and the multiple modernities paradigm. The rise of fundamentalist religious movements proves that some transnational structures have the potential to be mobilized as anti-Western movements. Shifting the understanding of multiple modernities from a sociological analysis to a telos, Sachsenmaier argues that this new paradigm can serve as a fertile additional element in conceptualizing a stable world order that so far is based almost exclusively on a system of nation-states. For him, a common awareness of belonging to a shared yet pluralistic modern condition can help to overcome some of the imbalances implicit in cultures' encounters with modernity and ultimately contribute to the establishment of an international civil society.

Whereas the other authors focus on continuing and even more accentuated cultural diversification, Bruce Mazlish's prediction for modernity is closer to the vision of a global age. Mazlish emphasizes the historical multiplicity of modernity in Europe in terms of different structures and discourses in various historical epochs. Beginning at the end of the nineteenth century, he argues, there were two separate, though not necessarily competing, debates on modernity: the aesthetic one among artists as well as philosophers, and the materialist one among social theorists and visionaries. Mazlish understands the global spread of modernity, as it occurred during the past century, as an export of certain European national models to their respective spheres of influence around the globe.

At present, according to Mazlish, modernity is about to enter a new stage that sets itself apart from all historical predecessors: the global epoch. Now, different world regions are interacting with unprecedented synchronicity and synergy; also, there is a new awareness of commonly shared problems and dangers, which Mazlish understands as the sprouts of a global community to come. In this global community the nation-state will lose its formative influence, since multinational corporations are rapidly gaining wealth and power. For Mazlish, the future well-being of the globe will depend heavily on whether the new international business elite is able and willing to take responsibility for global leadership.

The next section of the book, with contributions by Prasenjit Duara and Mark Juergensmeyer, addresses the issue of contestations to Western modernity and universalism, from both a historical and a contemporary perspective.

Focusing on the first half of the twentieth century, Prasenjit Duara discusses the concept of civilization, which was used as a locus from which to sanction and judge both modernity and the nation-state as reference systems. Duara points out that the complex discourses on civilization that concerned the relation between the self and the other on a macrosocietal level emerged from the spread of an interdependent world culture and from reactions to it. He describes the process by which a universal understanding of civilization in the singular, rooted in the Enlightenment conception of material and moral progress, became dominant during the late nineteenth century. As part of this development, civilization became increasingly positivist and even social Darwinist, and was often used in subjugating whole continents that did not match its legal and other standards.

Particularly after World War I, which discredited the idea that the West represented the highest goals and virtues of humanity, alternative notions of civilization started to gain prominence. Visions of cultures or civilizations as pure, closed, and in many cases ethnographic entities were formulated in explicit contrast to the universal scope of the older civilization discourse. In effect, the new discourses sought to mobilize the transcendent character of concepts of civilization to authenticate the particular. Now, civilizations were depicted as equally universal, yet higher forms of the good and truth.

Duara stresses that these newer notions of particularistic or alternative civilizations did not emerge from any authentic historical trajectories but remained caught within the parameters of the older civiliza-

tional notion. According to Duara, constructs such as the Confucian and the Hindu civilizations either defined their core elements as being identical with alleged functional equivalents in Western civilization or as binary opposites. In addition, Duara shows the variety of ways in which these particularistic visions of civilizations with universal reach were appropriated by nation-states in their quest for sovereignty, authenticity, and self-legitimization. Duara ends with the statement that the universal scope and role of civilization are still threatened by states and other social formations that express their desire for particularity through counteruniversalisms.

In the following chapter Mark Juergensmeyer depicts some of the current forms of counteruniversalism in his study on antimodernism as a global phenomenon. Very much in line with Duara's argument, Juergensmeyer holds that in the world today violent movements are reconstituting religion as a global civilization standing against the West. These mobilized belief systems are in no way a return to an "original" religion, but are rather reframed in contemporary ideologies meeting present-day needs in a projected clash of civilizations. The West, particularly the United States, is satanized as an enemy of religion and a proponent of secular values. According to Juergensmeyer, the attack on the World Trade Center has to be understood as a strike not only against American hegemony and its injustices, but also against an American-dominated worldwide capitalist system and popular culture, which are allegedly threatening to hollow out other cultural resources.

Juergensmeyer stresses that religious violence, of which radical Islamism is only the most efficiently organized, is not opposed to globalization or even modern technology per se. Rather, these forces fight against Western-style modernity and secular nationalism, which they want to replace with a theocratic world order in which religion holds political and public significance. Juergensmeyer predicts that in the future radical religious movements will take three different directions. Some will try to remain consciously regional and ignore globalization. Others will grow into transnational networks, and a third group will be organized globally in order to combat a supposedly Western version of globalization. Juergensmeyer concludes by observing that religious fundamentalism will remain an attractive means to regain identity and agency in an internationalizing world, and that it will continue to do so until there is a surer sense of citizenship in a global order.

Following the discussion of antimodernism, Jürgen Kocka and Tu Wei-ming share their ideas about the philosophical and ethical preconditions for a world community and its common good. While both agree on the necessary interplay between local traditions and commonly shared ethical standards, they accentuate the substance of the latter in different ways. Kocka welcomes the pluralization of modernity both as a structural development and as an intellectual discourse ending the dominance of Western-centric models. This process and the overall growing interrelatedness of the world, Kocka holds, bring gains. For example, it gives intellectuals and elites from different cultural contexts an opportunity to bring their indigenous resources into a global context without turning against modernity or the West as such. Yet Kocka maintains that it would be a grave mistake if the new cultural sensitivity led to the perception that other cultural realms cannot be measured by any higher normative standards. In his opinion, in some recent publications on multiple modernities and related issues the common denominator of all forms modernity has become too thin. Too many facets seem to be acceptable as modern and thus as morally acceptable, which causes Kocka to warn about the dangers of departing from understanding modernity as a commonly shared project with universal norms.

For the past, Kocka distinguishes two main processes of universalization that are not clearly separable: imposition and the effort to be desired by the other. As a third way he suggests negotiation, which he uses as a metaphor for the necessary process of adaptation, modification, and the adjustment of universal cultural norms to local contexts. He points out that in contrast to constructed fundamentalist creeds, Enlightenment values can be adapted locally because of their implicit potential for correction and learning. Negotiation over single concepts should be seen a process of mutual learning by the giver and the receiver, and according to Kocka, the West has yet to discover how to learn on an intercultural level.

This agenda of mutual learning is further elaborated in Tu Wei-ming's programmatic essay. Tu holds that even though world regions such as East Asia have been deeply influenced by the West, their way of life has continued to be significantly different from the American and European experience. For Tu, traditions, i.e., specific cultural, institutional, structural, and mental forms, have proven to be constituent parts of modernity, a fact that is often still ignored by elites both outside the West and within. In a world of multiple modernities,

Tu argues, societies should begin to consciously draw on their indigenous resources to find answers to modern problems that befit their own sociopolitical conditions and mentalities. According to Tu, so far world regions outside the West have looked only at Europe and the United States as reference societies, but to find a balanced way for the future, they should accept a plurality of models and engage in dialogues with them.

For Tu, this process must necessarily be accompanied by a willingness on the part of the West to exchange its position as a teaching civilization for one of a culture able to reexamine its own premises in critical yet open dialogues with other cultures. In other words, particularly the American presence in East Asia should be transformed from an asymmetrical relation into a real partnership characterized by mutual recognition of the other's otherness, shared understanding, and common appreciation. This implies the necessity for Western societies to incorporate other cultural experiences into their openness to change and readiness to experiment. Such a new spirit of openness could help to replace the current politics of domination with a politics of communication, negotiation, interaction, and collaboration.

In the following chapters, Frederic Wakeman and Ambrose King discuss China's encounter and ongoing struggle with modernity. Whereas Wakeman depicts the attempts to create a modern China from a longer historical perspective, King focuses primarily on the debates during the past ten years.
Wakeman discusses the great sense of loss and the search for a cultural and political self in the age of modernity. He emphasizes how this search was accompanied by great turmoil, by erratic jumps in defining both the meaning of China as a cultural particular and the kind of universalism and international order it wanted to be related to. He shows how as early as the turn of the twentieth century intellectuals faced the challenge of defining the Chinese particularity in reference to the overwhelming force of scientific universalism. This, Wakeman holds, led to the collapse of both the cyclical view of Chinese history and the self-perception that China constituted the center of the world. Both breaks were an essential part of the Chinese identity crisis that still persists.

Further, Wakeman sketches various Chinese experiments with modernity and with defining what it means to be Chinese on an individual and a collective level. These efforts have ranged from attempts to preserve a Chinese cultural heart by merely incorporating suppos-

edly value-neutral technology, to movements of radical Westerniza-
tion accompanied by iconoclasm, to a determined communist
nativism achieved through the sinification of Marxism. The latter
party-designed programs of social revolution peaked in the effort to
overtake the Soviet Union's revisionist modernity and to attain new
dignity by serving as the leader of the proletarian nations. In this way,
Wakeman argues, China sought to "attain modernity in both a specif-
ically Chinese and universally Marxist manner." This approach ulti-
mately failed in the self-mutilation of the Cultural Revolution.

According to Wakeman, Deng Xiaoping's program of "socialism
with Chinese characteristics" once again sought to confine Western-
ization to particular technological and economic sectors. In contrast
to a similar Confucian attempt at the end of the nineteenth century,
now socialism and political stability figure as the cultural heart to be
preserved, which expresses the current state of China's self-alienation.
For present-day China Wakeman describes the great tensions in the
quest for transformation, which he labels as a "kind of schizophrenia"
— a deep split not only between islands of richness and an ocean of
gray everyday life, but also between the party's hunger for economic
advancement as well as international exposure and its effort to keep
the society heavily regulated. Wakeman concludes that if one were to
define distinctive features of Chinese modernity in its current form,
one would have to refer to the lack of a civil society, a weak public
sphere, and a barely enforceable system of rights, accompanied by a
strong state and a society teeming with nationalistic fervor.

Ambrose King focuses mainly on how the Chinese intellectual dis-
course of the recent past has been related to international discussions
of universalism and particularism, of modernity and postmodernity.
He points out that the deconstruction of modernity as a universalistic
concept in Western intellectual discourse relates to East Asian
attempts to define the outlines of a culturally specific form of moder-
nity. King argues that neither the Habermasian approach of under-
standing the Enlightenment project as incomplete nor the postmod-
ern doubts about the viability of this project are considered to be true
alternatives in the Chinese intellectual scene, since these debates are
more or less confined to the European and North American experi-
ence. Rather, King holds, in the Chinese world there is persistent
pursuit of modernity and modernization, but without equating it with
Westernization.

King points out that with the recent economic success and creation

of stable modern societies in Asia, the Four Dragons and the rapidly modernizing China, in particular, have been reflexively reexamining their indigenous roots. On a societal level this development can be seen in the resurgence of East Asian values and tradition, while on an intellectual level there is a strong attempt to blend modern values with indigenous ones, which King regards as parts of the search for a modern identity. This reappreciation of tradition is embedded in an awareness that certain key facets and values of Western modernity have become intrinsic parts of East Asian life.

King emphasizes that a Chinese form of modernity can be convincing only if it has equally universal significance and if it contributes to a commonly shared faith in universal normative standards and social patterns. In a far more optimistic view than Wakeman's, King concludes that the "glocalization"[23] of East Asia can already be considered a viable alternative form of modernity. It has been partly shaped by the West, yet it moves along a different trajectory.

In the subsequent discussion of the European experience, Hartmut Kaelble and Bernhard Giesen explore different aspects of the history of European self-understanding. Whereas Kaelble traces the main patterns and developments in the conceptions of Europe throughout the twentieth century, Giesen explores the possible foundations of a European identity from a more contemporary perspective.

For the period between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, Kaelble distinguishes five major conceptions of Europe and its relation to other world regions. These conceptions, which partly overlap, are those of European superiority, of the threatened Europe, of Europe as part of the global modernization, of Europe as one civilization among others, and of European unity in diversity. Kaelble maintains that even though different notions were dominant at different times, traces of each of them can be found in the debates during the period under analysis. Consequently, Kaelble offers a periodization of European self-understanding in three main eras that he relates to a wider historical context.

First there was an "era of doubts" before World War I, in which European superiority was still widely taken for granted, but in which the idea of ever-continuing progress with Europe as its leader became questionable. In the "era of crisis," which lasted from World War I

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[23] See Robertson 1992, 173-4; Robertson 1995.

until the 1960s, the theme of European superiority was given up in
the face of the destruction of the continent, its loss of influence, and
the dangers it had to face from outside and from within. Yet, as Kael-
ble shows, it was during this time that intellectuals and travelers start-
ed to identify themselves as Europeans and not only as members of a
nation-state. In the third era, starting in the 1960s, which Kaelble
labels the "return of confidence," the definition of Europe has focused
on the creative potential of its internal diversity. With the image of
Europe as a global power having been replaced by the notion of its
being one of several equal world regions, intellectual and other
debates became more closely related to the project of political unifica-
tion. The European has ceased to be a merely academic construction.

Kaelble emphasizes that the shift in the themes of European dis-
course was related to but not directly linked with changes in the conti-
nent's social particularities. He argues that some of these particulari-
ties, such as the family household or a high percentage of industrial
labor, distinguished Europe from other world regions up to the mid-
dle of the twentieth century but ceased to do so thereafter. Other fea-
tures, such as European city life, the welfare state, and a distinct type
of mass consumerism, still remain exceptional in a global context.
Even though these particularities might be seen as aspects of a distinc-
tively European form of modernity, they do not figure prominently in
the debates on a European identity.

Following Kaelble, Bernhard Giesen offers some challenging ideas
about the outlines of and possible bases of a European identity. He
explores to what extent a European identity can be based on a consti-
tution alone, and in what ways Europe could be constructed as a cul-
tural movement. For the constitutional camp loosely associated with
Habermas, Giesen identifies four ideal-typical constitutional regimes
that are equally rooted in the European past: the city-state, the tradi-
tional empire, enlightened absolutism, and the modern nation-state.
According to Giesen, each of these historical models would be inapt
as a foundation for a contemporary Europe, since none comprises all
the essential features, such as inclusive citizenship, a strong political
center, and a demos with a common identity, as the ultimate subject
of political sovereignty.

Giesen points out that to a significant degree the European nation-
state rested on the modern assumption of the people's building a col-
lective body prior to any constitution, legal system, and public sphere.
As for the possible foundation of a European demos, Giesen discusses

three historical models of cultural heritage: the translation of an embodied cultural heritage, a common missionary universalism that in contrast to the idea of translation presupposes historical discontinuity, and a community of memory. For Giesen, only the last can serve as a basis for a common and distinct European identity — however, not as the memory of a revolutionary birth of the demos, which is nationally confined and thus lacking in the European case. As an alternative collective memory he suggests historical trauma, which is compatible with the current trend of turning away from historical triumphalism. As Giesen points out, the atrocities of World War II and the Holocaust have already become an essential part of identity building in all European nations, and memories of involvement in the Shoah are beginning to serve as a common bond between European nations, leading to a new culture of ritual confessions of guilt. In his conclusion Giesen points out why such confessions of guilt actually prove to have a healing and revitalizing effect, which means that they can serve as the cornerstone of a common identity for all European people.

Although most of the contributions in the chapters summarized above address cultural factors when exploring the problem of multiple modernities, Richard Whitley and Gordon Redding add the perspective of the structural economist. Whitley focuses mainly on differences in formal institutions between business cultures; Redding expands his model by integrating into it informal institutions such as value systems and patterns of behavior. Although the types of economic systems that Whitley distinguishes can comprise nation-states in several world regions, Redding's typology is more closely tied to single cultural zones.

Whitley develops a typology of five major versions of market economies based on specific combinations of ten generic institutional features that characterize the status and influence of the state, the financial system, the work force (development) and trust and authority relations. Because these features do not combine randomly but are mutually reinforcing, they can be combined to describe five types of market economies. Two of these show a low level of market regulation by the state. Therefore, the "arm's length" type is based on high and the "particularistic" type on low trust in formal institutions. The other three types display a high level of market regulation. When this is combined with the willingness of a dominant state to share risks with private owners and with a lack of intermediaries, it is called the "dirigiste" type. For

the "corporatist" and the "state-guided" types the opposite applies: low risk sharing and strong intermediaries. In the case of the corporatist type, these features are combined with a strong public training system and strong unions, both of which are absent in the state-guided type.

Whitley goes on to show how the features of the institutional structure lead to specific business-system characteristics such as the owner-manager relationship, the owner integration, and the interfirm and employer-employee relations. Whitley's typologies, which he understands as depicting dynamic systems, enable him to draw important conclusions about the ability of single capitalisms to handle change. As already shown by Soskice,[24] different institutional settings are predisposed to different kinds and amounts of change. "Coordinated market economies" like Germany, Sweden, or Switzerland are more prone to incremental change in established technologies, while "liberal market economies" like the United States or the United Kingdom are more open to radical innovations in new technologies. In this context Whitley points out two important additional facets: the endogenous dynamics between institutional structures and business systems on the one hand, and the consequences of international cooperation and competition on the other.

Building on Whitley's model, Redding argues that the social scientists and economists such as Whitley have emphasized the influence of formal institutions at the expense of informal institutions, that is, culture. Therefore he sets out to supplement Whitley's system with a cultural dimension. Redding uses rationality, identity, and authority to conceptualize culture. With identity and authority he refers to norms governing horizontal and vertical social order, which comes close to the trust and authority relations Whitley distinguishes. Redding's main argument rests, however, on the role of rationality. Here he builds on Max Weber's distinction between value rationality (*Wertrationalität*) and instrumental rationality (*Zweckrationalität*). In discussing the interrelatedness of these two aspects of substantive rationality (*materiale Rationalität*),[25] Redding makes an important theoretical contribution and points out significant real-world implications.

On a theoretical level, Redding aims to overcome the cleavage between theories focusing on either instrumental or value rationality

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[24] See Hall and Soskice 2001b.
[25] Substantive rationality has to be differentiated from formal rationality, of course, but the latter is not so central for Redding's argument.

— a divide going back to Adam Smith and Emile Durkheim. On a practical level, he maintains that Western (economic) culture so far has focused mainly on instrumental rationality, symbolized by *homo oeconomicus*. According to Redding, this partial blindness has become dysfunctional in two ways. First, it distorts our understanding of ourselves and of our Western reality; second, it tends to make non-Western cultures that emphasize value rationality incomprehensible to the Western observer.

In the book's epilogue, Jens Riedel takes stock of what can be learned from the preceding chapters from a business perspective. He briefly compares the multiple modernities perspective with other approaches that seek to provide insights into intercultural management issues, namely, the fields of cross-cultural psychology, international political economy, and cross-cultural management studies. To demonstrate the practical relevance of the multiple modernities perspective to real business problems, Riedel contrasts it with a diametrically opposed view. Such a view can be derived from modernization theories claiming the worldwide homogenization of societal and business structures and interactions. Riedel holds that this view is in many cases explicitly — and even more often implicitly — applied to business situations, which can turn out to be counterproductive, if not detrimental. Explicit support of a view of heterogeneity akin to the multiple modernities perspective is shown to be limited mainly to marketing and to the rhetoric of CEOs.

Further, Riedel discusses the implications of the multiple modernities perspective for individual companies and for business as an actor in society. According to him, the formulation of business strategies can be enriched by the multiple modernities perspective, as it opens up a realm for decisions. It enables managers to make explicit choices between homogeneity and diversity as required by the business problem at hand.

With its collection of historical, sociological, philosophical, and economic essays, this book provides a broad overview of the most important academic approaches to multiple modernities. In addition, it touches on a wide variety of *problematiques* for which the concept of multiple modernities might prove to be highly relevant. Among these are, to name a few, identity building, the question of universal values, social transformations, and the divergence of economic cultures. Furthermore, the reader of this book will also get an insight into some culturally and geographically specific encounters with modernity.

When added together, all these perspectives and theories, experiences and visions, may deepen readers' understanding of the diverse yet related character of forms of modernity and our world in general.

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PART B

MULTIPLE MODERNITIES

PARAMETERS OF THE DISCUSSION

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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON MULTIPLE MODERNITIES

Shmuel N. Eisenstadt

Multiple Modernities Defined

The notion of multiple modernities goes against the view of many of the classical theories of sociology and above all the theories of modernization and of the convergence of traditional societies that were very influential after World War II. Those views assumed that the cultural program of modernity as it developed in modern Europe and the associated basic institutional constellations would ultimately prevail in all modernizing and modern societies.

The concept of multiple modernities goes also against two very influential recent theses about the contemporary world, that of the "end of history" as promulgated by F. Fukuyama and that of the "clash of civilizations" as promulgated by S. P. Huntington.

Contrary to these views, the idea of multiple modernities presumes that the best way to understand the contemporary world — indeed to explain the history of modernity — is to see it as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs and cultural patterns of modernity.[1]

One of the most important implications of the term "multiple modernities" is that modernity and westernization are not identical. Western patterns of modernity are not the only authentic modernities, though they enjoy historical precedence and continue to be a basic reference point for others.

It is central to the analysis of continually changing multiple modernities that such distinctive patterns, different in many radical ways from the "original" European ones, crystallized not only in non-Western societies, in societies that developed in the framework of the various great civilizations — Muslim, Indian, Buddhist, or Confucian — under the impact of European expansion and in their ensuing confrontation with the European program of modernity. They evolved also — indeed first of all — within the framework of the Western

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[1] For greater detail, see Eisenstadt, *Daedalus* 2000, and the entire issue.

expansion in societies in which seemingly purely Western institutional frameworks developed in the Americas.

In these Western institutional and cultural frameworks, derived and brought over from Europe, there developed not just local variations of the European model or models, but radically new institutional and ideological patterns. Whereas it was sometimes assumed that European patterns of modern development were repeated in the Americas, it is now clear that North America, Canada, and Latin America developed from the start in distinctive ways. Indeed, throughout the Americas we can trace the crystallization of new civilizations, and not just, as Louis Hartz claimed, of "fragments" of Europe.[2] It is quite possible that this was the first crystallization of new civilizations since that of the great "axial" civilizations and also the last to date. The crystallization of modernity in the Americas attests that even within the broad framework of Western civilization — however defined — there developed not just one but multiple cultural programs and institutional patterns of modernity.

This view of multiple modernities entails certain assumptions about the nature of modernity. The first is that modernity is to be viewed as a distinct civilization, with distinct institutional and cultural characteristics. According to this view, the core of modernity is the crystallization and development of mode or modes of interpretation of the world, or, to follow Cornelius Castoriadis' terminology, of a distinct social "imaginaire," indeed of the ontological vision, of a distinct cultural program, combined with the development of a set or sets of new institutional formations — the central core of both being, as we shall see later in more detail, an unprecedented openness and uncertainty.

This civilization, the distinct cultural program with its institutional implications, crystallized first in Western Europe and then expanded to other parts of Europe, to the Americas, and later throughout the world, giving rise to continually changing cultural and institutional patterns that constituted different responses to the challenges and possibilities inherent in the core characteristics of the distinct civilizational premises of modernity.

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[2] See Hartz 1964; Eisenstadt 1982. For discussions about the unity and diversity of the historical experience of the Americas see Hanke 1964.

The Cultural and Political Program of Modernity

The modern project, the cultural and political program of modernity as it developed first in the West, in Western and Central Europe, entailed distinct ideological as well as institutional premises. It entailed some sharp shifts in the conception of human agency, of its autonomy, and of its place in the flow of time. It entailed a conception of the future in which various possibilities that can be realized by autonomous human agency — or by the march of history — are open. The core of this program has been that the premises and legitimation of the social, ontological, and political order were no longer taken for granted; there developed a very intensive reflexivity around the basic ontological premises as well as around the bases of social and political order of authority – a reflexivity that was shared by even the most radical critics of this program, who in principle denied the legitimacy of such reflexivity.

The core of this cultural program has perhaps been most successfully formulated by Weber. To follow James D. Faubian's exposition of Weber's conception of modernity:

> Weber finds the existential threshold of modernity in a certain deconstruction: of what he speaks of as the "ethical postulate that the world is a God-ordained, and hence somehow meaningfully and ethically oriented cosmos..."
>
> ... What he asserts — what in any event might be extrapolated from his assertions — is that the threshold of modernity has its epiphany precisely as the legitimacy of the postulate of a divinely preordained and fated cosmos has its decline; that modernity emerges, that one or another modernity can emerge, only as the legitimacy of the postulated cosmos ceases to be taken for granted and beyond reproach. Countermoderns reject that reproach, believe in spite of it...
>
> ... One can extract two theses: Whatever else they may be, modernities in all their variety are responses to the same existential problematic. The second: whatever else they may be, modernities in all their variety are precisely those responses that leave the problematic in question intact, that formulate visions of life and practice neither beyond nor in denial of it but rather within it, even in deference to it...[3]

It is because all such responses leave the problematic intact that the reflexivity that developed in the program of modernity went beyond

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[3] Faubion 1993, 113-115.

that which crystallized in the axial civilizations. The reflexivity in the modern program focused not only on the possibility of different interpretations of the transcendental visions and basic ontological conceptions prevalent in a society or societies, but came to question the very givenness of such visions and of the institutional patterns related to them. It gave rise to awareness that many such visions and patterns existed and that such visions and conceptions can indeed be contested.[4]

This awareness was closely connected with two central components of the modern project, emphasized in the early studies of modernization by Dan Lerner and later by Alex Inkeles. The first component is the recognition, among those becoming and being modernized — as illustrated by the famous story in Lerner's book about the grocer and the shepherd — of the possibility of undertaking a great variety of roles beyond any fixed or ascriptive ones, and the concomitant receptivity to different messages that promulgate such open possibilities and visions. Second, there is the recognition of the possibility of belonging to wider translocal, possibly also changing, communities.[5]

Concomitantly, closely related to such awareness and central to this cultural program there developed an emphasis on the autonomy of man; his or her, but in the initial formulation of this program certainly "his" — emancipation from the fetters of traditional political and cultural authority and the continuous expansion of the realm of personal and institutional freedom and activity. Such autonomy entailed several dimensions: first, reflexivity and exploration; and second, active construction, mastery of nature, possibly including human nature, and of society. In parallel, this program entailed a very strong emphasis on the autonomous participation of members of society in the constitution of social and political order and its constitution; on autonomous access by all members of the society to these orders and their centers.

Out of the conjunctions of these conceptions there developed a belief that society could be actively formed by conscious human activity. Two basic complementary but also potentially contradictory views of the best ways to do this developed within this program. First, the program as it crystallized above all in the Great Revolutions gave rise, perhaps for the first time in human history, to the belief that it

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[4] See Eisenstadt 1982.
[5] See Lerner 1958; Inkeles and Smith 1974.

was possible to bridge the gap between the transcendental and mundane orders, to realize through conscious human actions in the mundane orders, in social life, some of the utopian, eschatological visions: Second, there was increasing acceptance of the legitimacy of multiple individual and group goals and interests and of multiple interpretations of the common good.[6]

The modern program also entailed a radical transformation of the conceptions and premises of the political order, of the constitution of the political arena, and of the characteristics of the political process. The core of the new conceptions was the breakdown of traditional legitimation of the political order, the concomitant opening up of different possibilities for constructing such order, and the consequent contestation about how political order was be constructed by human actors. It combined orientations of rebellion and intellectual antinomianism with strong orientations toward center formation and institution-building, giving rise to social movements and movements of protest as a component of the political process.

These conceptions were closely connected with the transformation of the basic characteristics of the modern political arena and processes. The most important of these characteristics were, first, the openness of this arena and of the political process; second, a strong emphasis on at least potentially active participation by the periphery of society, by all its members, in the political arena. Third were the strong tendencies of the centers to permeate the periphery and of the periphery to impinge on the center, blurring the distinctions between center and periphery. Fourth, was the combination of the charismatization of the center or centers with the incorporation of themes and symbols of protest — equality and freedom, justice and autonomy, solidarity and identity. They became central components of the modern project of human emancipation. It was indeed the incorporation of such themes of protest in the center that heralded the radical transformation of various sectarian utopian visions from peripheral views to central components of the political and cultural program.

This program entailed also a distinctive way of constructing the boundaries of collectivities and collective identities. There developed new concrete definitions of the basic components of collective identities — the civil, primordial, and universalistic and transcendental "sacred" ones — and of the ways they were institutionalized. There

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[6] See Eisenstadt 1992.

developed, first, a strong tendency to make them absolute in ideological terms. Second, their civil components became increasingly important,; and third, the construction of political boundaries and those of the cultural collectivities became closely connected. Fourth, territorial boundaries for such collectivities were emphasized and a continual tension between their territorial and/or particular components and broader, potential universal ones developed. At the same time, the most distinct characteristic of the construction of collectivites, very much in line with the general core characteristics of modernity, was that such construction was continually problematized. Collective identities were no longer taken as given or as preordained by some transcendental vision and authority, or by perennial customs. They constituted foci of contestations and struggles, often couched in highly ideological terms.[7]

A central component in the construction of collective identities was the self-perception of a society as "modern," as the bearer of the distinct cultural and political program – and its relations from this point of view to other societies — be it those societies which claim to be — or are seen as — bearers of this program, and various "others."

Trust in Modern Societies

The crystallization of the modern institutional formations has generated, in modern societies, some distinct problems of trust. The place of trust in social interaction and institution-building evinces some paradoxical dimensions and complexities. The most basic paradox is that although trust does indeed constitute a precondition for the continuity of any long-range social interactions, it is not naturally given but continually constructed and reconstructed, and hence also fragile. By trust I mean, following Claus Offe:

> ... Trust is the *belief* that others will do certain things or refrain from doing certain things. The truster knows that the action of the trusted others will have consequences for his own welfare, and that for this reason there is a *risk* involved in trusting. Trust is a reflectively fallible ex ante guess. It follows the logic: "I know it *can* happen, yet I believe it *won't happen*" with "it" being some undesired event caused by the trusted.

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[7] See Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995; Shils 1975.

The dynamics of trust-building can be represented on the time axis. Trust, once its necessary and sufficient conditions are met, is a steady state capable of reproducing itself. What is associated with this steady state is a perception of predictability, consistency, robustness concerning the behavior of relevant others... He should always remain faithful to shared beliefs and values and perform competently accordingly and will continue to do so in the future — at least in the absence of irritating events and perceptions that lead the actor to reconsider whom to trust, to what extent to trust, and in what respects. In the absence of such irritating events, a trust relation is self-enforcing...[8]

But trust is inherently fragile. It is fragile first of all because it entails a strong element of uncertainty, of risk. This risk results, to follow Margaret Levi,

from the fact that the truster is *unable to make sure* or *know for certain* that the other person(s) will actually act in the way preferred by the truster. The means by which he might be able to make this sure — coercive *power*, economic resources to be employed as *incentives*, and certain *knowledge* derived from direct observation or tested causal theories — are not at the disposal of the truster.[9]

The fragility of trust is exacerbated in any broader institutional setting because the conditions that make for maintenance of trust are seemingly best met in relatively limited ranges of social activities or interaction, such as in family, kinship, or small territorial groups in which social interaction is regulated according to primordial and/or particularistic criteria. Such limited ranges of interaction seem to constitute the necessary minimal conditions for the initial development of trust, even if they may not be enough to guarantee its continuity. At the same time, however, these very conditions may be inimical to the development of resources and activities needed to develop and institutionalize broader institutional complexes. The very processes that generate the resources needed to construct such broader institutional settings also tend to undermine the trust that develops within the family, or kinship groups or in small communities — but at the same time such construction cannot be effective without strong components of trust being built into it.

The institutionalization of such broader complexes depends on the availability of "free" resources[10] that are not embedded in relatively

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[8] Offe 1996, 3-4.
[9] See Offe 1996, 3.
[10] See Eisenstadt 1993.

closed and limited ascriptive settings. But unless the use of such resources is regulated in some way, their very development may create a situation of anarchy or of irregulated conflict — almost the original Hobbesian state of nature. Such regulation may of course be in principle effected by purely coercive means. But even if coercive elements constitute a crucial component in all such regulation — the effectiveness of purely coercive regulation for broader creative institution building is rather limited. Continuous institution building, the crystallization, continuity, and transformability of broader institutional complexes, depends to no small extent on the interweaving of purely utilitarian considerations and coercive components with the establishment of broader frameworks of trust — that is, on the effective extension of trust, its symbols and the normative obligations they imply, beyond the minimal scope of primordial units. Such extension is found, for example, in the depiction of rulers as "fathers" of their countries.[11]

Such extension entails the *generalizability* of trust beyond "narrow," particularistic settings. But such generalizability, connected as it is with the interweaving of trust in broader institutional settings with utilitarian considerations and with coercive components of regulation, necessarily generates contradictions and tensions with regard to the criteria for social interaction and for allocation of resources. Such contradictions and tensions arise first between criteria rooted in relatively small and particularistic settings and those derived from broader ones, and second between the criteria derived from different — for instance, religious or political collectivities, each of which is populated by different social actors, especially by different elites and influencers, and coalitions thereof.

The problems of the extension of trust and its generalizability exist in all societies. They become especially visible in more complex or differentiated societies in all of which develop special social mechanisms to cope with them, with different degrees of success. But the nature of the problems and the mechanisms differs greatly between different societies. In the axial civilizations, for instance, there emerged autonomous elites that were crucial in the crystallization of distinct types of institutional formations that were not embedded in various ascriptive — family, kinship, and narrow territorial — settings, such as distinct civilizational or religious collectivities, as well as

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[11] See Eisenstadt 1995.

different types of autonomous centers distinct from their peripheries that were constructed according to broad universalistic principles. Even the permeation of the family units (and of the periphery in general) by the center was to some extent legitimized in terms of universalistic principles. There developed a break in the transition from the various particularistic — family, local and the like — settings to the broader ones, and potential confrontation between trust defined in various particularistic terms and the claims of various universalistic principles. The problem of how to interweave the primordial-particularistic orientations with universalistic ones constituted in all these civilizations a potential point of contention. The Confucian controversy over the relative priority of filial piety and loyalty to one's lord is but one illustration of the potential confrontations that developed in all axial civilizations.

Moreover, in all these societies there could also develop contestations between the bearers of different broader, even universalistic principles or visions, be they political, religious, or cultural.

In all these societies there developed different regulatory frameworks, such as legal and bureaucratic ones, as well as voluntary associations and public spheres not embedded in closed particularistic settings, structured according to some formal and rational universalistic principles that attempted to regulate or mediate between such contesting claims. The efficacy of such regulation has depended on these frameworks being legitimized not only in terms of their own internal formal rational criteria but also in the broader symbols of collective identity and solidarity, and the core symbols of the respective societies. It is only insofar as such legitimation is indeed crystallized that trust rooted in various narrow, particularistic settings is successfully generalized and extended; the rupture of the transition to broader settings, and to the institutional frameworks organized according to universalistic principles, is mitigated, and the flow of such generalized trust between different sectors of society and between them and the broader frameworks and central institutions of their respective societies is effected.

This problem of trust has been exacerbated in modern societies first by the combination of their structural characteristics, that is their great structural differentiation and the development of autonomous differentiated institutional systems, and of the core characteristics of the modern political process, above all the various aspects of its openness. Second, the problematic of trust is exacerbated in modern soci-

eties because the major dimensions of social order, the production and distribution of economic resources, the regulation of power, and collective identities have been constructed by different, autonomous carriers, different elites or representatives of different groups and interests. Each has usually held a distinctive vision, and the relations between them, and between them and the central institutions, especially the open modern political process, are not given and cannot be taken for granted.

These problems are continually exacerbated by the structural characteristics of the modern political process: how political support is mobilized and the relations between the mobilization of such support and governance as manifest in the promulgation of policies and their implementation. In these circumstances there are greater opportunities for the breakdown of trust between different sectors of society and between them and the central institutions but also new opportunities for flexibility, openness, and new linkages among them.

Continuous Change of Cultural and Institutional Patterns

Such possibilities for the breakdown or reconstruction of linkages of trust change continually in modern societies on all levels of social interaction and organization and on all these levels they constitute one of the persistent challenges to the continuity of these societies.

The concrete contours of the different cultural and institutional patterns of modernity as they crystallized in different societies have indeed been continually changing, because of the combination of the tensions inherent in the cultural and political program of modernity and the continual institutional social, political and economic developments attendant on the development and expansion of modernity.

The institutional and cultural contours of modernities changed, first as a result of the internal dynamics of the technological, economic, political, and cultural arenas as they developed in different societies and expanded beyond them.

Second, the contours changed with the political struggles and confrontations between different states, and between different centers of political and economic power, and later through the continual expansion of European, American, and Japanese modernity. Such confrontations developed within Europe with the crystallization of the modern European state system and became further intensified with

the crystallization of "world systems" from the sixteenth or seventeenth century on.

Third, the shifting hegemonies in the different international systems that developed in the wake of developments in the economic, political, technological, and cultural arenas and in centers thereof brought about further change.[12]

A fourth cause of change were the continual confrontations between interpretations promulgated by different centers and elites, and the concrete developments, conflicts, and displacements that accompanied the institutionalization of these premises.

Fifth, these confrontations activated the consciousness of the contradictions inherent in the cultural program of modernity and the potentialities conferred by its openness and reflexivity; and gave rise to the continual reinterpretation by different social actors, especially the different social movements, of the major themes of this program, and of the basic premises of the civilizational visions, and of the concomitant grand narratives and myths of modernity.

Sixth, the very expansion of modernity entailed confrontation between the concrete premises and institutional formations that developed in Western and Northern Europe and other parts of Europe and later in the Americas and Asia: in the Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, and Japanese civilizations.

The continual changeability of the institutional and ideological patterns of modernity indicates that the history of modernity is best seen as a story of continual development and formation, constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs of modernity and distinctively modern institutional patterns, and of different self-conceptions of societies as modern — of multiple modernities.[13]

The development and expansion of modernity was not, contrary to the optimistic views of modernity as progress, peaceful. It bore within it very destructive possibilities, which were indeed voiced, and also often promulgated, by some of its most radical critics, who saw modernity as a morally destructive force, and emphasized the negative effects of some of its core characteristics. The crystallization of the first modernity and the development of later forms were continu-

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[12] See Tiryakian 1985; Tiryakian 1991; Tiryakian 1994.
[13] See Eisenstadt 2000 and the entire *Daedalus* volume (Winter 2000) devoted to this topic.

ally interwoven with internal conflicts and confrontations, rooted in the contradictions and tensions attendant on the development of capitalist systems and, in the political arena, the growing demands for democratization. They were interwoven with international conflicts as well, in the framework of the modern state and imperialist systems. Above all they were closely interwoven with wars and genocides, repressions and exclusions constituted continual components thereof. Wars and genocide were not, of course, new in the history of mankind. But they became radically transformed and intensified, generating continuous tendencies toward specifically modern barbarism, the most important manifestation of which was the incorporation of violence, terror, and war in an ideological framework, manifest first in the French Revolution. This transformation emerged from the interweaving of wars with the basic constitutions of nation-states, with those states becoming the most important agent — and arena — of the constitution of citizenship and symbols of collective identity; from the crystallization of the modern European state system; from European expansion beyond Europe; and from the development of the technologies of communication and of war.

The multiple and divergent modernities of the "classical" age of modernity crystallized during the nineteenth century and above all the first six or seven decades of the twentieth century in the different territorial nation-states, revolutionary states, and social movements that developed in Europe, in the Americas, and in Asian and African societies. The institutional and symbolic, ideological contours of the modern national and revolutionary states and movements that were seen as the epitome of modernity have changed drastically with the intensification of globalization. These changes are manifest in growing movements of autonomy among world capitalist forces, strong international migrations, and the concomitant elevation of social problems such as prostitution and delinquency to an international scale. All of these trends reduce the control of the nation-state over its own economic and political affairs, despite the continual strengthening of "technocratic" rational secular policies in various arenas, such as in education and family planning. At the same time the nation-states have lost some of their partial monopoly on internal and international violence to local and international groups of separatists or terrorists without any nation-state or the concerted activities of nation states being able to control the continually recurring occurrences of such violence. Concomitantly the process of globalization has been

closely connected to the cultural arena, with expansion especially through the major media in many countries around the world, including western ones such as European ones or Canada, of what were seemingly uniform hegemonic American cultural programs or visions.

Above all, the ideological and symbolic centrality of the nation and revolutionary state, of its being perceived as the charismatic locus of the major components of the cultural program of modernity and of collective identity, has been weakened, and new political, social, and civilizational visions and visions of collective identity have developed. These new visions and identities were promulgated by several types of new social movements. Such movements, which generally developed in Western countries included the women's and the ecological movements, and were all closely related to or rooted in the student and anti-Vietnam war movements of the late sixties and seventies. They were indicative of a more general shift in many "capitalist" and communist countries from movements oriented toward the state to more local ones. The fundamentalist movements that developed in Muslim, Protestant, and Jewish communities, the communal religious movements that developed, for example, in the Hinduist and Buddhist ones, and the various particularistic "ethnic" movements and identities that constituted deformations of classic models of the nation- or revolutionary state gained momentum, especially in the last two decades of the twentieth century in former republics of the Soviet Union but also in most terrifying ways in Africa and in part of the Balkans, especially in the former Yugoslavia.

These movements developed in tandem with the crystallization of new social settings and frameworks that also went beyond the classic model of the nation-state. A few of the most important such settings were the Muslim, Chinese, and Indian diasporas, and the new types of ethnic minorities like for instance the Russian ones that emerged in many of the successor states of the Soviet Union.

In these, and in many other settings, there crystallized new types of collective identities often promulgated by movements that went beyond the models of the nation-state and which were no longer focused on it. Many of these hitherto seemingly "subdued" identities — ethnic, regional, local, and transnational alike — moved in a highly reconstructed way into the centers of their respective societies and often into the international arena. They contested the hegemony of the older homogenizing programs, claiming their own autonomous

places in central institutional arenas — be they educational programs, or public communications and media — and often they demand a redefinition of citizenship and the rights and entitlements connected with it. In these settings local dimensions have often been brought together in new ways with transnational ones such as for instance, the European Union; or with broad religious identities, many rooted in the world's great religions, but reformulated in modern ways.

At the same time, there have been continuous shifts in the relative hegemony of different centers of modernity — first in Europe and the United States and later in Asia — shifts that are intimately connected with growing contestations between the centers over their presumed hegemonic standing.[14]

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[14] See Tiryakian 1994.

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MULTIPLE MODERNITIES — THE CONCEPT AND ITS POTENTIAL

Dominic Sachsenmaier

Multiple Modernities beyond Academic Discourse

The multiple modernities approach acknowledges that modern societies have many central features in common, yet at the same time it emphasizes the persistent differences between them in terms of mentalities, institutions, and other factors. Like some other recent developments in the social sciences,[1] "multiple modernities" thus departs from schools treating modernization and Westernization as closely related processes. However, as I will argue in this essay, the potential contribution of the multiple modernities paradigm reaches far beyond the realm of academic discourse. Understanding modernity as a diversified phenomenon can be an important intellectual framework for an age in which cultural identities and the reaffirmation of primordial ties are rising quickly. In the near future, it will be a major intellectual, political, and also economic challenge to harmonize claims to diversity with global commonalities and responsibilities. An important step towards this telos might be to change mentalities that – consciously or unconsciously – still regard globalization and development as homogenizing processes.

In many national governments and in parts of the business world, there is still a strong conviction that economic and social success can be guided by one formula alone. For example, the idea that the structural conditions of Western societies only needed to be exported to other countries to make their societies move to a successful standard model underlay the World Bank's failed "shock therapy" in Russia during the early 1990s.[2] Likewise, both the World Trade Organization and the World Bank are still driven by a spirit that is relatively similar to the convergence paradigms of modernization theory. The leading players in international business are just beginning to discover

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[1] Heading in a similar direction is, for example, Roland Robertson's theory of "glocalization." See Robertson 1992.

[2] For more details and other examples, see Stiglitz 2002.

that economic theories, strategies, and practices cannot be simply unrolled from a Western context alone but have to be regionally adapted. But global powers and Western institutions are not the only ones clinging to convergence models.

In significant ways, radical countermovements have also rallied against the narrow perspective of modernity that they share with Westernizers in their region and beyond. As I show, many movements, such as religious fundamentalism, were — and still are — highly modern in their rhetoric and character. They see Western modernity, however, as an uncompromising force, a tightly knit system of values and institutions threatening to dissolve all other social systems. In other words, like the proponents of a global culture uniting all mankind, fundamentalists regard globalization and modernization as having the potential to overpower all cultural divergence. The crucial difference is that the latter do not believe in the promise of a global village. Whereas for the heirs of the Enlightenment the image of the globe expresses the great task of man to shape his own destiny, for many radical religious groups it symbolizes a small, too-small ball floating in an empty space devoid of sense and meaning.

As I discuss later in more detail, a potential contribution to reducing the growing tensions between Westernizers and anti-Western movements is to promote a culturally pluralistic notion of modernity. For this purpose, the concept of modernity must be broadened far beyond its currently prevalent image. First, it must be de-Westernized and pluralized beyond the homogenizing view historically rooted in the rapid emergence of a Western-centric world order during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the eyes of many, the images of the West and of modernity when combined develop a gravitational force that compresses both to the Weberian iron cage. If they are separated, both concepts can expand significantly. "The West" can encompass a humanistic and religious heritage that, except for the Protestant work ethic, has been rather ignored in reflections on the modern condition of Europe and the United States. Analogously, modernity can be understood to express a wider range of possibilities for institutional settings, sociopolitical orders, and value-systems.

One way to disassociate the concepts is to question the uniformity of Western modernity. Taking a historical look at modernity, one can clearly recognize that Western societies have continued to differ

significantly in their core mentalities and social structures.[3] But even more importantly, modern societies in other parts of the world are addressing the central *problematiques* of modernity in distinct ways outside the scope of Western possibilities.[4] This is, for example, the case with the inner workings of democratic nation-states in Asia. Even though democracy is commonly regarded as the epitome of political convergence, crucial factors, ranging from political cultures and social values to institutions and the structure of public spheres, continue to differ profoundly even among successful systems. The reason is that these essential parts of democracies and civil societies remain embedded in wider sociocultural contexts. Thus almost all dominant theoretical models of the nation-state and the preconditions for democracy remain unconvincing when applied to the experiences of the Four Dragons in East Asia and other political systems.[5]

Without a doubt, a tightly interconnected world is undergoing parallel transformative processes that are caused by technological innovations — like the IT revolution, shifts in working patterns, and the growing importance of multinational corporations — as well as other factors.[6] But even though the West has been the epicenter of these revolutions and evolutions for a long time, it was equally transformed by them, which is why it is not too convincing to see these processes simply as Westernization. As Inglehart and Baker have shown in a recent study of a large number of societies, there are in fact parallel value changes on a global scale, but these transformations remain culturally determined without causing convergence toward a standard model.[7] Furthermore, the growing significance of diaspora cultures[8] as well as the European effort to establish a historically new political

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[3] Particularly the differences between the North American and the European experiences have led scholars such as Shmuel Eisenstadt to assume that the former constituted the first new form of modernity outside Europe. Compare Eisenstadt, 2000.

[4] See Wagner 1999.

[5] A more detailed discussion is provided by Tonnesson and Antlov 1996. See also Smith 2000.

[6] See Geyer and Bright 1995, 1037.

[7] See Inglehart and Baker 2000. Inglehart explains the parallelism of these changes with similar educational demands and living standards occurring in the shift from industrial societies to service-oriented economies.

[8] For a discussion of Multiple Modernities and the transnationalization of identities and social structures, see Tambiah 2000.

order and constellation of identities[9] makes a distinction between the West as a homogenous entity and an equally stereotypical "rest" even less meaningful.

Before I reflect on the potential implications of an open, culturally pluralistic understanding of modernity for the current world system, I will depict the ambivalence inherent in understanding modernity in terms of Westernization. For many societies, following the Western path meant both hope for a better future and the threat of losing the indigenous heritage. It meant gaining freedom and self-determination, and it meant losing the safe havens of hereditary communities and value systems. In the following part of my argument, I will emphasize the main trajectories of anti-Western or antiliberal identity formation, in which a greatly reduced image of modernity or the West has always played an important role, both as an instrument of mass mobilization and as one of the root causes of rejectionist identities. I will then discuss how a wider notion of modernity can greatly enrich regional debates on the future of society. This set of questions will be regarded in the light of recent developments such as the challenge of globalization to the nation-state paradigm, shifts in identity patterns, and the prospects for an international civil society.

Needless to say, this discussion cannot provide a comprehensive historical overview of the relationship between tradition and modernity. By focusing the first part of my analysis on the image of modernity in Western social theory and rejectionist movements, I merely take two lines of investigation out of a far more complex constellation. For example, the wealth of reformist and earlier nativist movements will remain largely in the background of my study. Generally ignoring the hopes and fears of communism, I further narrow my scope to the image of modernity in the liberal capitalist sense. In addition, my depiction of modernity discourses does not fully consider the wealth of economic, social, and political factors that were essential for the emergence of rejectionist and other movements; I merely outline some correlations between geopolitical constellations and the ideas that I discuss. The conceptual equation of modernization with Westernization certainly grew with Europe's and later the United States' dominant position in the world. Furthermore, the experiences of steadily increasing integration in the international system, and of

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[9] See Castells 2000, 339 ff.

growing gaps between rich and poor and between developed and underdeveloped societies, seemed to suggest convergence as the only viable solution.[10]

The Ambivalence of Universalizing Visions

Understanding modernization as Westernization and understanding Westernization as uprooting indigenous resources has always been Janus-faced for developing societies. On the one hand, the expectation that society would converge toward a standard pattern carried great promise. It implied that any country could eventually reach the elevated status of the privileged societies, in terms of both living standards and international influence. On the other hand, there was a sense of radical loss: of personal dignity, of faith and social order, of history, and of values. In the eyes of many, the modernization process hollowed out cultural resources and left their skins in the form of museums and folklore. Out of this ambivalence emerged "tradition" as the great counterconcept to modernity, and in many regards it is right to state that as an intellectual search and an emotional yearning, tradition is an invention of modernity. The very fact that the European concept of the nation-state became the new venue for defining, preserving, and expressing this tradition displays the full scope of this double-natured relation to the West. Often the main aim of learning from the West stood in the context of defending the state against the West.

So from the West came a decisive threat and, paradoxically, also the hope of being saved. Since modernity tended to be equated with the West, it was often received with mixed feelings. The ambivalences of hope and despair, of humiliation and new dignity, of gaining and losing, of savior and threat, contributed to putting whole societies, faith communities, and other groups into a restless state. Time and again such a constellation proved to be strong enough to polarize social forces and spin them off to the extremes. The story of many countries' encounters with the modern condition, or better, with a global perception of modernity, is thus often a story of great internal turmoil. It is the story of efforts to reshape the domestic order for the

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[10] See Buzan and Little 2000, 388. For an overview of convergence debates, see Guillen 2001. For the historical context of modernization theory during the 1960's, see Latham 2000.

purpose of persisting in an international area in which only the fittest would survive.[11] And it is also the story of a complex relationship between the self and the modern as the other, full of self-contemptuous love and incestuous hatred, of admiration for Western or modern societies and of a burning desire to reach their status, to become like them. This student-teacher relationship often contributed to the emergence of feelings of repulsiveness for the Western model as the sole source of inspiration. Many societies struggled to maintain their dignity by rebelling against their own degradation to the peripheral position of a latecomer, a receiver, an admirer and devout disciple of the West.

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, one can distinguish different attempts to cope with the advent of modernity. Since the nature of modernity supposedly did not leave much middle ground, either absolute Westernization programs or radical rejectionist moves were rather common reactions. Another coping mechanism, which also presupposed that modernity and tradition were exclusive dichotomies, was to incorporate pure — that is, purportedly culturally neutral — science and technology, while leaving the assumed cultural heart untouched. But such efforts to keep modernity and tradition separate from each other tended to be rather short-lived. This was, for example, the case with the modernization efforts of the Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman Empire, the *Wakon, Yosei*-program in Japan, and Chinese Confucian reformism during the late nineteenth century. In many instances such movements were succeeded by more radical attempts at self-transformation, either in the form of outright Westernization, or as self-strengthening programs that stood against Western supremacy. The two related yet conflicting impulses of following the West and of self-affirmation often resulted in symptoms of "cultural schizophrenia."[12] Together with the sociopolitical and economic crises that often accompanied a country's intensified exposure to the international scene, this situation either agitated or paralyzed societies. In many instances, it made them strut and fret, toss and turn in their effort to establish a modern collective self.[13]

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[11] Social Darwinism was a common lens for understanding international relations during the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries. For its influence on China see Pusey 1983.

[12] For the term compare Shayegen 1992.

[13] See for example Dror 1971.

China's history during the past century and a half exemplifies the desperate jumps a country could take in the search for modernity and its search for a safe haven in a international sea that looked merciless from the home shores. On its way to modernity, the empire turned nation-state displayed an unceasing longing for a suitable state ideology or at least a common consensus that could harmonize China's international role with the civic identity of its people. This shared identity had to adapt the collective self to the new domestic and international conditions.[14] There were many contesting attempts in the race to be modern, each with a different international reference system but most assuming a decisive historical break between modernity and tradition. The several experimental routes to modernity include the May Fourth endeavor to Westernize the old Middle Kingdom, to get rid of a demonized past whose image in significant ways was constructed as an opposite to Western modernity. Moreover, the victory of communism was the victory of an ideology rooted in the Enlightenment tradition, which even though it stood against the Western powers equally devalued the Chinese tradition.[15]

Thus it is right to state that during the twentieth century many of China's pushes for modernization were accompanied by cultural autoaggression and iconoclasm. After a period of pro-Westernization movements during the 1980s, many Chinese intellectuals now recognize that their country has to find its own path to modernity.[16] Even today, however, China has not found a satisfying answer to the question of what kind of cultural self it can and ought to feed into its modernization process. The very fact that many thinkers and political leaders see China's particularities primarily in a specific form of socialism reveals their alienation from the Chinese past.[17] Generally speaking, they hold a highly stereotyped image of the Chinese heritage to be incompatible with an equally stereotyped image of modernization. Similar to Western modernization theorists, intellectuals of this camp depict the relation between Chinese tradition and

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[14] On the problem of establishing both international and domestic legitimacy see Habermas 1973, specifically for China see Dittmer and Kim 1993, 23. See also Pye 1971.

[15] For example, after the breakup of the Soviet Union Communism in its Maoist reading, China could position itself in an internationally leading role again: as the leader of all proletarian nations.

[16] See also Zhao 1998.

[17] Compare the contribution by Frederic Wakeman to this volume.

modernity as a relation between two exclusive forces that can succeed each other but never truly intermingle. For the future it remains to be seen whether those voices encouraging China to reconnect with its cultural resources in an open and tolerant way will spread to wider parts of society. It is difficult to imagine that the current sense of cultural insecurity and the recurrent tendency to understand the international arena in terms of hierarchy and competition can be overcome if the Chinese search for modernity is not combined with a healthy sense of historical rootedness.[18]

Radical Countermovements to Western Modernity

In many countries segments of society that understood modernization as Westernization recurrently competed with both reformist and rejectionist movements. In contrast to the Westernizers, the latter two shared the primary aim of preserving indigenous resources. Generally speaking, reformist movements tried to develop a broader notion of modernity that would make it possible to combine the modern project with regional diversity and cultural particularities. By contrast, rejectionist movements such as religious fundamentalism discarded Western modernity or even modernity as a whole in order to defend an alleged tradition.

Looking back at the history of the past 100 years, one can easily distinguish between two periods, in which contestations to the existing world order became particularly prevalent. As such, the first began after World War I, which had shaken faith in Europe as the spearhead of global development. The second began with the end of the Cold War, which had terminated the dichotomy between two antagonistic Enlightenment eschatologies: communism and capitalist liberalism.[19] Both periods were marked by a crisis of world hegemony, which loosened many political blocs and made it seemingly possible for societies to reshape their domestic order while revising their international status. A newly amorphous global system and rapidly changing socioeconomic conditions caused by accelerating internationalization led to common feelings of displacement, both at the level

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[18] For related current debates among Chinese intellectuals and the worrying trend of neonationalism see Lin 1999, chapters six and seven.

[19] After Wallerstein 1991, 2.

of nation-states and at the level of individuals. While the position of many states in the world system became particularly uncertain, large segments of their societies saw the conditions for their traditional existence and societal dignity endangered.

Such factors encouraged the rise of totalitarian movements around the world that not only mutually inspired each other in many cases, but also revealed some fundamental similarities in their ideologies. Among the radical totalitarian movements that emerged during the 1920s, the Japanese, German, and Italian cases are among the most renowned. Even though the root causes of all of these movements branch out into much wider grounds of socioeconomic conditions, history, and culture, they shared similar anxieties and hatreds. Among their common enemies were openness and pluralism — values of the modernity they combated. Japan shifted from the effort to leave East Asia articulated by the modernization architect Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835 – 1901) to the World War II ideology of overcoming modernity with a great revitalized East Asian civilization led by the Land of the Rising Sun.[20] Also German, Italian, and other believers in fascisms mobilized their forces with a rhetoric of regaining mastery of the nation's past and future.[21] But more importantly, a driving force behind these movements was the perception that the ethnic primordial, the national unconscious, was threatened by individualism, soulless rationalization, and mechanization. These Enlightenment forces could come either from communism or capitalist liberalism and were depicted as the pluralization and thus self-dissolution of the people. Against these alleged threats, the Nazi ideologues posited the ideology of a German elemental force, a monolithic collective will that, in Goebbel's words, would replace the idolization of the individual with the idolization of the *Volk*.[22] Similar to older European discourses,[23] one consequently tried to compensate for feelings of insecurity and humiliation by countering the dominant interpretation of modernity with superiority in values. The Nazis resolved the inherent contradiction with the country's own quest for power and technological supremacy by defining achievements in science and industry as

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[20] See Harootunian 2000.
[21] For the differences between the ideology of Japanese imperialism and German fascism see Eisenstadt 1998, 116ff.
[22] A revealing speech by Goebbels is paraphrased in Fest 1973, 581ff.
[23] See Wagner 1999, 40ff.

expressions of a primordial force: the German soul.[24] For the fascist ideologues this bellicose soul needed to be purified of elements that supposedly weakened its spirit. The prime example of such supposedly inimical forces was the Jews, who were depicted as domestic collaborators with the allegedly subverting forces of international capitalism and even Bolshevism.[25]

Since September 11 it has become particularly apparent that antipluralistic and anti-Western movements are on the rise again. Certainly, in the future, single nation-states or regional state clusters might eventually be driven by antiuniversal, uncompromising identities and act aggressively against any kind of otherness.[26] However, it is safe to state that today — in contrast to the 1920s and 1930s — defensive "traditionalisms" are proliferating less than previously from national contexts, but appear increasingly in the form of transnational religious networks. In essence, religious fundamentalists are denying the possibility of living under religious law in a modern context with its implicit tolerance. They equate the relegation of religion to the private sphere with the dissolution of faith and a collapse of social relations,[27] and they appeal to an alternative universalism of values that they hold to be superior to the essence of global culture as they perceive it.

While religious fundamentalism is a widespread phenomenon,[28] Islam has become the most significant source of inspiration for antiliberal movements as well as a seedbed of aggressive countermovements against the West, which is perceived as a homogenizing force. An amalgam of economic, political, demographic, and other social crises[29] has the potential to move an increasing number of forces to exclusivism or resistance identities that are posited against a

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[24] See Herf 1984.

[25] A very interesting collection of studies comparing anti-Semitism in Germany and other parts of central Europe with the persecution of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia is Chirot and Reid 1997.

[26] See also Castells 1997.

[27] See Juergensmeyer 2000, 212ff and 240.

[28] See Juergensmeyer 2000, who also discusses religious violence in the US, radical Zionism, Sikhism, and the Aum Shinrikyo sect in Japan.

[29] Many countries modernized very successfully on the state level, but failed to do so on an economic level. Together with the current demographic explosion, this discredits the validity of programs following a purely Western model. See Castells 1997, 18–19.

world order that is seen as being carried by the logic of domination and oppression.[30] Since the object of their defensive reactions in the name of a highly artificial but allegedly pure allegiance to the words of the prophet is not geographically bound, many radical Islamist movements are globally organized. They have tight networks of schools, organized transmission of ideas, and news channels. Many of these groups are openly attacking the nation-state, and they seek to replace secular societies and other allegedly Western models with a new religious unity across the old political boundaries. The promise of modernity's core programs, such as autonomy of action, the right to criticize, and the principle of subjectivity are perceived as forces unable to encompass any cultural alternative.[31] In the fundamentalist perspective, the modernity of the West arrives with an impact potential that necessitates a total rejection.

> So violence becomes the only form of self-affirmation of the new subject. . . . The neo-community then becomes a necro-community. The exclusion from modernity takes a religious meaning, thus self-immolation becomes the way to fight against exclusion.[32]

In summary, the totalitarianisms and fundamentalisms of the 1930s and today did not grow from a healthy self-confidence, but rather from neurotic feats of self-strengthening driven by a tormented collective self. In a total reconstruction of political and cultural realities, they tried to overcome the ambivalence of modernity by drawing cruelly distinct lines between the collective self and the other, a dividing line that was also held to mark the boundary between purity and impurity. It is a psychohistorically remarkable phenomenon that these quests for authenticity were mostly accompanied by fears of contamination and disgust with inner pluralism, which seemed to match the threat of being dissolved from outside. In their extremes, such movements sought to reconstitute the sociopolitical order as artificially designed and often brutally enforced uniformities with an all-encompassing worldview.[33] Particularly in the Japanese and the German cases, the escape from the perceived emotional drought of science and cognition ossified in the most ruthlessly mechanized social systems ever seen.

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[30] For a solid definition of resistance identities see Castells 1997, 8.
[31] Following Tibi 2000 and Castells 1997, 13ff.
[32] Khosrokhavar 1995. Translation in Castells 1997, 20.
[33] See Eisenstadt 1998, especially 66–68.

Despite their struggle for authenticity and self-defence, fascisms and religious fundamentalisms greatly resemble each other in their rhetoric, psychology, and even to some extent their actions. This is partly because they founded themselves in direct opposition to a shared stereotype. To a significant degree, their projected collective selves were mirror reflections of a set of global images that were directly or indirectly related to a universalizing understanding of modernity. Among the images against which totalitarian countermovements rally are liberal capitalism, the West, and pluralization as well as differentiation. In other words, these movements are equally opposed to pluralism and openness — the values of the modernity they combat. Through expressing the desire not to be part of the open form of modernity, fascisms, fundamentalisms, and related movements reveal their inability to act independently from their power structures and dominant discourses. Their effort to reduce diversity and to construct closed ideological universes has always carried them further and further away from any set cultural resources. In fact, they ended up in a very dark kind of modernity that Shmuel Eisenstadt has termed the "Jacobin-totalitarian" version.[34]

Forms of Identity beyond the Nation-State

The rising tide of religious fundamentalism is the ugly side of a wider, mostly peaceful shift in identity patterns[35] that needs to be considered when reflecting on the future of our world. True, in many cases religious, ethnic, and other nonnational identities have led to eruptions of religious and ethnic violence. This has occurred in many areas, such as parts of India, the former Yugoslavia, and the Caucasus. In cases such as the European Union, however, the new transnational identities have the potential to pluralize political commitments. As I show, this can be seen as a potentially promising development for intrasocietal tolerance and for the future of the world community at large.[36] Under favorable conditions, identities beyond the nation-state can make societies more open and inclusive than most purely national allegiances have ever allowed.

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[34] Eisenstadt 1998.
[35] Certainly these new forms of identities are not more or less authentic, more or less artificial than nationalisms.
[36] See Habermas 1998, 114ff.

Most nation-states are founded on the assumption that the people as the political sovereigns constituted a cultural, ethnic, or historical unity prior to state citizenship. Often the quest to assume a clearly definable demos led to the equation of ethnic boundaries with political ones,[37] even though the state territory was often no more than the outcome of mere historical coincidences. In numerous cases around the world such a constellation has led to discrimination against certain groups, if not to attempts at forced homogenization. This becomes particularly apparent when one considers that currently in only about two dozen states do linguistic communities roughly match national borders: in more than half of the approximately 190 countries in the world, less than 70 percent of the population speaks the same language.[38] The problem of the nation-state's identity is not a problem of adequate size and boundaries alone, for political entities of any size will encompass minorities, newly conscious or of long standing, who are either different peoples within the territory or migrant minorities.

Much has been written lately about the decline of the nation-state as the key unit of political order and as the source of primary self-identification on a collective level.[39] Currently a combination of factors ranging from the globalization of the economy to the privatization of social security seems to be weakening the nation-state's sovereignty.[40] With the old state structures being unable to satisfy the new demands of the time, governments and political systems have suffered from a cascade of legitimation crises in recent years. For the foreseeable future and beyond, this process will not make the nation-state disappear but it will force it to redefine its role, both domestically and internationally.

Most forms of the newly emerging identities are not challenging the very principle of the nation-state but are rather expressions of a growing diversification of identity, which idealtypically can be the result of either regional integration or the growing ties among nonnational groups.[41] Remarkable examples for the latter are the approximately 40 million overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and North

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[37] Following Gellner 1983, 1.
[38] See Dittmer and Kim 1993, 9–11.
[39] For more detailed accounts see Giesen 1991, 11ff., and Rodrik 1997, 4ff.
[40] See for example Beck 1997; Giddens 2000; and Bauman 1998.
[41] See Castells 1997, 27ff.

America. Their newly strengthened bonds and deepened identities during the 1990s did not lead to an increasing identification with China as a culture, state, and society, but rather to a growing understanding of themselves as overseas Chinese. Many see themselves as a transnational migrant group with a common historical descent and a shared concern for each other across a wide range of host societies.[42] This growth of a distinct community identity is interlinked with the fortification of structural ties between different overseas Chinese communities.[43] For instance, many overseas Chinese and also some Western scholars[44] are starting to regard group-specific business patterns such as the tendency to operate with small, privately owned companies as a distinct overseas Chinese business culture. Some Western-based scholars are even beginning to consider Chinese transnational structures a specific form of modernity[45] and thus an addition to the nation-state paradigm.[46]

In a very different manner, Europe is also experiencing a shift of identities as it moves toward greater sociopolitical integration. There is a growing sense that Europe can and ought to restructure its political, cultural, and economic order beyond the nation-state paradigm and certainly past the dividing lines shaped by World War II. Aspects of this process are the intensive debates among intellectuals and in the media, which take place increasingly on a transnational level.[47] As with the case of the Chinese diaspora, there is broad consensus that a transnational European identity should not replace national allegiances but add another layer to them, either on top or as part of a more complicated hybrid structure.

As alluded to earlier, in many countries the equation of the nation, a sociopsychological construct, with the state, an administrative entity and unit of power, turned out to be quite problematic.[48] Another recurrent problem of many nation-states is their position as the major

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[42] Particularly the anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia, which flared up in May 1998, became a major focal point of a new overseas Chinese identity. See Sachsenmaier 2002.

[43] See Wang 1994.

[44] For example Redding 1990.

[45] See Ong and Nonini 1997.

[46] See Schnapper 1999, 229.

[47] For more detailed accounts see the chapters by Kaelble and Giesen in this volume.

[48] See Dittmer and Kim 1993, 241ff.

intermediary between the level of the individual and the level of the global. The compression of society, community, and political body into one entity contributes to many states' recurrent unwillingness to act as members of a global community. From the nation-state's position as the last authority before the world level, it is a relatively small step toward the notion of the state being the only form of true authority. Since its elites are merely responsible to a domestic demos, the nation-state is likely to act in a highly exclusivist manner, particularly in times of crisis, when it displays a strong tendency toward defensive mass mobilization.[49] In many instances, the international arena tends to be perceived as a Social Darwinist jungle, a state of nature, in which only the fittest and the most ruthless have a chance of survival and self-determination. Here the quest for national authenticity and self-sufficiency encourages a lack of communication and trust beyond the boundaries. Even institutions such as the League of Nations or its successor, the United Nations, that adhere to an international system of rules have often been paralyzed by national governments jealously defending their own privileges.[50]

In history, the main alternative to the nation-state in depicting the relation of the collective self to the other has been the civilization discourse. The concept of civilization has been used in two ways for almost two centuries. In the first usage, civilization depicts a singular and universal Enlightenment ideal potentially encompassing all mankind.[51] The second usage has often been mobilized against any notion of a superordinate world community and has often carried an intrinsically competitive spirit, because — at least in one understanding — it did not entail a shared condition of different civilizations, but rather tended to regard cultures and civilizations as closed entities following their own logic of development.[52] Often, this extremely relativistic civilization discourse was directly related to the system of nation-states by single nations either defining themselves as separate civilizations or, like Japan in World War II, by acting as champions of a wider cultural realm.

It is difficult to imagine that either the international system of

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[49] See Smith 2000, 5f.
[50] For ideas to make the United Nations more efficient and democratic, see Habermas 1996, 218ff.
[51] For more details see Prasenjit Duara's contribution to this volume. See also Braudel 1969.
[52] This notion of civilization is underlying the thesis of Huntington 1997.

nation-states or dialogues among civilizations can provide all the possible alternative approaches to a prolific future for the world community. Among the major shortcomings of these approaches are their preconceived gap between cultural or political units and their tight connection with power structures. Furthermore, neither the idea of the nation-state nor the notion of civilizations can fully express global reality in its current state. Neither concept fully encompasses a globalizing economy, exuberant migrant flows, diasporas, and other structures that span geographic and cultural boundaries. So far there is no substitute for the rights and conditions that the constitutional state and the welfare state can guarantee, but on the level of global cooperation a potentially promising additional venue might start from the notion of a commonly shared condition: modernity.

A World of Multiple Modernities?

To be able to understand modernity as a common condition, one must broaden the concept far beyond the confines of its currently prevalent image, which dominates a wide range of discourses, from Western social theory to the antinomies of modernity. For a number of reasons, the multiple modernities paradigm has the potential to provide a particularly promising alternative to the homogenizing visions that are ill-suited for understanding the current condition of the world and its future prospects. This paradigm can do so more than many forms of postmodernism with their doubts about the modern project as such, which is incompatible with the desires of the masses that have not reached modernity yet but are longing for its fruits.[53] Furthermore, from the postmodern tendency to reduce cultures to games of language and power it would be difficult to develop an approach that could encompass the resurgence of primordial or allegedly primordial identities in a prolific way.

As a telos, multiple modernities can contribute to defusing the

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[53] Immanuel Wallerstein writes (Wallerstein 1995, 471ff.): "The appeal of this kind of modernity has not exhausted itself. There may no doubt be millions of children of the new age who assert that they reject this eternal quest for speed and for control of the environment as something that is unhealthy, indeed nefarious. But there are billions—billions, not millions—of persons in Asia, Africa, in Eastern Europe and Latin America, in the slums and ghettos of Western Europe and North America, who yearn to fully enjoy this modernity."

smoldering conflict between homogenization and its antinomies by combining two projects often thought to be mutually exclusive: the preservation of one's indigenous roots and adherence to the modern project. Often, too often the tension between tradition and modernity has proved to be disastrous, because it has been a means of mobilizing aggressive potential and also an underlying cause of counteruniversalist movements. The desire to be a fully recognized member of the world community tended to be seen as incompatible with retaining one's historical and cultural heritage. As discussed above, societies and communities thus had a recurrent tendency to either give up their indigenous resources, or to mobilize them as allegedly superior values in opposition to modernity. Both options, which Benjamin Barber in a dark prognosis on the future of the world has termed the choice between "globalism and tribalism"[54] are in fact symptoms of cultural inferiority complexes.

By contrast, a program of developing a distinct version of modernity would provide the necessary self-appreciation for a constructive encounter with any kind of otherness. Tolerant and open exchanges between cultures are difficult in a constellation in which Western modernity takes the position of a teaching civilization that alone can draw from its internal resources while the others must be inspired solely from outside. With the decline of this Western hypothesis goes also the necessity of cultural antitheses,[55] which lessens the likelihood of intolerant resistance identities driven by a spirit of competition.

A sense of belonging to a specific form of modernity implies the assumption of a global community with common problems and potential answers. It acknowledges that regions and cultures have been shaped — but not replaced — by modernity, by ever more tightly interconnected worldwide political, economic, and cultural networks. Seen in this way, cultural, national, and other differences in the age of modernity are manifestations of a commonly shared condition. From this point it is rather easy to sketch the ideal of a future world in which pluralistic identities seek to contribute to a global community in an open and tolerant way. One could further theorize about a world in which the pluralization of modernity could contribute to a growing openness of identities, because it is conceivable

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[54] See Barber 1992.
[55] See Habermas 1998, 189.

only as an additional reference system to national and other allegiances. In this world of multiple modernities, the appreciation of difference on a global level would mirror a tolerant set of identities on a domestic or intracommunal level.

Certainly we are very far away from such a world, maybe further than we thought during the, in some regards, golden age of the 1990s. But there are potential venues for a prolific global order, many of which build on the concept of modernity as an intercultural collective. Of these I will outline prospects for the establishment of an international civil society. Building on that, I will briefly discuss some recent intellectual debates about how to outline an ethical system that would be universally applicable yet culturally pluralistic.

Every world region has in one way or another struggled with modernity. So far, however, these regional debates have scarcely engaged with each other. Although all these debates over the relationship between modernity and tradition focus on the Western experience, they show little readiness to take other, parallel experiences seriously into account. It is remarkable, though, that in most cultures, movements aiming at a return to tradition draw heavily on Western critiques in order to demonstrate that modernity is not a narrow way, a zero-sum game in its relation to tradition. For example, in Turkey the Islamic opposition for decades has closely studied postmodernism as well as other theories and applied them to their struggle against the secular Kemalist government and constitution.[56] The same spectrum of ideas has had a similar influence in China,[57] in the Indian intellectual decolonialization movement,[58] and in the Japanese — albeit more moderate — voices advocating for Asianization for their country.[59]

Since they are not engaged in a significant intellectual exchange with each other, the culturally specific debates on the prospect of an Asian, Islamic, or other manifestation of modernity have often been held to be unique departures from an otherwise globally homogenous phenomenon. In significant regards, this has solidified the juxtaposition of the Western way and its alternatives as distinct and mutually

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[56] See Göle 1996. After Aydin 2001, 34.
[57] See Lin 1999.
[58] For example see Chakrabarty 2000.
[59] See Miyoshi and Harootunian 1989.

exclusive paths. By often depicting themselves as exemptions from an alleged standard Western pattern, such approaches tend to turn away from a sense of a commonly shared responsibility for the world, with the consequence that reformist approaches can be instrumentalized by rejectionist ones. A number of right-wing intellectuals and politicians in East Asia, the Middle East, and other regions propagate an extreme cultural relativism, either by arguing that no civilization can be measured by any superordinate standard, or by formulating a counteruniversalism against the reach of modern and allegedly Western values. The latter often reveals a spirit of openly challenging the West and its form of modernity. Such notions again tend to reduce the image of Western modernity to the old discourse of an empty, mechanized civilization threatening to hollow out any alternative vision of human life and social order.

As noted, a stronger sense of community can grow from a common understanding of modernity as a shared condition. On an institutional level, a promising recent development has been the growing number and influence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which can be seen as early, modest beginnings of a worldwide public sphere. Even though NGOs and global media are often instrumentalized by political powers, notably Western ones, they may turn out to be the sprouts of an international civil society of global proportions. Analogously to national civil societies, many internationally operating NGOs are already independent counterforces to the political realm. As arenas they choose international institutions such as the United Nations Organization, but increasingly also national public spheres. Within the latter they serve as pressure groups that can make national leaders domestically responsible for coping with global threats. In this manner some NGOs have the potential to make states more cooperative internationally. As domestically operating pressure groups with a global agenda, they can force some governments to apply their domestic values to the international scene.[60] Furthermore, by trying to create an awareness of global problems such as environmental threats, NGOs have the potential to contribute to the consciousness of a world community with shared responsibilities. As one can see from, for example, the antiapartheid movement during the 1980s and 1990s, NGOs can increase the

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[60] See Habermas, 1996, 202ff.

number of forces that are able and willing to act responsibly on an international level.[61]

Such global solidarity can grow, however, only from a wider base of intercultural trust and support. So far, most international NGOs with a social, political, or environmental agenda not only have their headquarters in Western countries, they also draw most of their membership from the West. In many countries the very basis of such organizations' work, the belief in universal values, is still being equated with Western imperialism. The fact that the United States and,to a lesser extent, Europe support undemocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia, while justifying military operations as defending liberty and human rights, contributes to many societies' turning away from these ideals altogether.[62] As a precondition for intercultural trust it is thus essential that NGOs and related actors express their programs in ways that are disassociated from the Western experience alone.

Behind this agenda looms the larger task of developing an ethical universalism, which is no longer tantamount to the codex of Enlightenment values. How to constructively depart from the previous understanding of moral universals while trying to retain the idea of common ethical bonds constitutes a great philosophical challenge, perhaps the greatest one for the foreseeable future. The Enlightenment universalism was built on the premise that normative concepts could be formulated universally, since they could be derived from the allegedly culturally neutral human reason alone. Such a view has become questionable because of the potentially offensive, patronizing character of guidelines and rules that are formulated in a Western conceptual framework. Alternatives to a universally ethical programm are minimalist approaches that try to find the lowest common denominators of culture-specific value systems. These lowest common denominators, however, are not much more than very basic, almost self-evident, truisms.[63] In this capacity, they are inept to serve as pillars for a global ethical system.

One basis for another approach lies in the common condition of modernity, both as a set of worldwide problems and a source of possible answers. Needless to say, as a potential forum in which common-

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[61] See Habermas 1998, 85ff.
[62] A point made by Huntington 1997, 183f. The notion that ethical universalism is a disguise for Western imperialism is shared by many postmodern theorists.
[63] About minimalist approaches to a global ethics, see Walzer 1994.

ality and diversity flow into each other, modernity must be under-
stood as an open, pluralistic system intermingling with other social
and cultural forces. Even strong defenders of the Enlightenment pro-
ject and the incomplete character of modernity such as Jürgen
Habermas have recently begun to emphasize that proper ethical uni-
versalism contains respect for the other's otherness. According to
Habermas, such a notion of universalism can even accentuate indi-
vidual and cultural difference, since it is committed to the free unfold-
ing of the self, on both an individual and a collective level.[64] This
would include the possibility that different world cultures arrive at
commonly shared ethical standards through their own systems of
thought and respond to global challenges from their own conceptual
frameworks. The awareness of facing identical dangers can indeed
form one of the pillars of a diverse global community. Every world
region has to cope with worldwide problems such as environmental
threats or industrialization processes that are dissolving traditional
family patterns. As a consequence, a culturally specific response in a
shared world of multiple modernities would be understood as a con-
tribution to a common agenda, rooted in the awareness of being
exposed to related or even identical risks. So it is because of modern
societies' parallel exposure to the transformations of a global age that
local discourses can gain global significance.[65]

A significant theoretical problem is to establish an overarching
framework of agreements, of shared or negotiated universals,[66] from
which it would be possible to judge local approaches from a higher
perspective. A true universalism of values needs to be able to encom-
pass different concepts and heritages, but it also must be able to dis-
tinguish between right and wrong. To give an extreme and thus sim-
ple example, it would be impossible to regard the brutally constructed
homogeneities of totalitarian movements as valid "local" contribu-
tions to a larger whole. In most cases, however, the dividing line
between acceptable and unacceptable elements will be more subtle,
posing more philosophical challenges.

For the purpose of establishing a new ethical universalism, concert-
ed comparative efforts should establish the commonalities and differ-
ences between all kinds of cultures in value systems, sociopolitical

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[64] See Habermas 1996.
[65] See Tu 2000. See also Giddens 2000, 30ff.
[66] Compare the contribution by Kocka to this volume.

orders, attitudes to modernity, and other problem zones. Intercivilizational dialogues that are set up as exchanges between original, closed entities, however, are bound to be rather artificial, since they do not consider the heavy impact of the West and, in many cases, the ensuing self-alienation that many world regions face today. Since many cultures such as China have become estranged from their own cultural and social resources, their search for common values has to be conducted in parallel to internal negotiations over the relationship between tradition and modernity. Only if cultures that have faced a cascade of identity crises can develop a stable self-understanding as a manifestation of modernity can they trust the validity of their own way enough to be trusted by others.[67] Needless to say, such an effort has to be accompanied by the willingness of the West to depart from its hereditary claim to privileged access to modernity in general and normative unilateralism in particular. Only if these conditions are met will mutual learning, mutual understanding, and diverse contributions in the spirit of a commonly shared responsibility for the modern world be credible and possible.

All in all, theoretical frameworks such as the multiple modernities paradigm can serve as programs that can overcome the dichotomies to which the narrow vision of modernity as a distinct civilization has contributed. The intellectual endeavor to separate modernity from the Western experience alone can greatly enrich regional debates, since it allows cultures to re-appropriate their indigenous resources without questioning the validity of the modern as such. As an ideal alternative, a world of multiple modernities would share normative standards to which different cultural experiences could contribute. It would not be a world of isolated civilizations or nation-states, but rather an open system in which different ways of being modern find the commonalities to interact creatively and understand themselves as part of a larger whole.

Even though scholarly analyses increasingly treat the global experience as a network of exchanges and hybrid forms, any optimistic account that describes the future as moving in the same direction is bound to be wishful thinking. But to understand and creatively shape our today, we have to look at tomorrow. Much of the future of the world order will depend on the gaps of power and living standards in

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[67] See Tu 2000, 206.

the world and the way the privileged deal with them. For the purpose
of setting a common agenda, the existence of a global elite is a prime
requirement: not an identityless elite[68] defining itself through privi-
leges, but an elite driven by a spirit of responsibility that is rooted in
divergent cultural and sociopolitical frameworks. Much will depend
on intellectuals across the world developing a shared vision that may
then trickle down to other circles. Their theories are theories, but
they have an influence on reality. That in a world of hardening con-
flicts, of rising fundamentalisms and nationalisms the right theories
influence reality in the right ways, is a matter of joint effort — and
hope.

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[68] An argument made by Bauman 1998.

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GLOBALIZATION:
THE MOST RECENT FORM OF MODERNITY?

Bruce Mazlish

Modernity and globalization are contentious terms. To analyze their relationship and to ask whether the latter is a recent form of the former requires us to plumb their meaning more closely. I will undertake here to look closely at modernity, which not only takes multiple forms, but has multiple meanings, and I'll do the same with globalization. Both processes, modernity and globalization, raise questions about the universal and the local, the material and the cultural, and how they relate to one another. I will also look at one specific feature of globalization, the multinational corporation. More narrowly, I will examine the possibility of the rise of a global elite, with the implications that might have for policymaking. I will then try to sum up and answer the question: Is globalization the most recent "multiple" of modernity?

1.

In present usage, multiple modernities means that different societies may pursue their own paths to modernity, retaining their own cultures, rather than merely becoming pale imitations of the West and its modernization. In fact, however, modernity has been multiple since its inception, in the sense that it keeps evolving in meaning. Thus, modernity during the Renaissance, insofar as it can be said to have existed, was different from the modernity of the seventeenth century, as promoted by Bacon, or the eighteenth century, as expressed by Kant. All these modernities, of course, had various features in common, especially an expanding commercial basis. What distinguishes them from subsequent nineteenth-century modernities is that they were mainly intellectual in nature. That is, they challenged tradition — as symbolized in the battle of the ancients and the moderns — and asked for new, autonomous readings of nature and society.

I will argue that in the nineteenth century, in Western Europe, two variants, or two major multiples, of modernity arose. I will call one aesthetic and the other materialist modernity, and cite for illustrative

purposes the poet Charles Baudelaire and the philosopher Karl Marx. I also wish to call attention to the fact that at that time the word and the idea of "modern" metamorphosed into the word and the idea of "modernity." The latter term is a neologism, given official recognition in the second edition of Emile Littre's Dictionary in 1869.

The notion of modernity itself was first given birth and classic form by the French poet Baudelaire in his essay "The Painter in Modern Life," written in 1859, but not published until 1863. "By 'modernity,'" he tells us, "I mean the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent, the half of art whose other half is eternal and the immutable."[1] With this formulation, Baudelaire changed the terms of the relation between the ancient and the modern. Whereas in the earlier battle, the ancient was rejected and to be done away with, now it is the necessary counterpoint of the modern, i.e., of modernity, and requisite to its definition. In this new interpretation, the emphasis is not so much on the intellectual as on the artistic side, especially including the notion of fashion, which is why I label as aesthetic this particular multiple of modernity.

Baudelaire did not have it all his own way in the nineteenth century. His contemporary was Karl Marx, whose modernity was a material one. Marxist modernity, as is well known, is grounded in the economic base on which the superstructure of culture then rises as a dependent factor. Unlike Baudelaire, Marx wished to abolish whatever is eternal and immutable. As he declared in his manifesto, "All that is solid melts into air." In this desire, Marx was at one with many of the other classical sociologists, who opposed the ancient and who posed in its place a single inexorable model for modernity.

If what I have been saying so sketchily is accepted, we can see that multiple modernities have existed in the past, in the sense of different conceptions of the modern and of its component parts, as well as being present now in our own century. We can also glimpse the fact that the themes of the universal and the ephemeral, and the strands of the economic and the cultural, figured prominently in the discourse on the subject in the past just as they do today.

The dilemma is carried forward into our century. Here, "multiple" is not so much a historical concept as a contemporary one. Moreover, the subject is greatly broadened by the moves to modernity of non-European parts of the globe, whether in Asia, or the Middle East, or elsewhere. To discuss further what is involved, we need now to

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[1] Baudelaire 1964, 13.

inquire what modernity might mean in the abstract, as a prelude to our comparison with globalization.

2.

Essentially, to answer the question of the meaning of modernity, i.e., to give an ideal-type definition, we must ask what, if any, are the common features in the multiple modernities of the past and up until our time. In 1920, Max Weber wrote a famous introduction to the previously published *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.* There he tells us that "in Western civilization [which he is equating with modernity], and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having *universal* significance and value." These phenomena include science, based on mathematics and the method of experiment; history and art, especially rational harmonious music; print culture; the modern state; and lastly "the most fateful force in our modern life, capitalism."[2]

By and large, these characteristics still persist in any definition of modernity. I will try now to build on Weber's definition of modernity, while acknowledging the challenges that can be made to modernity as an enterprise. To Weber's stress on capitalism I would add attention to the major shift in human existence from an agricultural to an industrial society. Occurring in various degrees of timing and intensity, this shift is correlated with the growth of urban living — the British census of 1851 noted that for the first time in history more than 50 percent of the population was living in urban areas. As part of the first industrial revolution, we have the factory as a place in which people work, under new conditions of discipline and possible alienation.

Increasingly from the mid-nineteenth century to our new millennium, life in the new social environment is generally seen to be fast and fragmented, with fashion and consumerism playing larger parts in a society still significantly oriented to production. Time and space have been considerably condensed. The role of women is in flux, with their entrance into public life expanding rapidly. The public sphere, in general, grows steadily, with masses of people having to be reckoned with by both democracies and dictatorships.

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[2] Weber 1958, 13 and 17.

So, too, a civilizing process, as Elias shows, takes place steadily, both externally, i.e., in terms of social controls, and internally, i.e., in terms of self-control. Much of this is connected to the growth of instrumental rationality and calculation, as well as to a broader sort of rationality that seeks to understand modern life in terms of social science. This is the new form of "daring to know" in the face of tradition, accepting nothing on faith, and constantly forging forward in terms of new knowledge. In the process, as one scholar nicely puts it, "Modernity, which had been defined as a 'break with tradition,' itself became a tradition, the 'tradition of the new.'"[3] I should add that modernity evokes antimodernities in various forms, united only in their opposition to the perceived universality of modernity. Thus, another feature of modernity is necessarily antimodernity.

There are less pleasant features of modernity as well. In the view of some scholars, much of eighteenth-century modernity, for example, was based on slavery and a plantation economy. Whether modernity as we have come to know it could have flourished at the time without these underpinnings is debatable. The same argument is made in regard to the industrial revolution, which set the tone for another phase of modernity: unsanitary cities, unhealthy factory conditions, class exploitation. So, too, was Western imperialism a major accompaniment of nineteenth-century modernity. Anyone dealing with the subject must try to strike a proper balance between modernity's goods and evils.

With that said, I want to make one last point about modernity as such before moving on to globalization (which, incidentally, requires us to draw up the same normative balance sheet of the positives and the negatives). As exported from Europe, starting in the nineteenth century, modernity has been conflated with Western civilization. In fact, it matters which of the multiple modernities has been and is being shipped out to the rest of the world. The modernity faced by India has been a British model, in large parts of Africa it has been a French model, and now for much of the world it is an American one. In short, multiple modernities breed multiple local adaptations, which reflect back upon them ad infinitum, and must be studied in these constantly shifting terms if we are to understand hitherto and currently existing modernities.

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[3] Kumar 1995, 100.

3.

In essential ways, globalization is easier to define than modernity. It is both more ancient as a process and more recent in its fluorescence. Instead of offering an abstract definition, I prefer to approach the topic from a historical perspective. Seen from this perspective, the globalization process has been in effect from the earliest migrations of hunter-gatherers spreading across the world. With that said, it is the globalization occurring in the last half century or so that engages us today. Recognizing that all aspects of it have roots in the past — nothing is completely new under the sun — I nevertheless focus on the following factors as having an intensity and importance previously not existing, and interacting with one another in an unprecedented synchronicity and synergy.

The first such factor is humanity's thrust into space, imposing upon us an increasing sense of inhabiting a concrete global entity — Spaceship Earth — that can be viewed from outside the earth's atmosphere. Other factors are the satellites, part of our thrust into space, that link the peoples of the earth in a more intense fashion than ever before; the possibility of intentional or unintentional spread of harmful viruses, genes or nuclear fallout, which demonstrate that the territorial state can no longer adequately protect its citizens (e.g., AIDS, or Chernobyl); environmental problems, such as ozone holes and global warming, that refuse to conform to lines drawn on a map; and multinational corporations, which increasingly dominate our economic and cultural lives.

Numerous other factors could be added: global consumerism (obviously related to multinationals); the supplementing or displacement of an international political system by a global one; the globalization of culture, especially music (fostered as it is by satellite communications); the increasing spread of human rights as a global standard of behavior; and so forth.[4]

These factors all cry out for sustained research and theory. I chose one of them, the multinational corporations, for closer examination simply as an example. It happens that I have been involved, with my colleague Alfred Chandler, in a conference that took as its task the mapping of the multinational corporations (MNCs). Our starting

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[4] An initial account of the factors making up contemporary globalization can be found in Mazlish and Buultjens 1993, especially in my introduction.

point was the United Nations statement that of the 100 largest possessors of GNP, about half were multinationals. On that index, they were wealthier than 120-130 nation-states. These, then, are the new leviathans of our time. Yet, if we open an atlas we do not see them, only the nation-states and their boundaries. My idea was that we should give visual representation to the new state of affairs. A result of the project, therefore, has been the production of a book, *Global Inc.*, containing more than 200 pages of maps and other means of visual representation with accompanying texts.[5]

The representation is dramatic. It shows the growth and distribution of MNCs from the beginning. A recent book has it that the MNC goes back 2,000 years.[6] We do not go that far. Instead, we start with the seventeenth century and proceed to the present, which engages most of our interest. Needless to say, definition of the MNC is critical, and changes in some regards. In any case, what is important for present globalization is that when we started our project about four years ago, there were about 37,000 MNCs. When we finished this year, there were more than 60,000. Another revealing figure: about 25 years ago, of the 500 largest industrial MNCs, almost all were European or American. Today, the list would show that about 170 are non-Western.

Insofar as one of the major actors transcending national boundaries is the MNC, sustained attention is requisite. The MNCs are the vehicles by which much of globalization moves today. In saying this, I do not mean to reduce globalization to economics; quite the contrary. Economic effects could not proceed without a host of other factors, in which the political, social, and cultural loom large. It is merely to say that MNCs are important both because of their own globalizing weight and their implications for policy. How do we have sufficient governance and regulation when there is no national framework in whose nets we can restrain our new leviathans? What new institutions are required?

Having noted this problem, I leave it here, adding only one other piece to the MNC project. At our conference, one of the papers was titled "A Global Elite?" Did one exist, we asked, or was one coming into being? How would one identify it, assuming it to be singular? What

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   [5] See Mazlish, forthcoming.
   [6] Moore and Lewis 1999.

sites should be examined, for example, the Trilateral Commission or Davos? How were regional and national elites related to a presumed global elite? Was there a characteristic lifestyle of a new global elite?[7]

Our focus, of course, was on MNC elites, but we were interested in examining their power, which required us also to look at political and other kinds of elites. Many CEOs think of themselves as global leaders, whose interests may transcend those of their own nation. Legal, accounting, and consulting firms increasingly see themselves in global terms. I think it fair to say that our host, BCG, while attentive to its national roots, may also aspire to a global identity.

Globalization is seen by some as an impersonal, deterministic force, like modernity. I do not accept that viewpoint. There are, of course, strong trends and currents that push in a given direction. But the steering, I believe, is done by human actors. Thus global elites are important. We need to know not only who they are but what their values are. What is their training, and how might we affect the way they exercise their wealth and power? For the moment, there are no manuals, such as existed in the Middle Ages for the courtier and aristocrat, on how to behave properly in regard not only to manners but to moral behavior. I have called our growing MNCs the new leviathans. In this light, their leaders take on some of the qualities of statesmen. How they are to behave as such, balancing their other obligations to their corporations, is a question desperately needing attention.

4.

With definitions and depictions of globalization in hand, I want to turn now to my original question: is globalization the most recent form of modernity? Only by comparing it to the defining features of modernity, as I outlined them earlier, can I come to an answer. I conclude that, on almost all counts, globalization continues and enlarges most of the central features of modernity.

In comparison to modernity, globalization is further removed from agricultural existence, having made it ever more a market relation. Science, technology, rationality, these are all universalistic hallmarks of the globalizing process. Urbanization expands in the form of

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[7] See Mazlish and Morss.

megacities. The pace of life quickens further, as space and time undergo even greater compression. Fashion and consumerism are more omnipresent. Women assume greater and greater prominence. The computer opens up the public sphere, and promises greater democracy everywhere. Of course, the ideal-type outlined above is often not realized in reality. Nevertheless, on balance the statement that globalization is the most recent form of modernity is sustainable.

Which brings us to a paradox. I will argue that the continuation of modernity by globalization also leads to the replacement of the former. In the place of modernity as a periodizing device I suggest we think in terms of humanity entering a global epoch. We must remember that for the last few centuries modernity has been based on the nation-state. As globalization transcends the nation, while not abolishing it, globalization becomes a process encompassing all peoples. It is no longer associated simply with the West. While globalization does inherit the same antifeelings as modernity, it holds out the promise of overleaping them. If ever the Hegelian dialectic applies, it may be in the *Aufhebung* incorporated in globalization. Neither deterministic — and here I part ways with Hegel — nor with the balance between its good and bad effects as yet known, globalization contains within itself the possibility of a universalizing force that manifests itself appropriately in the local.

The homogenization contained in globalization is matched by its heterogenizing impulses. Small-batch production replaces Fordism. Local tradition is as often incorporated as it is treated dismissively. We now recognize that older infrastructures are vital as the containing frame for the rapid and unsettling forces of globalization. Collapsing a large argument, I simply conclude by reiterating the suggestion that modernity has developed into globalization. The ever-new that marks the concept of modernity is being replaced by a new long-time process: globalization. We need to change our consciousness to keep up with this new development.

I realize that I have made assertions without the full detail to back them up. I have left out large parts of the argument I have been trying to make. In the end, however, I am suggesting that modernity of all kinds has metamorphosed into the globalization process. I would like to believe that by asking the question whether globalization is the most recent form of modernity I have opened up new ways of thinking about modernity and its multiple forms. At the least, I hope that I have globalized the subject.

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PART C

CONTESTATIONS OF WESTERN MODERNITY AND UNIVERSALISM

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CIVILIZATIONS AND NATIONS
IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD

Prasenjit Duara

The idea that there are different paths of modernity assumes that
there are different starting points; that different cultures and civiliza-
tions will assert their distinctive patterns of values and ideals in the
pursuit of certain shared modern goals. Here, I explore the "discourse
on civilization" in an age of nation-states and show how the idea of
origins and horizons of different modernities — the idea of civiliza-
tions — is a complex one.

I argue that the mold in which the contemporary conception of
civilizations was constructed was a product of early-twentieth-century
global culture and mirrored the nineteenth-century Enlightenment
conception of civilization as material and moral progress. Hence the
starting point represented less the origins of different civilizational
modernities than the remodeling of a society or nation's self-represen-
tation by its leaders and intellectuals in line with different contempo-
rary conceptions of the modern. What I call the new discourse on civ-
ilization had very little in common with the moral projects — the civ-
ilizing processes, if you will — of older societies that arguably did not
have a word for progress.

At the same time, the new discourse had one great power in the
modernizing world. It was a source of moral authority that transcend-
ed both nations and modernity even though — or perhaps because
— forces representing both sought the sanction of this authority.
Although this transcendent authority did not necessarily originate in
the older civilizations, its power derives from the perception that it
did and from the use of historical language, symbols, and institutions,
by states and others, for new purposes. In this way, civilization could
emerge as the moral and symbolic locus from which to sanction, defy,
or regulate modernity and nationalism. As such, this locus — a sym-
bolic regime — becomes the object of contestation between the
nation-state and other forces that wish to control it.

Discourses on civilization concern the definition of the self versus
other at a macrosocietal level. Specifically, the self that is being
defined expresses the ideals or truth of the macrosocietal order. What

distinguishes civilizations from other macro-societal identifications, such as nations, is that they are often repositories of a transcendent moral or spiritual authority with the potential to encompass otherness. Despite the nation-state's claims on the loyalty of its citizens, it often recognizes that the highest truths are not necessarily to be found within the national community, but in a transcendent or universal realm. For instance, according to the guidelines provided to those applying for U.S. citizenship, a person may decline to take the oath of loyalty to the U.S. constitution if that oath conflicts with a religious belief. The discourse on civilization in the era of nation-states is closely tied to this yearning for a transcendent purpose.

A Genealogy of Civilization

Beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, when the signifier civilization became current in Europe, Europeans recognized other civilizations, such as Chinese, Indian, or native American civilizations.[1] But by the mid-nineteenth century, at the height of European imperial power, Civilization became established as a singular and universal phenomenon and came to be challenged only toward the end of World War I. In the intervening years, Western imperial nations invoked the signifier to justify their conquest as a civilizing mission. Whole continents were subjugated and held in thrall because they were not constituted as civilized nations by means of a formulation in which to be a nation was to be civilized and vice versa.

To be sure, the idea that there were civilizations other than that of Europe or Christendom had been around from at least the late eighteenth century, but during the nineteenth century the singular conception of Civilization, based originally on Christian and Enlightenment values, came not only to be dominant but to be the only criterion whereby sovereignty could be claimed in the world. It also became clear that to be a nation was to belong to a higher, authorizing order of civilization.[2]

Arising in the context of European domination of the non-Western world, this conception could be specifically found in the legal language of various unequal treaties and its interpretation by interna-

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[1] Febvre 1973, 236.
[2] See Gong 1984, 12; Febvre 1973, 229-247.

tional lawyers. At an explicit level, the term Civilization in these treaties and interpretations referred principally to the ability and willingness of states to protect rights to life, property, and freedom (particularly for foreigners), but this usage necessarily also presupposed and demanded the existence of the institutions of the modern European state, and its goals, values, and practices, ranging from the pursuit of material progress to Civilized manners and clothing.

By the late nineteenth century, international law and its standard of civilization became increasingly positivist and reflected the social Darwinist conception that certain races were more civilized than others. While a hierarchy of races with different capacities to achieve civilization seemed *natural*, the notion of Civilization did not theoretically preclude the ability of a race to become civilized.[3]

At the same time, an alternative view of civilization — the beginnings of what Lucien Febvre called "the ethnographic conception of civilization" — had emerged in Europe of the 1820s and '30s, particularly in the ideas of Herder and Alexander von Humboldt.[4] During the latter half of the nineteenth century, this Germanic counterrevolutionary strain coexisted with several other discourses within the penumbra of the hegemonic conception of Civilization. Most significant among these discourses in Asia were the older imperial Chinese conception of *wenming*, the Christian and, particularly, Jesuit, valorization of Chinese civilization, the tradition of Orientalist scholarship of Sir William Jones and others in Bengal, and the world Buddhist revival.[5]

Douglas Howland has elegaically documented the death of the imperial Chinese notion of the civilized world or *wenming* when the exchanges between Chinese and Japanese diplomats conducted through brush-talk, signifying mastery and thereby affirmation of the world of the written character, became evidently irrelevant to the Japanese and the world around them. Nonetheless, even as Fukuzawa Yukichi was exhorting Japan to escape from Asia (*datsua)* and become Civilized, both Japanese and Chinese were reworking vestigial

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[3] The embodiment of Civilization in legal form had the effect of universalizing it, or in other words, of disassociating it from the particular soil or conditions of its emergence (such as Christianity) in the West. It was in this particular legal incarnation that countries like Japan (and Turkey) could aspire to the status of a Civilized nation and, indeed, sought very hard to achieve that goal.

[4] See Febvre 1973, 220, 236; Bunzl 1996.

[5] See Ketelaar 1990; Bechert 1984; Schwab 1984.

expressions of the old Chinese notions of common civilization (*tong-wen/dōbun, tongjiao/dōkyō*) as well as improvisations on these ideas influenced by contemporary social Darwinism such as the neologism *tongzhong/dōshu* or common race.[6] Although these efforts may have represented an attempt to create an alternative East Asian civilization, they were still closely associated with the social Darwinist ideas underlying Civilization. At any rate, they did not make much headway.

Also relevant to the transformation of the conception of civilization was the emergence of the idea of a world religion. But the idea of world religions itself involved considerable remaking or reconceptualization of these religions to conform to acceptable ideas of civilized traditions. Heinz Bechert has identified the emergence of Buddhist modernism in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, beginning with the Christian-Buddhist debates in Sri Lanka, the initiatives taken by Sri Lankan Buddhists and their Western supporters in the Theosophical Society, and the forging of international links between Buddhists in Sri Lanka, Japan, and the West. Indeed, Sri Lankans and Japanese Buddhist thinkers have remained in the forefront of contributions to contemporary Buddhist thought.[7] The same reconstruction of Hinduism was taking place in India under the auspices of the Theosophical society and thinkers like Sri Aurobindoo and Swami Vivekananda.

In East Asia, James Ketelaar has demonstrated how Buddhism could survive the persecution of a new Shinto national cult during the Meiji period only by refashioning itself as a world religion. Central to this development was the 1893 Chicago Congress of World Religions, in which each of the traditions first gained publicity, indeed, was publicly produced as a world religion.[8] In all of these cases, the end product resembled much less any particular or lived experience of Buddhism or Hinduism than an abstract, rationalized, modernized, and, perhaps, most of all, Christianized body of thought that served to represent the core of another civilization.

By the time of World War I, the German counter-evolutionary intellectual tradition could be found in what may be the most important statement of the new conception of civilization, Oswald Spen-

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[6] See Howland 1996, 262, n.22; and Reynolds 1993, 22 and 28.

[7] See Bechert 1984, 274-5.

[8] See Ketelaar 1990.

gler's *Decline of the West*.[9] Ironically, if not unexpectedly, Spengler does not refer to the entities of his world history as civilizations, but as cultures or Kultur. This is because he reserves civilization for a stage, the final stage, the frozen stage of a dynamic, evolving culture.[10] At any rate, for our purposes, his cultures are equivalent to what we have been calling the alternative conception of civilization: multiple, spiritual, and — as the highest expression of a people's achievements, virtues, and authenticity — authorizing. At the moment of German defeat in war, the Germanic notion of Kultur gained a significant victory over the notion of a universal civilization that measured value only according to certain Western standards of progress.

The triumph of the alternative civilization must be grasped not only through the ideas of philosophers but in relation to that other triumph of the world system of nation-states and nationalism as a global ideology, which ironically required the conception of a transcendent civilization. But Spengler's notions — especially as popularized by Toynbee — were very influential in the new global discourse on civilization. They clarified the inchoate shapes that had hovered in the penumbra of Civilization.

Spengler professes to examine two themes. The narrower one is the decline of the West as a civilization, which as a thing already-become rather than coming-to-be, was predestined to decline; but his study also occasioned a new philosophy — the philosophy of the future — of the world-as-history in contrast to the world-as-nature, which had hitherto been the only theme of philosophy.[11] In his sweeping vision of the new world history, Spengler lays out the basic features, many of which have endured in our understanding of civilization. First is the critique of linear history based on the ancient-medieval-modern division, which stacks the deck to make the rest of the world revolve around Europe.[12] In place of this division, Spengler traces many mighty cultures that develop on the model of organisms, each undergoing its own temporal cycle of rise and decline, and each developing in isolation from the others. Needless to say, a culture can-

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[9] See Spengler 1962.
[10] One cannot but be reminded of the German association of the word civilization with an effete and superficial French cult of manners and courtesy (see Elias 1978). But note that for Humboldt, writing in the early part of the nineteenth century, Kultur and Zivilisation were quite interchangeable (see Febvre 1973, 244).
[11] See Spengler 1962, 5.
[12] See Spengler 1962, 12.

not be judged from the standpoint of another not only because truths are truths only in relation to a particular mankind,[13] but also because the goal of history is to seek the relationship that inwardly binds together the expression forms of all branches of a culture.[14] Spengler not only presents cultures as autochthonous, but by distinguishing the new history from science, he also confirms the irreducible authority of culture or civilization.

In Spengler, a culture is a fundamentally spiritual or ideal phenomenon that authoritatively distinguishes it from other cultures. This ideational quality would become, or perhaps already reflected, the most salient characteristic of the new conception of civilization. Ideas of Eastern versus Western civilizations, which increasingly accompanied World War I, were premised on this ideal of civilizational spirituality.

In the West, the most influential scholar to propagate and develop these ideas was Arnold Toynbee. In the course of more than forty years (1920s-1960s), during which he wrote the 12 volumes of *A Study of World History*, Toynbee broke with the vestigial progressivist vision of (essentially Western) civilization and even departed in some measure from Spengler's view of hermetically closed organic civilizations.[15] But perhaps most significant was his conception of the role of religion in civilizations. In contrast to Gibbon and others who associated Christianity with barbarism as the destroyer of civilization, Toynbee in his earlier volumes already viewed religion as a kind of an aid to civilization, as a chrysalis that preserved the germs of an older civilization. By the 1940s, he began to see the rise and fall of civilizations as subsidiary to the growth of religion.[16]

In this way, Toynbee came to reverse earlier notions of civilization, which were frequently founded on disenchantment. For instance, he sought to counter James Fraser's view of religion in the West as having sapped the manliness of early Europe.[17] For Toynbee, the goal of history, the historical function of civilization, was to seek ever-deeper spiritual insight.[18] In the final years of his life, Toynbee was drawn to ideas of a common global civilization originating in the technological

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[13] See Spengler 1962, 35.
[14] See Spengler 1962, 6.
[15] See McNeill 1989, 103, 165; Bentley 1996, 7.
[16] See Toynbee 1948, 230-234.
[17] See Toynbee 1948, 228.
[18] See Toynbee 1948, 238-9.

achievements of the West, but spiritually regenerated by the major world civilizations. It is not surprising to find his ideas fall on fertile ground in Japan, where he was accepted as a major public thinker and conducted a series of dialogues with the leader of the Soka Gakkai, a new religion nourished precisely on such ideas of the blending of East and Western civilizations.[19]

What were the conditions for the emergence of this view of civilization? The view surfaced in tandem with the disillusionment during World War I with the idea of the civilizing mission. "The nature of the battle on the Western Front made a mockery of the European conceit that discovery and invention were necessarily progressive and beneficial to humanity, writes Michael Adas.[20] Writer after writer denounced the materialism and destructiveness of western civilization. At the same time, the wider political forces produced by the end of the war and the new balance of power, namely, the beginnings of decolonization, the emergence of new nation-states, and the concomitant ascendance of the ideology of antiimperialism, found little use for Civilization. To many in these nascent movements, Civilization was increasingly seen not only to be compatible with, but to have furnished the moral ground for, imperialism and war. The final triumph of nationalism or national self-determination over imperialism as the hegemonic global ideology was clinched by two political developments: the Soviet revolution and Woodrow Wilson's advocacy of the right to national self-determination in the aftermath of the First War.[21]

The philosophy of Spengler and Toynbee reflected the world as a newly unified theater of history. Spengler's insistence on seeing Europe as just a bit player in the history of humanity (rather than its telos) was well suited to a changing world where other actors (nations) had learned the language through which they could demand to be heard. Not only were new nations beginning to emerge all over the world, they were also telling their histories in the same linear mode of emergent national subjects mothered by classical civilizations. Thus was nationalism genetically linked to a moral universalism greater than itself, and civilization would serve as an ultimate rationale for the sovereignty of these nations, just as it had for imperialist nations.[22]

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[19] See McNeill 1989, 269-273.
[20] See Adas 1993, 109.
[21] See Barraclough 1964, 118-122.
[22] Notably at the onset of World War II, Norbert Elias was to tell us that Europeans had already been subtly transforming the notion of civilization, at least in rela-

Thus while nations were closely tied to the civilizations they claimed, the territorial nation-state was not coextensive with this civilization. New, like old, nations seek the transnational conception of civilization because it is only as a transterritorial, universal ideal of say, Islam or Confucianism with its potential capacity to reveal the truth of the human condition and embrace all of humanity that this (civilizational) self can achieve recognition from the Other. At the heart of the critique of civilization launched by both Western and non-Western intellectuals after World War I was the universalizing promise of the civilizing mission — a mission that exemplified the desire not (simply) to conquer the Other, but to be desired by the Other. In this critique, Civilization had forfeited the right to represent the highest goals or ultimate values of humanity and was no longer worthy of being desired, or even recognized, by the Other. In so opposing the legally articulated notion of the good and valuable posed by Civilization, the alternative civilizational self had to counterpose a still higher good and a truth that was authentically universal.

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tion to each other if not to the world they colonized. Elias defined the idea of civilization thus: the concept expresses the self-consciousness of the West — one could even say the national consciousness. It sums up everything in which Western society of the last two or three centuries believes itself superior to earlier societies or more primitive contemporary ones. By this term Western society seeks to describe what constitutes its special character and what it is proud of: the level of *its* technology, the nature of *its* manners, the development of *its* scientific knowledge or view of the world, and much more (see Elias 1978, 3-4). Although Elias notes that this civilization allows Europeans to think of themselves transnationally as the upper-class to large sections of the non-European world (see Elias 1978, 50), he is much more concerned with its transformation within intra-European relationships into national civilizations. The German bourgeoisie articulated its role as the leader of the emerging German nation by championing Kultur, which it opposed to the French idea of civilization as merely external and superficial court etiquette (see Elias 1978, 29-34). Similarly, the French bourgeoisie in the same century adapted the courtly notion of civilization into a national representation with which it opposed the Germans (see Elias 1978, 38-40). Given the thrust, timing, and references in the work, the reader may well be led to believe that this transmutation of civilization has much to do with the European national wars that enveloped the world in the twentieth century. This may well be so and may thus prefigure the shift from a singular notion of civilization to multiple civilizations, at least within Europe. At the same time, I believe that Elias tends to conflate civilization with nation a little too readily, particularly when these nations face societies perceived as radically different. In doing so, he elides a very significant ambiguity in the new conception of civilization: that territorial nations are lesser than the civilizations from which they emanate; that the principle of civilization creates value for the territorial nation; that the principle of territoriality may also be in conflict with the principle of civilization; and that nations spend a lot of energy seeking to match the formal sovereignty deriving from territorial or civic nationalism with the source of authenticity or truth of the nation deriving from civilization.

One might say that the transcendent authority of civilization derives from this dialectic.

Note here the close relationship, indeed, the mirroring by civilization of the older Western conception of Civilization. It is the spiritual, moral, and universal core of civilizations that furnishes nations with the same kind of authenticating and authorizing function that Civilization furnished for Western imperialist nations. Note further that the gap between the territorial nation and civilization is not only territorial, but principled. Because the spiritual impulse of a civilization tends to be universalizing or at least nonterritorial, national boundaries are ultimately artificial and limiting. The transcendent stance of civilization thus may permit a critique of the nation and can produce the problem of loyalties divided between those to the nation and to civilization.

But if there is no exact match between the two, there is no doubt that the territorial nation-state seeks to appropriate civilization. The nation's custodial power over civilization becomes the means of exercising the national hegemony both within and without. One might argue that for some nations, such as France or Italy, one can stretch the nation to fit the civilization — territorially, if not in principle. Similarly, one can see how in China Chiang Kai-shek could declare (a selective) Confucianism, and in India, Gandhi proclaim (a reformed) Hinduism as the civilizational heritage of the nation. But how can smaller nations do so? I believe there are several narrative strategies within national historiography that nations can use to represent themselves as part or leaders of a certain civilizational tradition. The most powerful of these — at least in terms of its impact on the domestic population — was the Japanese claim to have inherited the leadership of Asian civilization because of its success in mastering Western civilization. But one can think of how Sri Lankan intellectuals went about constructing a Buddhist civilization in a way that made Sri Lanka the leader of such a project. Consider also the promotion of pre-Columbian civilizations among the relevant Latin American nations or pre-Islamic civilizations among Middle Eastern nations. Civilization in the era of nation-states thus needs to both transcend and serve the territorial nation.

Thus civilization both opposes the Civilization of imperialism and depends on it in the way that it authorizes this opposition for nations. This is most evident in the selection of elements and themes from the history of the civilization and their reconstruction in a narrative that

will enable it to perform this authorizing function. The basic approach involves establishing equivalence by identifying elements that are a) identical to and b) the binary opposite of the constituents of Civilization. One strategy is to discover elements identical to those of Civilized society within the suppressed traditions of a civilization: Confucian rationality, Buddhist humanism, Hindu logic, etc. The other strategy finds the opposite of the West in Asian civilizations, which are peaceful, as opposed to warlike; spiritual, as opposed to material; ethical, as opposed to decadent; natural, as opposed to rational; timeless, as opposed to temporal; and so on. Finally, the nation authorizes its opposition to imperialist Civilization by synthesizing or harmonizing the binaries after the equivalence has been established. Thus Western materialism will be balanced by Eastern spirituality and modernity redeemed. Indeed, because the categories of civilization have to be translated into the new lexicon of modernity, they are more meaningful to a contemporary sensibility than to the historical society they allegedly represent. In these ways, civilization is always remade in reference to Civilization. Contemporary analysts, such as Samuel Huntington,[23] whose notion of civilization involves ancient continuities that are, historically and conceptually, pure and closed entities, are, like contemporary nationalists, reifying a relatively recent construction.

Civilization, Sovereignty and Authenticity

The tension between nationalism and transnationalism within civilization reflects the tension between universalism and particularism underlying the world system of nation-states. This system began to take shape during the first half of the twentieth century and emerged fully in the post-World War II era, when it came to be regulated by such exemplary institutions as the United Nations. During the interwar years, as more and more societies became nations, their institutions and laws were increasingly shaped by the emergent global or international institutions such as the League of Nations, the Court of International Justice, the Multilateral Treaty of Paris, the World Disarmament Conferences, and the like.[24] Despite the catastrophic com-

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[23] See Huntington 1993.
[24] See Toynbee 1931, 753-55.

petitiveness among states and the inability of the League of Nations to achieve its primary goal of peace, in the interwar years the system increasingly influenced these nations, old and new, integrating them into it and reinforcing their dependency on it. The urge for nation-states to compete and even overpower others while being shaped and reliant on the system as a whole remains basic to the system, but also an unresolved tension within it.

Accompanying the system of nation-states, we also see, from the late nineteenth century, the intensified circulation of practices, conceptions, and norms of what has been called world culture in the formation of nations. The formation of nations involves overhauling societies to conform to standardized conceptions and norms, from the concept of the "child," to statistical norms of deviance, to the units for measuring voltage and currents, such as the hertz.[25] The dissemination of these practices and norms was frequently undertaken by non-state agencies such as professional associations or advocacy groups, but nations, old and new, and even would-be nations among the colonies (such as India and Egypt), frequently accepted these concepts and standards in order to be recognized in the system of nation-states. In a similar way, the conception of civilization in the twentieth century also conformed to a globally disseminated norm or desideratum that nations have unique cultures and civilizations.

We may now see more clearly the tension in the world system of nation-states; a tension closely tied to the problem of sovereignty. As nation-states and nationalism came to represent the only legitimate mode of belonging in the world, a nation's sovereignty was perceived to derive from two sources: recognition by the evolving system of nation-states and world culture; and, in a more immanent conception, inherence in the preconstituted communal body of the nation. During much of the twentieth century, the former source of sovereignty was frequently obscured, or recognized only tacitly by nations. Nationalism as the predominant ideology of the nation-state tends to locate sovereignty in the history and traditions of a people, indivisible, in a territory. Cultural — and frequently, civilizational — traditions, institutions and even their human embodiments (royalty, for example) are the markers and symbols of the authenticity of the nation; together they form what I call a regime of authenticity that authorizes and guards the nation's sovereignty.

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[25] See Boli-Bennet and Meyer 1978; Boli and Thomas 1999.

Until recently, scholarly studies of sovereignty themselves tended to treat the sovereignty of the nation-state as an outcome of the evolution of the general will of the people in the maturation of political society. According to the classic work of F. H. Hinsley, sovereignty first emerged internally, as citizen and community came to exercise political and ethical restraints upon the modern state; subsequently, internal sovereignty became the basis for external sovereignty conferring on the state a right to play a role in the interstate system. One could say that this immanent conception of sovereignty reflected nationalism itself.[26]

Early critics, such as Harold Laski, argued that the doctrine that the sovereign state represented all citizens was significantly undermined by the reality of class stratification within national society. Indeed, this theory of sovereignty was manipulated to allow the state to expand its prerogative within domestic politics.[27] More recently, Anthony Giddens has shown that it is simplistic to assume the sovereign state predated the interstate system. He says, "The European state system was not simply the 'political environment' in which the absolutist state and the nation-state developed. It was the condition and in substantial degree *the very source* of that development."[28] The sovereignty of a modern state depends on a reflexively regulated and monitored set of relations between states. The system orders both what is internal and external to states, "presuming a system of rule that is universal and obligatory in relation to the citizenry of a specified territory but from which all those who are not citizens are excluded."[29] Not only was sovereignty an essential condition of belonging to the system, the latter would shape the very form of the sovereign nation.

If the impetus to conform *practically* to the global model of the nation is so strong and the resources of nation formation derive in significant part from this system, then why do nations insist on the immanence of their sovereignty? Two interrelated factors are important here. The first relates to the problem of authority in the system. The immanent conception, I have suggested, is embedded in a symbolic "regime of authenticity." Those who can represent themselves

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[26] See Hinsley 1986.
[27] See Laski 1968 (1921), 27-28.
[28] See Giddens 1987, 112 (emphasis added).
[29] See Giddens 1987, 281.

as the custodians of the authenticity of the nation, culture, or civilization are authorized not only to demand loyalty and sacrifice from those within, but also to regulate and even declare an inviolability in relation to powers outside. The second factor is perhaps more constitutive than instrumental, and concerns the problem of time and identity in modern polities.

The problem of identity, so characteristic of modern societies, is most fundamentally a problem of time. It is a quest to retain a sense of self when everything around is perceived to be in flux. Politically, the identity problem arises in the ability to claim sovereignty in the foundational ideals of a regime when the ideals may no longer be viable or when the conditions underlying them are no longer sustainable. In other words, the search for identity is an effort to grasp, retain, and extend presence. Identity and authenticity become salient issues in politics when linearity becomes the dominant mode of representing time and history.

Modern linear history is distinguished from traditional histories principally in that the meaning that the latter almost always seeks in history refers to an earlier presumed ideal or to a transcendent time of god. Traditional historiography usually has a cyclical structure whereby time will reproduce, return to, or approximate a "known certainty." Linear history frequently dispenses with god and replaces it with the model of a unified actor — the subject, the nation — moving forward in time conquering uncharted territories. Just as linear time in capitalism is dominant, so too linear history is often a hegemonic conception that is imposed on and sometimes resisted by various groups in society whose lives respond to different rhythms or conceptions of time — whether seasonal or ritual.

According to Reinhart Koselleck, by the end of the eighteenth century the impact of capitalism and the industrial revolution, together with the developing notions of linear time produced an increasing gap between "experience" and "expectation." Whereas until then most Western Europeans had expected to live their lives as their fathers and forefathers had, the accelerating pace of change in their lives now caused their expectations to diverge from experience, and from this tension emerged the concept of historical time as we know it. Linear history was experienced and formulated as unique, in that the past became distinct from the future not simply in one case, but as a whole.[30]

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[30] See Koselleck 1985, 276-281.

In the late nineteenth century, a historicist view was conjoined with a people or nationality and a territory. By historicism, I refer to the dualistic understanding of history: on the one hand, that the future will not repeat the past, and, on the other hand, that our history will shape the future and we are therefore in some essential way what we have been in the past. The three-way relationship between a people, a territory, and a history distinguishes nationalist histories from other kinds of historical understandings that preceded nationalism. Such a linear history became a most important means of constituting nationhood and the rights of nations, and was disseminated globally through world culture and the nation-state system.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, older modes of recording the past in many parts of the world, such as chronicles or annals or dynastic histories, gave way to linear narratives of the evolution of a people in a territory — the geobody. In these narratives, the nation as a preexisting unity, like a species, is typically shown to have evolved since *ancient* times, to have overcome strife and obstacles – whether in the form of barbarism or superstition — in the *middle* period, and to be poised, self-aware, at the threshold of *modernity*, to gain mastery in the competition among nations. The effort to institute this history by nationalists seems to have taken place both in societies where the process of making the "people" was well under way and in those where this relationship would call or awaken the people into being. Nationalists faced with the latter task, typically in non-Western societies, of course encountered greater difficulties, but they too shared this global method for producing a national identity.[31]

By the twentieth century, national educational systems taught individuals to identify with nation-states that had supposedly evolved over a long history to reach the self-conscious unity of the nation and the individual as the condition for further progress. I have written about the time-space vectors constituting the nation that became deeply embedded in most historiography of the twentieth century. These

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[31] Historically, all kinds of communities, and not only religious ones, had a strong sense of Self versus Other and developed hard boundaries in relation to outsiders. What these movements lacked was not self-consciousness or identity per se, but the historical claim arising from the idea of a sovereign people within a delimited territory (See Duara 1995, chapter 2). Moreover, the notion of authenticity was, as we have seen, clearly important in prenational polities. Authenticity is distinctive in the twentieth century because it has to coexist, often in a deeply tense relationship, with the dominant conception of linear time and rapidly accelerating change.

vectors served to bound the nation as the natural historical object and to project the national history backward to eras that preceded the nation. Territorial boundaries delimited a heterogeneous space that was projected back in time as the homogenous space of national sovereignty. Periodization schemes brought temporal coherence to this dubious spatial unity by linking disparate meanings across and within periods. It is through the medium of history that a people or nationality gains or "awakens" to the consciousness of its unity and lays claim to a territory as exclusively its own. This three-way discursive relationship produced the rights of modern nations.

But national history is not only about linear evolution; it is also about timelessness. Born amid the loss of a known, if hard to attain, certainty, linear history is posited on a linear, preexisting conception of time into which it can be seen to fall or unfold. As such, it cannot rid itself of the anxieties of a linear conception of time. According to Paul Ricoeur, the concept of linear time generates a set of aporias that can never be fully overcome.[32] Among these, we can include the aporia between experience and expectation discussed by Koselleck, but also that between time as loss and uncertainty, and that between mortal time and cosmological time. The anxieties that emerge from the constancy of flux thus call for an artifice that can negotiate or conceal this aporia in the unfolding of history. The artifice must represent a timelessness that serves as an anchor for identity in modern histories and a foundation of the symbolic regime of nation-states. We may think of this artifice as none other than the subject of history — the nation, race, or civilization. The subject enables history to be the living essence of the past, but also simultaneously to be free from the hold of the past: that which evolves is that which remains, even as it changes. Thus the subject is necessary for linear history. Linear histories have certainly become dominant in the era of capitalism and nation-states, and the unchanging does not have the primacy it once had in traditional histories. But it has not disappeared.

The unchanging essence of the past is often endowed with a special aura of sanctity, purity, and authenticity at the heart of a modern discourse on progressive change that is otherwise entirely synchronous with the quickening pace of change — the transformative drive — of global capitalism. It is possible to think of the aporias of linear history as demarcating two regimes, that of capitalism and of (national or

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[32] See Ricoeur 1984.

transnational) authenticity, which institute two poles of authority. Certainly linear, measurable time is necessary for capitalism, where time is money, but the corrosive effects of capitalism (where all that is solid melts into air) are also made visible by this very conception of time. It is not simply the disruption caused by rapid material change that necessitates the production of an abiding truth. It is ultimately the dominant temporal conception that exposes this change as having no goal or meaning that necessitates a continuous subject of history to shore up certitudes, particularly for the claim to national sovereignty embedded in this subject.

The opposition between authenticity and capitalism is an old one and I need to outline the specificity of my argument. The tradition of modern writing on authenticity tends to locate it as the positive (both ethically and ontologically), if fleeting or evanescent, term in the opposition between the self and the market or modernity. Alessandro Ferrara argues that it derives from Rousseau's notion of authenticity as man in the state of nature. The tradition develops through the thought of Hegel, Kierkergaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger and in such contemporary thinkers as Daniel Bell and Christopher Lasch who deplore the corrosion of authenticity and the reduction of self to pure exteriority.[33] Notably, this tradition focuses on authenticity of the self or personhood. Ferrara also identifies an assumption of authenticity in the thought of social thinkers like Marx or Durkheim, whether located in the concept of the worker or the "species being," or in ideas of community or *Gemeinschaft*. Here the role of such concepts as Marx's alienation, Weber's rationalization, or Durkheim's anomie seems to indicate that authenticity is under constant threat of erasure. Most of all, for all of these thinkers, the loss of authenticity spells the destruction of social identity.[34] The authentic that I want to explore here refers primarily neither to selfhood nor, for that matter, to any ontological category. Authenticity in my formulation refers primarily to an order or regime simulated by representations of authoritative inviolability. It derives this authority from being good for all times, which is tantamount to being beyond the reach of time. My understanding of the regime differs fundamentally from the conception of authenticity as an attribute of some endangered *being*; rather the regime is a power that repeatedly constitutes itself as the locus of

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[33] See Ferrara 1993, 30, 148-50; Hegel 1956.
[34] See Ferrara 1993, 47-50, 86-90.

authenticity. The hegemony of linear time accompanying the trans-
forming drive of capitalism necessitates the repeated constitution of
the unchanging subject of history precisely because it is this very com-
bination of capital and linear time that erodes it and simultaneously
exposes the spectacle of erosion.

Perhaps the best known signifier that simulates the authenticity of
the primordial nation — and is most emblematic of the circulatory
process — is the national flag; and there is perhaps no other symbol
whose desecration incites such strong feelings of dishonor. In general,
symbols of authenticity must produce deep affect, and may include
both older historical ones as well as modern ones such as the constitu-
tion. Note for instance, how the doctrine of original intent in the
American constitution treats it as a symbol of authenticity. These
symbols have the capacity to generate a range of responses to the pos-
sible erosion of the true, including nostalgia, fear, militancy, height-
ened devotion, discipline, self-abnegation, dutifulness, and vigilance.
Moreover, loss is not only existential but may be experienced as dis-
honor, desacralization, and defilement (by commodification or sexu-
alization).

Some of the most powerful symbols are not necessarily institutions or
objects, but living embodiments of authenticity with the capacity to
produce empathy and identity. Thus it is that woman, the child, the
rustic, the aboriginal, and royalty often embody the authenticity of the
nation. Each has been associated with deep, although different, symbol-
ic affects in various historical cultures, including motherhood or virgini-
ty among women, innocence and naturalness among children, the
primitive and rootedness among peasants, and timelessness in royalty.
Each has also had a dependent status and their embodied authenticity
is represented as such by other more active agents of the nation or civi-
lization. This is clearest, in many parts of the world, with the case of
women, who are frequently depicted simultaneously as representing the
nation's progress and being repositories of its timeless virtues. Their
assumed authenticity is frequently contained in spatially patterned roles
and movements — such as segregation or domestication — until it is
challenged, usually by a feminist movement. As repositories of authen-
ticity, they are of course informed by historical conceptions such as the
good wife, wise mother (*xianqi liangmu, ryôsai kembo*) ideal in East Asia, or
the goddess of the home (*grihalakshmi*) imagery in India, but their
authenticity is also shaped by their common opposition to the globally
circulated idea of the liberated or Westernized woman.

The question of agents who seek to designate, represent, and thus also control the symbols of authenticity returns us to the other factor behind the consciousness of immanent sovereignty, the problem of authority in the nation-state system. The symbolic regime of authenticity grants its custodians the authority to regulate the relationship with other nations and global capitalism, as well as to regulate and shape the identity of national citizens. These agents typically need to balance and police the boundaries between the regimes of authenticity and capitalism — both global and domestic. On the one hand, the symbolic regime may develop in, or can be mobilized to produce, opposition to capitalism and modernity, as fundamentalist and nativist movements the world over (whether they be the Taliban or the prewar Japanese Showa Restorationists) have shown. Through most of the twentieth century, even when the symbolic regime was being significantly shaped by world culture and the nation-state system, antiimperialist nationalism was able to mobilize considerable opposition to global capitalism by drawing precisely from the authority of this regime.

At the same time, the regime should not basically be seen as contradictory to global capitalism. On an everyday level, the regime of authenticity authorizes a range of representational practices that are in constant traffic with the practices of the capitalist order, a traffic that produces an elaborate economy of authorization and delegitimation, and that the nation-state would like to control. The regime is rather an autonomous authority deployed by its controllers to contain the effects of the world economy and culture, regulate their role, and, perhaps most of all, become a successful player in the global competition.

Culture and civilization are central components in the regime of authenticity. In an age of competitive nation-states, they become part of the machinery of identity politics — where, as in nationalism, identity becomes the basis of the body politic — that drives this competition to a significant degree. The discourse on civilization may also authorize visions of community outside the ambit of territorial states, such as Islamic modernity or Asian values, and may even change the rules of regulated competition. Although technology may enable the realization of these visions across territorial states, the impetus to create such alternative visions and communities in an era of identity politics — even when it may seem purely religious — continues to make such movements susceptible to mobilization by a regime of authentic-

ity. The tension between the universal and particular may be decoupled from territory in the contemporary world, but it is unlikely to wither away in a globalizing world.

Conclusions

The argument I have tried to make may be construed as a social constructionist one, but it is neither strongly so, nor is it made merely to celebrate construction. A society cannot sustain conceptions of authenticity and civilization without some historical basis for these conceptions. Nor can these conceptions be understood without reference to the globally circulatory discourses accompanying the spread of modernity and the nation-state system. Civilization and authenticity emerged from, and in response to, an inter-dependent world culture that created mutually recognizable — if competitive — sovereign actors. It is imperative to grasp that no civilization has ontological, historical, or moral priority over another or others.

At the same time, without the perception of civilizational transcendence and claim to universality — to encompass the good for all — we can scarcely find a position from which to judge nation-states or the goals of modernity. This is the paradoxical condition of civilization in our times. It both reflects and is susceptible to the tensions of a globalizing world divided by nations. The universal scope and role of civilization are threatened by states or other power formations that seek to highlight the distinctive origins of civilization and mobilize its transcendence for the authenticity of the particular. Any theory of multiple modernities will have to identify and evaluate the claim to a historical or civilizational inheritance guiding modernity in the context of the global conditions of the desire for particularity.

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GLOBAL ANTIMODERNISM

Mark Juergensmeyer

The assault on New York's World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, stunned the American public and a global television audience. The world watched as the twin towers crumbled into dust in an awesome demonstration of the al Qaeda view of the world. Theirs was a world at war — and global warfare at that — a view that was echoed in the headlines and public pronouncements of America's political leaders in the days following the attack. But what kind of war did this act proclaim? It was not a war between states — Osama bin Laden scarcely commanded a cave, much less a political region — and it was not a contest between military powers. As the United States soon showed in its air strikes in Afghanistan, neither bin Laden nor his Taliban hosts could long withstand America's awesome military might. It was, in a sense, a religious war, in that bin Laden had proclaimed a jihad against America some five years before, and his several prior acts of terrorism — including attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa and an American naval ship in a Yemeni harbor — were attempts to bring that warfare to life. Yet his foe was not another religion. What he despised was nonreligion, the secular values of the West, the aggressive military and economic posture of modern societies, and the regimes of Saudi Arabia and other moderate Muslim states that bin Laden regarded as America's puppets. In that sense the Pentagon and the World Trade Center were apt targets, for they represented the power of the United States in all its military and economic glory.

But the World Trade Center was not just an American symbol. It was a *world* trade center, after all, and a sign of global economic strength. From its twin towers high above Manhattan's Wall Street its economic tentacles truly had a global reach. Virtually every major financial center was represented in its offices. Its employees came from every corner of the planet. In the lists of the dead that were tallied after the buildings' collapse, citizens from 86 nations were numbered among the victims. In choosing the World Trade Center as a target — twice, as it turned out, once in the less successful car bomb attack in 1993 and again on September 11 — Islamic militants associated with the al Qaeda network showed that the

Western-dominated world of economic globalization was their ulti-
mate foe.

In an interesting way, the World Trade Center symbolized bin
Laden's hatred of both a certain kind of modernization and a certain
kind of globalization. I say "a certain kind," in both cases, since the al
Qaeda network was both modern and transnational in its own way.
Its members were often highly sophisticated and technically skilled
professionals, and its organization comprised followers of various
nationalities who moved effortlessly from place to place with no obvi-
ous nationalist agenda or allegiance. In a sense they were not opposed
to modernity and globalization, as long as it was of their own design.
But they loathed the Western-style modernity that they imagined sec-
ular globalization was forcing upon them.

Some 23 years earlier, during the Islamic revolution in Iran, Aya-
tollah Khomeini rallied the masses with a similar notion, that Ameri-
ca was forcing its economic exploitation, its political institutions, and
its secular culture on an unwitting Islamic society. The ayatollah
accused urban Iranians of having succumbed to "Westoxification" —
inebriation with Western culture and ideas. The many strident move-
ments of religious nationalism that have erupted around the world in
the more than two decades since have echoed that cry.

This anti-Westernism has at heart an opposition to a certain kind
of modernism — its secularism, its individualism, its skepticism. Yet,
in a curious way, by accepting the modern notion of the nation-state
and by adopting the technology and financial instruments of modern
society, many of these movements of religious nationalism have
claimed a kind of modernity on their own behalf.

Understandably, then, these movements of anti-Western mod-
ernism are ambivalent about modernity — about whether it is neces-
sarily Western and always evil. They are also ambivalent about the
most recent stage of modernity (or post modernity): globalization. On
the one hand these antimodern political movements are reactions to
the globalization of Western culture. They are responses to the insuf-
ficiencies of what is often touted as the world's global standard: the
elements of secular, Westernized urban society that are found not
only in the West but in many parts of the former Third World, and
which are seen by their detractors as vestiges of colonialism. On the
other hand, these new ethnoreligious identities are alternative moder-
nities with international and supernational aspects of their own. This
means that in the future some forms of antimodernism will be global,

some will be virulently antiglobal, and yet others will be content to create their own alternative modernities in ethnoreligious nation-states.

How Globalization Has Led to Antimodernism

In those parts of the world that for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were under Western colonial control, economic and cultural globalization has often been perceived as an extension of colonialism. In the latter half of the twentieth century, political independence did not mean complete liberation from European and American colonial powers. New forms of economic and cultural ties were emerging that yoked African, Asian, Middle Eastern, and Latin American societies to the United States and Europe.

By the 1990s some of these ties had begun to fray. The global economic market undercut national economies, and the awesome military technology of the United States and NATO reduced national armies to border patrols. More significantly, the rationale for the Western-style secular nation-state came into question. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the postcolonial critique of Western democracy, the secular basis for the nation-state seemed increasingly open to criticism. In some instances, such as in Yugoslavia, when the ideological glue of secular nationalism began to dissolve, the state fell apart.

The effect of what I have elsewhere called the loss of faith in secular nationalism was devastating.[1] Throughout the world, it seemed, the old Western-style secular nationalism was subject to question, and the scholarly community joined in trying to understand the concept in a post-Cold War and transnational era.[2] Part of the reason for secular nationalism's shaky status was that it was transported to many parts of the world in the cultural baggage of "the project of moderni-

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[1] See Juergensmeyer 1993.

[2] See Anderson 1983; Gottlieb 1993; Kotkin 1994; Smith 1995; Tamir 1993; Young 1993. The renewed academic interest in nationalism has spawned two new journals, *Nations and Nationalism*, and *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, both launched in 1995. Other journals have devoted special issues to the topic: "Reconstructing Nations and States," *Daedalus* 122:3, summer 1993; "Ethnicity and Nationalism," International Journal of Comparative Sociology 33:1-2, January-April 1992 (Anthony D. Smith, guest editor); and "Global Culture," Theory, Culture, and Society 7:2-3, June 1990.

ty"[3] — an ascription to reason and a progressive view of history that many thought to be obsolete. In a multicultural world where a variety of views of modernity are in competition, the very concept of a universal model of secular nationalism became a matter of lively debate.

Globalization challenged the modern Western idea of nationalism in a variety of ways. These challenges have been varied because globalization is multifaceted: it includes not only the global reach of transnational businesses but also their labor supply, currency, and financial instruments. In a broader sense it also refers to the planetary expansion of media and communications technology, popular culture, and environmental concerns. Some of the most intense movements for ethnic and religious nationalism have arisen in nations in which local leaders have felt exploited by the global economy — as in Iran and Egypt — or believe that somehow the benefits of economic globalization have passed them by.[4] The global shifts in economic and political power that occurred following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the sudden rise and subsequent fall of Japanese and other Asian economies in the past 15 years have had significant social repercussions. The public sense of insecurity that has come in the wake of these changes has been felt especially in areas economically devastated by the changes, including those nations and regions that had been under the dominance of the Soviet Union.

These shifts led to a crisis of national purpose in less developed nations as well. Leaders such as India's Jawaharlal Nehru, Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Iran's Riza Shah Pahlavi once tried to create their own versions of America — or in some cases a cross between America and the Soviet Union. But a new, postcolonial generation no longer believed in the Westernized vision of Nehru, Nasser, or the Shah. Rather, it wanted to complete the process of decolonialization by asserting the legitimacy of its countries' own traditional values in the public sphere and constructing a national identity based on indigenous culture.[5] This eagerness was made all the more keen by the global media assault of Western music, videos, and films that satellite television beam around the world, and that threaten to obliterate local and traditional forms of cultural expression.

In other cases it has been a different kind of globalization — the

[3] Habermas 1987, 148.
[4] See Juergensmeyer 1993; Juergensmeyer 2000.
[5] Chatterjee 1993.

emergence of multicultural societies through global diasporas of peoples and cultures, and the suggestion of global military and political control in a "new world order" — that has elicited fear. It is this fear that has been exploited by bin Laden and other Islamic activists, and that made it possible for al Jazeera television and other popular media outlets in the Islamic world to portray America's military response to the September 11 attacks as a bully's crusade, rather than the righteous wrath of an injured victim. In some parts of the Muslim world, the post-September 11 U.S. coalition against terrorism was seen as an excuse for expanding America's global reach.

Perhaps surprisingly, this image of America's sinister role in creating a new world order of globalization is also present in some quarters of the West. In the United States, for example, the Christian Identity movement and Christian militia organizations have been fueled by fears of a massive global conspiracy involving liberal American politicians and the United Nations. In Japan a similar conspiracy theory motivated leaders of the Aum Shinrikyo movement to predict a catastrophic World War III, which their nerve gas assault in the Tokyo subways was meant to demonstrate.[6]

As far-fetched as the idea of a "new world order" of global control may be, there is some truth to the notion that the integration of societies, communication among disparate peoples, and the globalization of culture have brought the peoples of the world closer together. Although it is unlikely that a cartel of malicious schemers has designed this global trend, the effect of globalization on local societies and national identities has nonetheless been profound. It has undermined the modern idea of the nation-state by providing nonnational and transnational forms of economic, social, and cultural interaction. The global economic and social ties of the inhabitants of contemporary global cities are intertwined in a way that supersedes the idea of a national social contract — the Enlightenment notion that peoples in particular regions are naturally linked together in a specific nation-state. In a global world it is hard to say where particular regions begin and end. For that matter, in multicultural societies it is hard to say how one should define the "people" of a particular nation.

This is where religion and ethnicity step in to redefine public communities. The fading of the nation-state and the disillusionment with old forms of secular nationalism have produced both the opportunity

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[6] See Asahara 1995.

for new nationalisms and the need for them. The opportunity has arisen because the old orders seem so weak; and the need for national identity persists because no single alternative form of social cohesion and affiliation has yet appeared to dominate public life the way the nation-state did in the twentieth century. In a curious way, traditional forms of social identity have helped to rescue one of Western modernity's central themes: the idea of nationhood. In the increasing absence of any other demarcation of national loyalty and commitment, these old staples — religion, ethnicity, and traditional culture — have become resources for national identification.

The Alternate Modernity of Antimodernism

In the contemporary political climate, therefore, religious and ethnic nationalism has provided a solution to the perceived insufficiencies of Western-style secular politics. As secular ties have begun to unravel, local leaders have searched for new anchors to ground their social identities and political loyalties. What is ideologically significant about these ethnoreligious movements is their creativity. Although many of the framers of the new nationalisms have reached back in history for ancient images and concepts that will give them credibility, theirs are not simply efforts to resuscitate old ideas. These are contemporary ideologies that meet present-day social and political needs.

In the context of Western modernism this is a revolutionary notion — that indigenous culture can provide the basis for new political institutions, including resuscitated forms of the nation-state. Movements that support ethnoreligious nationalism are, therefore, often confrontational and sometimes violent. They reject the intervention of outsiders and their ideologies and, at the risk of being intolerant, pander to their indigenous cultural bases and enforce traditional social boundaries. It is no surprise, then, that they get into trouble with each other and with defenders of the secular state. Yet even such conflicts serve a purpose for the movements: they help to define who they are as a people and who they are not. They are not, for instance, secular modernists.

Since Western-style secular modernism is often targeted as the enemy, that enemy is most easily symbolized by things American. The United States has taken the brunt of religious and ethnic terrorist attacks in recent years in part because it so aptly symbolizes the

transnational secularism that the religious and ethnic nationalists loathe, and in part because it does indeed promote transnational secular values. For instance, it has a vested economic and political interest in shoring up the stability of regimes around the world. This often puts it in the position of being a defender of secular governments. Moreover, the United States supports a globalized economy and a secular culture. In a world where villagers in remote corners increasingly have access to MTV, Hollywood movies, and the Internet, the images and values that have been projected globally have often been American.

So it is understandable that the United States would be disdained. What is perplexing to many Americans is why their country would be so severely hated, even caricatured. The demonization of the United States by many ethnoreligious groups fits into a process of delegitimizing secular authority. It also involves the appropriation of traditional religious images, especially the notion of cosmic war. In such scenarios, competing ethnic and religious groups become foes and scapegoats, and the secular state becomes religion's enemy. Such satanization is aimed at reducing the power of one's opponents and discrediting them. By humiliating them — by making them subhuman — ethnoreligious groups assert their own moral superiority.

During the early days of the Gulf War in 1991, the Hamas movement issued a communique stating that the United States "commands all the forces hostile to Islam and the Muslims," and singled out then-President George Bush, who, it claimed, was not only "the leader of the forces of evil" but also "the chief of the false gods."[7] As late as 1997, Iranian politicians, without a trace of hyperbole, could describe the United States as the "Great Satan." This rhetoric first surfaced in Iran during the early stages of the Islamic revolution when both the shah and President Jimmy Carter were referred to as Yazid (in this context an "agent of satan"). "All the problems of Iran," the Ayatollah Khomeini elaborated, are "the work of America."[8] By this he meant not only political and economic problems, but also cultural and intellectual ones, fostered by "the preachers they planted in the religious teaching institutions, the agents they employed in the universities, government educational institutions, and publishing houses, and the Orientalists who work in the service of the imperialist

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[7] Hamas Communique, January 22, 1991, quoted in Legrain 1991, 76.
[8] Khomeyni 1977, 3.

states."[9] The vastness and power of such a conspiratorial network could only be explained by its supernatural force.

The Global Agenda of Antimodernism

Although the members of many radical religious and ethnic groups may appear to fear globalization, what they distrust most are the secular aspects of globalization. They are afraid that global economic forces and cultural values will undercut the legitimacy of their own bases of identity and power. Other aspects of globalization are often perceived by them as neutral, and in some instances, useful for their purposes.

Some groups have a global agenda of their own, a transnational alternative to the modern nation-state. Increasingly terrorist wars have been waged on an international and transnational scale. The international network of al Qaeda is a case in point. One of its affiliated movements, Gamaa i-Islamiya, literally moved its war against secular powers abroad when its leader, Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman, moved from Egypt to Sudan to Afghanistan to New Jersey. It was from the Jersey City location that his followers organized a bombing attack on the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993 that killed six and injured a thousand more. One of Osama bin Laden's operatives, Ramzi Youssef, who was also convicted of complicity in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, mastermined the "Bojinka Plot" that would have destroyed a dozen American airliners over the Pacific during the mid-1990s; Youssef moved from place to place, including Pakistan and the Philippines. Algerian Muslim activists brought their war against secular Algerian leaders to Paris, where they have been implicated in a series of subway bombings in 1995. Hassan Turabi in Sudan has been accused of orchestrating Islamic rebellions in a variety of countries, linking Islamic activists in common cause against what is seen as the great satanic power of the secular West. In addition to the acts directly attributed to his leadership, Osama bin Laden, from his encampment in Afghanistan, is alleged to have funded other acts of terrorism conducted by groups around the world.

These worldwide attacks may be seen as skirmishes in a new Cold

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[9] Khomeini 1985, 28.

War, as I once described it,[10] or, more ominously, a clash of civiliza-
tions, as Samuel Huntington termed it.[11] It is possible to imagine such
a clash if one assumes — as many Muslim activists do — that Islam
and other religions are civilizations comparable to the modern West,
and that secular nationalism is, in the words of one of the leaders of
the Iranian revolution, "a kind of religion."[12] He went on to explain
that it was not only a religion, but one peculiar to the West, a point
that was echoed by one of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt.[13]

Behind this image of a clash of cultures and civilizations is a certain
vision of social reality, one that involves a series of concentric circles.
The smallest are families and clans; then come ethnic groups and
nations; the largest, and implicitly most important, are religions. Reli-
gions, in this sense, are not just bodies of doctrine and communities of
believers, but shared worldviews and cultural values that span great
expanses of time and space: global civilizations. Among these are
Islam, Buddhism, and what some who hold this view call Christen-
dom or Western civilization or Westernism.[14] The so-called secular
cultures of places such as Germany, France, and the United States, in
this conceptualization, stand as subsets of Christendom/
Western civilization. Similarly Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and other
nations are subsets of Islamic civilization. From this vantage point, it
is both a theological and a political error to suggest that Egypt or Iran
should be thrust into a Western frame of reference. In this view of the
world they are intrinsically part of Islamic, not Western, civilization,
and it is an act of imperialism to think of them in any other way. Pro-
ponents of Islamic nationalism, therefore, often see themselves as a
part of a larger, global encounter between Western, Islamic, and oth-
er cultures. This view of a clash of civilizations is not confined to the
imaginations of Samuel Huntington and a small number of Islamic
extremists, but underlies much of the political unrest at the dawn of
the twenty-first century.

An even more extreme version of this global cultural clash is an
apocalypic one, in which contemporary politics is seen as fulfilling an
extraordinary religious vision. Some Messianic Jews, for instance,

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[10] See Juergensmeyer 1993.
[11] See Huntington 1996.
[12] Banisadr 1981, 40.
[13] See el Arian 1989.
[14] See Shitta 1989.

think that the biblical age that will be ushered when the Messiah returns is close at hand. It will occur when the biblical lands of the West Bank are returned to Jewish control and when the Jerusalem temple described in the Bible is restored on its original site — now occupied by the Muslim shrine the Dome of the Rock. Several of these activists have been implicated in plots to blow up the shrine to hasten the coming of the kingdom. One who served time in prison for his part in such a plot said that the rebuilding of the temple was not just a national obligation but also a critical moment in the redemption of the world.[15]

Religious activists who embrace traditions such as Millenarian Christianity and Shi'ite Islam, which have a strong sense of the historical fulfillment of prophecy, look toward a religious apocalypse that will usher in a new age. American Christian political activists such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson are animated by the idea that the political agenda of a righteous America will help to usher in an era of global redemption. The leader of Aum Shinrikyo, borrowing Christian ideas from the sixteenth-century French astrologer Nostradamus (Michel de Nostredame), predicted the coming of Armegeddon in 1999. Those who survived this World War III — mostly members of his own movement — would create a new society in 2014, led by Aum-trained "saints."[16]

Activists in other religious traditions may see a righteous society being established in a less dramatic manner, but some Sunni Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists have, in their own ways, articulated hopes for a political fulfillment of a religious society. They believe that dhammic society can be established on earth, as one activist Buddhist monk in Sri Lanka put it, by creating a religious state (Thero). These forms of religious politics are more than nationalist, since they envision the world as caught up in a cosmic confrontation, one that will ultimately lead to a peaceful world order constructed by religious nations. The result of this process is a form of global order radically different from secular versions of globalization, yet it is an ideological confrontation on a global scale.

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[15] See Lerner 1995.
[16] Asahara 1995, 300.

The Future of Antimodernism in a Global World

As we have seen, antimodern movements are ambivalent about globalization. To the extent that they are nationalistic, they often oppose the global reach of world government, at least in its secular form. But the more visionary of these movements also have their own transnational dimensions, and some dream of world domination shaped in their own ideological images. For this reason we can project at least three futures for antimodernism in a global world: one where religious and ethnic politics ignore globalization, another where they rail against it, and yet another where they envision their own transnational futures.

1. *Nonglobalization: New Ethic and Religious States*

The goal of some antimodernists is the revival of a nation-state that avoids the effects of globalization. Where new religious states have emerged, they tend to be isolationist. In Iran, for instance, the ideology of Islamic nationalism that emerged during and after the 1979 revolution, and that was propounded by the Ayatollah Khomeini and his political theoretician, Ali Shari'ati, was intensely parochial. It was not until some 20 years later that new movements of moderate Islamic politics encouraged Iran's leaders to move out of their self-imposed international isolation.[17] The religious politics of Afghanistan, especially after Taliban militants seized control in 1995, were even more strongly isolationist. Led by members of the Pakhtoon ethnic community who were former students of Islamic schools, the religious revolutionaries of the Taliban established a self-contained autocratic state with strict adherence to traditional Islamic codes of behavior.[18] Their willingness to harbor Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network led to their obliteration in a hailstorm of American air strikes in October and November 2001.

Other movements of religious nationalism have not been quite as isolationist and extreme. In India, when Hindu nationalists in the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), or Indian People's Party, came to power in 1998 — a victory that was consolidated in the national elections of 1999 — some observers feared that India would become isolated

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[17] See Wright 2000.
[18] See Marsden 1998.

from world opinion and global culture as a result. The testing of nuclear weapons as one of the BJP's first acts in power did little to dispel these apprehensions. But in many other ways, including its openness to economic ties and international relations, the BJP has maintained India's interactive role in the world community. Credit for this may be due, in part, to the moderate leadership of the BJP prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, one of the country's most experienced and temperate politicians.

If other movements of religious and ethnic nationalism come to power, will they behave like the Taliban or the BJP? Observers monitor developments in Pakistan, Egypt, Algeria, and elsewhere for signs of antiglobal sentiment should the considerable strength of religious politics in those regions lead to the establishment of religious states. When Abdurrahman Wahid, a Muslim cleric, edged past the daughter of Indonesia's founder to become the country's prime minister in 1999, observers wondered whether he would usher in an era of religious nationalism. In this case, however, the fears were unfounded. The actions of his government showed Wahid's brand of Islam to be moderate and tolerant, and committed to bringing Indonesia into the world community and the global economic market.

2. *Guerrilla Antiglobalism*

In other regions of the world it is not the creation of new religious states that is at issue but the breakdown of old secular states with no clear political alternative. In some instances, religious and ethnic activists have contributed to these anarchic conditions. In the former Yugoslavia, for instance, the bloodshed in Bosnia and Kosovo was caused by the collapse of civil order as much as by the efforts to create new ethnic and religious regions. Because these situations have been threats to world order, they have provoked the intervention of international forces such as NATO and the UN.

It is, however, world order that many of these religious and ethnic nationalists oppose. They note that the increasingly multicultural societies of most urban communities around the world have undermined traditional cultures and their leaders. They have imagined the United States and the United Nations to be agents of an international conspiracy, one that they think is hell-bent on forming a homogenous world society and a global police state. It was this specter — graphically described in the novel *The Turner Diaries* — that one of the nov-

el's greatest fans, Timothy McVeigh, had hoped to forestall by attacking a symbol of federal control in America's heartland. His assault on the Oklahoma City federal building and other terrorist attacks around the world were acts of what might be considered guerrilla antiglobalism.

The largest guerrilla band of antiglobalists has been the al Qaeda network associated with Osama bin Laden. Its vendetta against secular globalization led by the United States and the secular West has led to the bombing of U.S. Embassies in Africa in 1998, and the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000, and the catastrophic events of September 11, 2001. These acts were performances of power meant for a wide television audience, especially the Middle Eastern audience that viewed al Jazeera television, the popular tabloid talk-show format station based in the tiny country of Qatar on the Arabian coast. The purpose of such dramatic terrorist acts was to demonstrate to the Muslim public that there was a vast global war going on, one in which the United States and its form of globalization represented the forces of evil, while the forces of good were identified as a transnational Muslim populace led by heroic figures such as Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden's many videotaped appearances on al Jazeera television portrayed a gaunt, renunciatory figure leading his battles in exile from a cave — a picture that was probably intended to invoke in the Muslim imagination an image of the Prophet himself. Bin Laden pictured himself as a guerrilla antiglobalist in a cosmic war, one with enduring sacred dimensions.

3. *Transnational Alliances*

The far-flung reaches of the al Qaeda network also exemplify another dimension of contemporary religious activists: their transnationality. Members of the al Qaeda cells have come from such places as Algeria, Egypt, Palestine, and Pakistan, as well as bin Laden's native Saudi Arabia. Many were forged into a multinational fighting force in the crucible of the Afghan war against the Soviets. The political goals of this pluralist fighting force were not to create any one specific Islamic state — even the Taliban's Afghanistan was ultimately dispensable — but to project an image, albeit an inchoate one, of a transnational Muslim empire. In one of bin Laden's videotaped diatribes after the onset of the American bombing in Afghanistan in October 2001, bin Laden refers to the "eighty years" that the West had oppressed the

Middle East. The time frame is significant, because it seems to have referred to a signal event in the Muslim world in the 1920s, the final ending of the Ottoman Empire. In an interesting way, bin Laden was invoking the images of old Muslim dynasties in projecting his own image of an alternative globalization, one of Muslim values and presumably his own imperial leadership.

In addition to bin Laden's imaginary alternative globalization, there is the real possibility of religious states bonding together to create their own transnational entities, a sort of Muslim version of the European Union, for instance. According to one theory of global Islamic politics that circulated in Egypt in the 1980s and '90s, local movements of Muslim politics were meant to be only the first step in creating a larger Islamic political entity-a consortium of contiguous Muslim nations. In this scenario, religious nationalism would be the precursor of religious transnationalism.

Yet another kind of transnational association of religious and ethnic activists has developed in the diaspora of cultures and peoples around the world. Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network illustrates this form of transnationality as well. Members of the movement took up long-term residence and infiltrated the socially disgruntled immigrant Muslim communities of Germany, Belgium, Spain, Great Britain, Canada, and the United States. In the al Qaeda network, as in other patterns of expatriate association, rapid Internet communication technologies allow members of ethnic and religious communities to maintain a close association despite their geographic dispersion. These "e-mail ethnicities" are not limited by political boundaries or national authorities. Expatriate members of separatist communities — such as India's Sikhs, and both Sinhalese and Tamil Sri Lankans — have provided both funding and moral support for their compatriates' causes. The Kurd "nation" is spread throughout Europe and the world, united through a variety of modern communications technologies. In some cases these e-mail communities long for a nation-state of their own; in other cases, such as al Qaeda, they are prepared to maintain their nonstate national identities for the indefinite future.

Modernity, Identity, Power, and Globalization

Each of these futures of antimodernism contains a paradoxical relationship between certain forms of globalization and emerging reli-

gious and ethnic nationalisms. It is one of history's ironies that the globalization of culture and the emergence of transnational political and economic institutions enhance the need for local identities. They also create the desire for a more localized form of authority and social accountability.

The crucial problems in an era of globalization are identity and control. The two are linked, in that a loss of a sense of belonging leads to a feeling of powerlessness. At the same time, what has been perceived as a loss of faith in secular nationalism is experienced as a loss of agency as well as identity. For these reasons the assertion of traditional forms of religious and ethnic identities is linked to attempts to reclaim personal and cultural power. The vicious outbreaks of antimodernism in the incidents of religious and ethnic terrorism that have occurred at the turn of the century can be seen as tragic attempts to regain social control through acts of violence. Until there is a surer sense of citizenship in a global order, therefore, ethnoreligious visions of moral order will continue to appear as attractive though often disruptive solutions to the problems of modernity, identity, and belonging in a global world.

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PART D

MULTIPLE MODERNITIES
AND THE PROSPECTS
FOR A WORLD COMMUNITY

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MULTIPLE MODERNITIES AND
NEGOTIATED UNIVERSALS

Jürgen Kocka

Concepts such as modernity travel, and as they travel they change. Visions, such as that of civil society, emerge in specific historical cultures. Once they extend their claim for recognition to other historical cultures, they change, or at least they should, so as to be neither ineffective nor coercive. These hypotheses should be particularly relevant to the most recent period, with its huge wave of globalization. Changes in basic concepts in our social and political language are usually related to nonsemantic changes in historical reality. This is what makes semantic changes particularly interesting to study. Concepts and visions in the process of extension or universalization are keys for the study of social, political, and cultural interrelatedness or, rather, encounters between different parts of the world, such as the West and non-Western regions.[1]

The notions "modern," "modernity," and "modernization" originated in the West. At first they were European, later on European-North American. The term *modern* has been used at least since the fifth century (in Latin). It became a central concept in the late seventeenth century (in French) and continued to be used frequently through the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries in different Western languages to characterize art and poetry, social relations, types of states, ideas, or whole periods in one of three ways, all related to time: in the sense of present or current in contrast to previous or former; in the sense of new in contrast to old; in the sense of transitory in contrast to eternal. What people regarded as modern and how they valued it have differed tremendously over time. The noun *modernity* appeared at the turn of the nineteenth century — *Moderne* in German — meaning something like the aggregate of the most recent social, literary, and artistic directions.[2]

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[1] I owe much to the participants of "AGORA. Arbeit – Wissen – Bildung," a project the Wissenschaftskolleg Berlin sponsored and hosted 1999 – 2001.
[2] See Gumbrecht 1978.

Modernization, in contrast, only became a central concept in the 1950s and 1960s, under strong American influence. It helped to redefine modernity, which came to be seen as the product or reference point of modernization. The notion of modernization came with varying nuances. Here are a few defining elements. First, the notion related to time and referred to something new or present in contrast to old or traditional. More precisely, it related to change: it conceptualized a long-term transformation from traditional to modern. Second, it continued a long line of social-historical theorizing that emerged in eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought, which saw historical change as directed and irreversible, not using *modernization,* but words like progress, revolution, civilization, rationalization, social differentiation, or just history. Thirdly, modernization had a systemic scope in that it related to a conjunction between economic, political, social, and cultural transformations. It stressed as "normal" the interrelatedness between, for example, the emergence of capitalism, industrialization, the rise of liberal democratic structures, the building of the nation state, the emergence of pluralist society and social relations built on achievement, the advancement of science, certain personality structures, certain belief systems, and states of mind. Different authors stressed different items in different languages, but nearly all of them stressed the interrelatedness between the items they chose.

There was, fourth, the frequent implication, most clearly stated by Karl Marx, that — notwithstanding undeniable differences between the cases — the more modern country displayed to the more backward one how it would develop eventually. Although the West was first, the rest would follow and "develop" similarly in principle. Sooner or later the world would become more homogenous. And fifth, the whole trend was seen as a positive and desirable one (to be supported by "development" policies), much more clearly and directly than in, for example, the writings of Max Weber, an influential predecessor of this type of thought, who, although he spoke little of modernization, did not overlook its basic ambivalence.[3]

Clearly, these were Western concepts. As social historians we can try to reconstruct the experiences and underlying structures in Western Europe and North America that invited this kind of thinking and helped make it plausible — at least to parts of the elites. But this line of thought had global dimensions from the start in the eighteenth cen-

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[3] See Lerner 1968; Nolte 2001.

tury on. The subject of modernization philosophy tended to be all mankind, to be unified from its European center and led peacefully to a better future; the view was Eurocentric, but the claim was universal. When the vision was partly put into practice, particularly in the French Revolution, there were world-historical repercussions. And when European elites and later North American elites constructed this Western-centric line of thought, it was part of an emerging European and/or American identity, fueled by encounters with non-European cultures, from which Westerners set themselves apart: the so-called Orient in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the East and the developing countries in the twentieth. Both world wars played a role as arenas of catastrophic encounter. In other words, looking back it becomes clear that the most Eurocentric ideas were partly products of transnational entanglements that reached beyond the West.

The strong emergence of modernization theories in the 1960s sparked sharp criticism.[4] There is no reason to summarize all the criticisms, many of which were overdone. But I find two particularly convincing.

First, the catastrophies of the twentieth century were hardly reflected in the classic modernization theories, probably because of the strength of the United States and the triumphant mood among American intellectuals after 1945. It needed European authors and the passage of time for the traumatic experiences and dark sides of the twentieth century to make themselves felt in theorizing about modernization. When that occurred — think of Foucault and the rereading of Weber, think of Zygmund Baumann, but also of Elias, who can be read both ways — it deeply shattered the optimism of classic modernization theories, directed attention to the costs and the crises of modernization, and reduced its teleological implication. The reinterpretation of the major twentieth-century European dictatorships as to a large extent modern was part of this reorientation. So was the discovery of the environmental crisis.[5]

Second, the extension of modernization theories to the non-Western world opened them to criticism. The increasingly frequent encounters with other parts of the world, which increased during the most recent waves of globalization, cast doubts on the assumptions about growing homogeneity implicit in modernization theories.

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[4] A balanced view in Wehler 1975.
[5] See Schluchter 1996; Elias 1978-1987; Foucault 1973; Baumann 1989; Frei 1993.

Thorough historical comparisons had a similar effect. Gradually it became obvious that increasing interrelatedness did not necessarily mean growing similarity. And, the more time went by, the more development policies based on modernization thinking failed. Over the decades one could not help but recognize that many traditions do not disappear under the impact of modernization, but survive in modified form and help to direct the way in which modernization works. Tradition codetermines which modern elements are selected, redefined, and appropriated by the receiving culture. The more time one had to observe the workings of modernization in non-Western parts of the world and, for that matter, in non-Western parts of Europe after 1990, the clearer became the influence of culture on the chances, failures, and directions of economic and political modernization. The notion of embeddedness as well as ethnologically or anthropologically informed methods has substantiated criticism of classic modernization theories, which at times had been rather schematic.[6]

There were, on the other side, occasions and developments that tended to corroborate classic modernization theory. The decline of communism and the fall of the Soviet empire were such an occasion. These events can be read as support for the thesis that in the long run modern technological change and industrial growth are inextricably linked with constitutional, nondictatorial governments based on due process of law and with more or less open societies. It is this interrelatedness that had been stressed by modernization theories. Many additional developments all over the world, however, tend to make sense in terms of the classic modernization paradigm. The next case in point will probably be China. Changes there, however they may turn out in the end, may show again that in the long run a quickly modernizing economy needs to be accompanied by some kind of social and political modernization.

There are good reasons why the classic modernization paradigm has not been abandoned, despite the very heavy criticism of it over several decades.[7] But the paradigm has changed, and it continues to do so. It has lost its triumphant message, becoming more modest in sub-

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[6] See Gulbenkian Commission 1996, 48-60; Hannerz 1992; Friedman 1994; Eisenstadt 1986.

[7] An impressive defense of modernization theory after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe: Zapf 1991.

stance and method. One prefers to talk more about modernity and less about modernization. Although this may represent a loss of precision and a weakening of the historical dimension, it reflects the increased emphasis on culture and a more open set of expectations. There is, most important, the move from singular to plural and the notion of "multiple modernities," which has quickly put down roots. Professor Eisenstadt has pioneered this notion, and his view has been a decisive contribution to this conference.[8] He stresses that increasing globalization means increasing interconnectedness, but not necessarily increasing homogenization. The expectation of convergence is abandoned or reduced. The concepts "modernization" and "Westernization" are clearly differentiated. No single country or region can provide the yardstick for measuring the modernity of all others.

There is, however, a price to be paid for this change of categories implicit in the pluralization of modernization by extending it all over the world. It is essential to assume the existence of a common denominator of "modernity" and "modernization" to justify the use of these concepts in the plural. Sometimes the common denominator of all modernities — the defining core of the concept — is rather thin or vague. According to the Turkish scholar Nilüfer Göle, for example, the major characteristic of modernity is simply its potential for continual self-correction. For the Swedish social scientist Björn Wittrock, modernity is neither a unified civilization nor a period in time, but a global condition, a set of hopes and expectations entailing some minimal conditions of adequacy. He mentions a specific type of historical consciousness, a new sense of the place of the thinking and acting self, and the self-reflexive, critical nature of modern thought. For Eisenstadt a civilization qualifies as modern when its order is no longer taken for granted, but is an object of continuous contestation, in which protest movements play a significant role and new forms of political legitimation emerge. Again, economic as well as political-institutional criteria of modernity are not clearly specified. On the basis of such "soft" definitions it is not easy to distinguish between different degrees of modernity. At the same time, the conceptual dichotomy between modern and traditional is explicitly made relative, if not abandoned.[9]

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[8] Eisenstadt 2000; the Preface and the other contributions to this Daedalus issue (Winter 2000). Also see *Early Modernities* (Daedalus, Summer 1998), particularly the contributions Eisenstadt and Schluchter 1998 and Wittrock 1998.

[9] See the contributions Eisenstadt 2000; Göle 2000; Wittrock 2000.

As a consequence, nearly everything can qualify as modern. But, as we all know, the analytical usefulness of concepts that exclude almost nothing is small, although their diplomatic usefulness may be remarkable.

On the other side, the shift of paradigm from singular to plural brings big gains. The notion of multiple modernities makes it possible to fully recognize existing plurality without giving up a unifying reference point altogether. It makes it possible to compare institutions, strategies, and values globally. What is more, it invites people to explore and discover mutual influences, the effects of encounters on all sides, processes of perception, selection, and adoption, and intrinsic entanglements. The interrelatedness of the modern world becomes a topic; the hybrid character of most phenomena becomes clear. While Westerners are protected against overestimating their own traditions, intellectuals and elites in non-Western parts of the world can find new and productive ways to place their experiences and their traditions in a global context without turning against modernity as such, and without isolating themselves in an intellectually fragmented global landscape.

This is what I have in mind when speaking of "negotiated universals." I have already mentioned the claim for universal recognition and global validity built into the Enlightenment-generated modernity philosophy, in spite of its rather particular and regional origins. There are and have been over the centuries different ways of making this universal claim, to some limited extent, a reality.

There are, first, strategies of imposition, extension by rule and by rulership, universalization by pressure, manipulation, and force. The history of colonialism and imperialism holds many examples, including those of informal empires. There is, second, attractiveness and imitation. Again we find examples in the past as well as the present. There are many elements in the cultures, political systems, rights and the values, and economic structures of the West that turn out to be highly attractive to other parts of the world, particularly to segments of the elites, who try to adopt them without much modification. Admittedly, the two strategies of universalization — imposition on the basis of pressure and imitation on the basis of attractiveness — are not always clearly distinguishable.

A third way is "negotiation," which permits and invites contributions from all participating parties. I use the word negotiation

metaphorically. It can take many forms and display many facets, but basically it is a process in which the spatial and cultural extension of a concept, vision, or program is intrinsically tied to a change of its substance. Take the European or Western modernity paradigm again as an example. On the one hand it is not just a Western particularity. It claims ever broader recognition, it tends toward the universal, and it has, I am convinced, much to offer to other parts of the world. On the other hand, major concepts, theories, visions, and programs like the one we are discussing here are indeed context-dependent, culture-specific, in other words, historical. They cannot just be exported or transplanted into other cultures without altering or even hurting them. In being expanded, transplanted, and accepted, they have to be selected, reinterpreted, modified, adjusted, and incorporated into new contexts. The quality of the exportable good or the traveling idea can be judged by whether it lends itself to being modified, adjusted, and incorporated in such a way or not. Fundamentalist creeds cannot, but Enlightenment-based concepts and programs can, because the learning perspective is built into them, at least in principle. But of course this is not only an intellectual question, but also a question of practice, power, and skills.

Such a negotiating process involves give and take. It has at least two sides. On the receiving side the process flows into selective acceptance, reinterpretation, and modified incorporation, usually not without conflict, losers and winners, destruction, and new departures. Think of the only partial reception of Western models by Japan since the Meji restoration. But there is or should be a change on the sender's side as well. The Western modernity paradigm is challenged by new discoveries and new competition when being transplanted to East Asia, India, or the Islamic world. Self-criticism and self-relativization become necessary as the concept changes. Internal conflicts may result on the sending side, too. Again there are winners and losers. Some positions and convictions have to be abandoned and new positions emerge.

I think the change from classical modernization theories to the notion of multiple modernities is a case in point, an example of the negotiation I am talking about. As a consequence of such renegotiation of a central concept, its acceptance of plurality grows and change becomes continuous. At the same time, however, postmodern fragmentation, mutual isolation, and neglect are avoided, and elements of universalism are preserved or put into practice. Again, this is not an

exclusively intellectual process, but a process with practical dimensions as well. If it works — and it doesn't always — the results are negotiated universals.

This brief discussion has dealt with the global expansion of and resulting change in a European notion, a Western view and practice. What about the other way round? Which East Asian or Islamic concepts, notions, paradigms, or visions have had or have a similarly universal claim and lend themselves to similar processes of negotiation and expansion cum change?[10] Until the eighteenth century, Europe was more on the receiving side.[11] But in the last two centuries the negotiation of universals has been a very asymmetric affair, from the West to other parts of the world, but hardly ever the other way round. Why? Should we try to achieve more balance?

Finally, a word on comparing business and science, and on this conference, which is sponsored by a successful capitalist firm with global reach. The logic of scientific argumentation, i.e., the field that decides on the success and failure of scholars, and the logic of the market, which decides on the profits and losses of business firms, differ in many respects. I will not discuss those differences now. Rather I want to note some common problems and trends.

Both in the sciences (in the broad sense of *Wissenschaften*) and in business, the scope of the field in which one works has been expanding. In the latter instance it is or will be global. There are no built-in borders, limits, or walls that stand against basic internationalization in either science or business.

Both in science and in business, one of the major aims is to build and to profit from wide-reaching interconnections: in German, *Zusammenhang*. Increasing interconnectedness, as noted previously, does not necessarily mean increasing homogenization. It does not mean that the global suppresses the local. Such suppression would be counterproductive both for business (in spite of the triumph of global capitalism and economies of scale) and for the social sciences in spite of the importance of quantifying methods and systematic macro approaches. In both arenas the aim is to achieve different amalgamations of global and local, without denying the deep tensions that fre-

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[10] See the interesting suggestion with respect to the universal claims and potential attractiveness of "Asian values" in: Tu 2000, esp. 205-208.

[11] See Osterhammel 1998.

quently exist between the two. Interconnections and networks are the opposite to postmodern fragmentation, indifferent isolation, and conventional parochialism, and in that, they are essential for helping both science and business achieve their goals.

Usually the interconnectedness, with its universal implications, cannot simply be imposed by one side on the other. Both in science and in business, reciprocal processes, negotiation among them, and pertinent skills are required to achieve the necessary *Zusammenhang*.

But here the similarities stop. If negotiation does not lead to agreement between different scientific positions, that is not necessarily a failure. Compromises are more important, more congenial, and more necessary in the world of business or in the world of politics than among practitioners of science. In scholarly discourse, the sharpening of opposing opinions may be at least as important as the building of consensus. Contestation is important. Compromises can veil the truth; their legitimate role in scientific discourse is limited. Our concepts should not be all-embracing, but precise.

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MUTUAL LEARNING AS AN AGENDA FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT[1]

Tu Wei-ming

As we confront a new world order, the exclusive dichotomy of capitalism and socialism imposed by the cold war superpowers is woefully inadequate for understanding the rich texture of the emerging global community. Intent on offering an alternative global paradigm, Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington proffer two facile generalizations: "the end of history" and "the clash of civilizations." The two positions are seemingly contradictory readings of the human condition: an optimistic assertion that fundamental ideological divides no longer exist and a cautionary note that cultural, especially religious, differences are the major sources of international conflict.

It seems evident that the liberal democratic nations of Western Europe and North America, fueled by the market economy, have now set the stage for a radical global transformation. It also seems plausible that challenges from, for example, the Confucian and the Islamic cultural zones may impede this process. Yet should we take the trajectory of Western culture's impact as a sort of historical inevitability? Both positions cited above are predicated on the assumption that the current working dichotomy is still "the West and the rest." Is this conceptual framework adequate for enhancing social development as an international joint venture?

If social development is seen as an aspiration and a promise for human flourishing, we need to address the fundamental ethical and spiritual issues confronting the global community. The old triumphant or confrontational Western mindset is counterproductive. The United States, in particular, can take the lead in transforming itself from primarily a teaching civilization — especially in reference to East Asia since World War II — to a learning culture by considering some critical questions:

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[1] This paper is a slightly modified version of "Mutual Learning as an Agenda for Social Development," in: Jacques Baudot (ed.), *Building a World Community. Globalization and the Common Good.* Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in association with University of Washington Press, Seattle and London, 2001, pp. 253–260. Reprinted with the kind permission of the University of Washington Press.

Which is more congenial to social integration, viewing ourselves as isolated individuals or as centers of interpersonal relationships?

Even if we use quantifiable material conditions to define and measure our well-being, can we afford to cut off ourselves from the spiritual moorings of our cultures?

If success is measured solely as wealth and power to the exclusion of other goods, such as social capital, moral influence, and exemplary teaching, how can we transmit cherished values to the next generation?

Can our society prosper without inculcating in individuals a basic sense of duty and responsibility in addition to rights-consciousness?

Can we afford to focus our attention on the rule of law without emphasizing civility and trust in daily social intercourse?

Can liberty as an intrinsic value generate a humane society without distributive justice?

Can instrumental rationality alone, without sympathy and compassion, right inequality?

Should our culturally pluralistic world deliberately cultivate shared values as a common ground for organic social solidarity?

As we become more keenly aware of our earth's vulnerability and the depletion of natural resources, what steps toward preservation must we take?

Such questions suggest the need for a communal critical self-consciousness among the reflective minds of the world. We may be witnessing the very beginning of global history rather than the end of history. This new beginning must take the desire for mutual reference as its point of departure. Our awareness of the danger of civilizational conflicts rooted in ethnicity, gender, language, land, class, age, and religion makes the necessity of dialogue particularly compelling. If we envision development in social as well as economic terms, we recognize that globalization is not homogenization. Rather, it both intensifies and undermines various forms of localization. We should accept a plurality of models of sustainable development and emphasize the ethical and spiritual dimensions of human flourishing as integral parts of our development strategy.

A perception of development shaped by modernization as a unilinear progression and defined exclusively by quantifiable material gains is too simplistic to reflect the complexity and diversity of human flourishing. Surely, eradicating poverty is one of the highest priorities of any global approach to social development, but even here, the

enabling factors are political, social, cultural, and legal as well as economic. This requires a more sophisticated vision of how different spheres of interest are interconnected nationally, regionally, and globally.

Just as no local interests, no matter how compelling, should override national interests, regional and global interests must not be subsumed under national interests. Even if we assume that the United States alone can exert hegemonic influence in the global community, the really enduring American strength lies in "soft power" — moral suasion — as well as military might. Social capital, the cultivation of cultural competence and the enhancement of spiritual values, is as important as economic capital, the cultivation of technical competence and the enhancement of material conditions.

The politics of domination is being replaced by the politics of communication, networking, negotiation, interaction, interfacing, and collaboration. The strong 1960s belief that modernization would wipe out cultural, institutional, structural, and mental differences and, if unimpeded, would lead to a uniform modern world is no longer tenable. Since globalization engenders localization and indigenization as well as homogenization, cultural, institutional, structural, and cognitive differences actually shape the contours of the modernizing process. In consequence, traditions are constituent parts of modernity and modernization can assume different cultural, institutional, structural, and mental forms. The thesis of convergence, meaning that the rest of the world will inevitably converge with the modern West, has been modified.

In the 1980s, the thesis of reverse convergence was strongly implied, if not clearly articulated, by new modernization theorists as the result of East Asian economic dynamism. "Asian values," "network capitalism," and "the Asia-Pacific century" were advocated as an alternative to modern Westernism. But, the observation that the engine of development had shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific was premature. The 1997 Asian financial crisis forced a new interpretation. Authoritarianism and crony capitalism were identified as the cultural, institutional, structural, and mental causes: Asian financial institutions had suffered from a lack of transparency, public accountability, and fair competitiveness. As the economies of the Asia-Pacific region begin to recover, East Asia is likely to reemerge as the single most important reference and perhaps as a counterpoint to Western Europe and North America once again.

If instead of reverse convergence multiple modernities had been presented as an explanatory model, the implications of East Asian modernity would have been far-reaching. East Asia has been deeply influenced by Western Europe and North America and its accelerating modernity is mainly the result of the Western impact. Yet the shape of East Asian peoples' lives is significantly different from that of Westerners. The possibility of being modern without being Western suggests that, under the influence of East Asia as well as Western Europe and North America, Southeast Asian societies, notably Malaysia and Indonesia, may become modern without necessarily being European, American, or East Asian. By implication, Latin American, South Asian, and African forms of modernity are, in principle, realizable. Is the vision of multiple modernities merely wishful thinking, or a practicable guide for social development? Every country is, in both theory and practice, capable of human flourishing according to its own specific conditions. The mobilization of indigenous cultural resources for capacity building is a precondition for such an endeavor.

East Asia is a case in point. Can East Asian political and cultural leaders be inspired by the Confucian spirit of self-cultivation, family cohesiveness, social solidarity, benevolent governance, and universal peace to practice responsibility in their domestic affairs? This question concerns us all. As Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and Vietnamese emigrate to other parts of the world, can they share their rich cultural heritage? This question is important not only for East Asia, but for the United States, Canada, Australia, and the European Union.

The commitment to the development of Africa and other world regions stricken by poverty is predicated on a holistic vision of human flourishing and a realistic model of interdependency. If we consider ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity as a global asset, Africa should not be characterized by the HIV epidemic, poverty, unemployment, and social disintegration alone. It should also be recognized as a rich reservoir of human spirituality and elder wisdom. The African Renaissance, symbolized by the geological and biological diversity of the tiny area around Capetown (said to be comparable in richness to the vast area of Canada) ought to be a source of inspiration for a changed mindset that addresses social development as a global joint venture.

The development of Africa is important for us because, without a holistic sense of human flourishing, we cannot properly anchor our

sense of security, let alone well-being in the global community as a whole. The acknowledgment that there is a multiplicity of modern societies around the globe and that it is arrogant to proclaim our own cultural supremacy is a significant step toward mutual referencing among societies. We cannot help African societies accelerate their own development if we prematurely conclude that they have nothing to teach us. Indeed, celebrating cultural diversity, without falling into the trap of pernicious relativism, is profoundly meaningful for global stewardship.

As the rise of Confucian East Asia suggests, traditions are active agents in modernity; in fact, the modernizing process has assumed a variety of cultural forms. Modernization originating in Western Europe has powerfully transformed the world in one dominant direction. In its inception, however, it was already a mixture of conflicting and even contradictory trajectories. Even if we overcome the conceptual difficulty of generalizing European cases as paradigmatic manifestations of modernity, we must still treat North American modernity as a separate case. The story of modernization as a master narrative contains several versions of globally significant local knowledge. Now that East Asia's local knowledge is added to the story, it seems reasonable to anticipate an increasing number of normal or even exemplary modernities from other parts of the world. Fruitful comparisons across geographic, linguistic, ethnic, cultural, and religious boundaries will enrich our understanding of social development as a holistic program for human flourishing.

The common practice of "learning from the West," deemed absolutely necessary for survival by East Asian intellectuals and political leaders, will certainly continue, but the need to broaden the horizons of reference cultures is obvious. As mutual referencing progresses, East Asia can benefit from civilizational dialogues with Latin America, South Asia, the Islamic world, and Africa. I have been advocating in Beijing and throughout Cultural China that it is in China's best interest to take India seriously as a reference society. This will significantly broaden China's symbolic resources in understanding her own indigenous traditions, such as Mahayana Buddhism and religious Daoism, and help her better appreciate the modern relevance of religion. If China can recognize Tibet as an enduring spiritual and a venerable cultural heritage, not only will her international reputation improve significantly, but her domestic ability to promote social integration will do likewise.

In the United States and, by implication, the modern West, the need to transform America's arrogance as a teaching civilization into the humility of a learning culture is predicated on a global vision of social development. We should accept the dictum that the more powerful, wealthy, and influential nations are, the more obligated they are to enlarge the well being of the global community. Strong and rich nations, as beneficiaries of the international system, are obligated to see to it that the least developed countries benefit from their international policies. The isolationist mentality that advocates national interest as the ultimate justification for global action is, in the long run, detrimental to domestic social solidarity. The protectionist approach is self-defeating because it eventually undermines the very system that has generated and sustained its prosperity.

East Asian intellectuals have been devoted students of Western learning. In Japan, European and American tutelage has played an important role in modernization. Japan's ability to learn from the West without abandoning indigenous resources for national and cultural identity helped that country to become one of the most developed in the world. The West, on the other hand, has not felt compelled to learn from the rest of the global community. This asymmetrical situation is particularly pronounced in the United States' relationships with East Asia, notably China. To remain a strong international leader the United States needs an elite educated to be well-informed global citizens.

The time is long overdue for American educators and politicians to rekindle a cosmopolitan spirit. The United States' assumption of the role of a tutor for democracy, market economy, civil society, and human rights in East Asia since World War II has been instrumental in developing an international vision. Although an implicit hegemonic mentality in this vision was unhealthy, it had the potential to evolve into true internationalism. But, as the anticommunist ideology fades and East Asia assumes a greater role in global business and politics, a more wholesome American presence in East Asia is partnership. Implicit in partnership are recognition, understanding, and appreciation. Although the obligation to address this asymmetry is mutual, the United States, as the stronger and wealthier partner, has greater resources to improve the situation effectively and equitably.

America's current isolationist and protectionist mentality, a reflec-

tion of the politics of domination, cannot be transformed by top-down political will. Change can occur only through the mobilization of social forces, including nongovernmental organizations. Public intellectuals in government, media, business, the professions, labor, religion, and advocacy movements — for example, environmental protection, gender equality, racial harmony, or human rights — as well as the academic community should take responsibility for facilitating a new agenda to discuss the American vision of and contribution to the global community. Given America's habits of the heart and fragmented political prospects for increasing American internationalism, debates are not particularly encouraging in the short run. Nevertheless, pragmatic idealism and a cosmopolitan spirit are also defining characteristics of the American mind. American officials as well as scholars and experts have been at the forefront in ensuring that structural adjustment programs include social development and increasing resources allocated to social development. The possibility of an authentic American internationalism is still there.

The emergence of a new communal critical self-consciousness among public intellectuals will better facilitate American participation in strengthening cooperation for social development through the UN and help realize inspiring leadership on the global scene. In the eyes of East Asian intellectuals, the strength of the United States as a model of modernity lies in a vibrant market economy, a functioning democratic polity, a dynamic civil society, and a culture of freedom. The Enlightenment values, such as liberty, rights-consciousness, due process of law, and dignity of the individual, are evident in the American economy, polity, society, and culture. Yet unfortunately, American life is also plagued by inequality, litigiousness, conflict, and violence. The American people could benefit from a spirit of distributive justice in economy, an ethic of responsibility in politics, a sense of trust in society, and, above all, a culture of peace.

Among the developed countries, the United States is noted for openness to change, willingness to experiment, and flexibility. Somewhat liberal immigration policies, admittedly often dictated by economic need and political expediency, are clear indications of the evolution of the United States into a microcosmic "united nations." Multiculturalism and ethnic diversity are integral parts of the American way of life. The best of America is seen in a spirit of tolerance, coexistence, dialogical interaction, and mutual learning across race, gender, age, class, and religion. If the American mindset evolves to encom-

pass responsibility, civility, and compassion as well as freedom and rights and to take a global perspective in defining national interest, the United States can significantly enhance the global agenda for social development.

PART E

THE MODERNITY OF CHINA

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THE EMERGENCE OF ALTERNATIVE MODERNITY IN EAST ASIA

Ambrose Y.C. King

Modernization as a Great Transformation

The question of modernity has preoccupied the minds of great sociologists since the classical period of the discipline in the late nineteenth century. In his celebrated book, *All That Is Solid Melts into Air,* Marshall Berman writes:

> There is a mode of vital experience — experience of space and time, of the self and other, of life's possibilities and perils — that is shared by man and woman all over the world today. I shall call this body of experience "modernity."[1]

Indeed, modernization became a global phenomenon in the last decades of the twentieth century. Although modernization theory of American origin that was dominant in social sciences in the 1950s and '60s has lost its appeal, and has been subjected to criticism of various sorts, Asian countries, as a whole, have enthusiastically adopted modernization as the language of development.[2] It is significant that mainland China in 1978 made a fundamental shift from the antimodernist utopian engineering of the Cultural Revolution to a pragmatic search of the Four Modernizations. Historically, East Asia's embarking on the path of modernization was a reaction to the challenge of the West, with the intent to gain wealth and power, in short, to catch up with the West. True enough, Asians' engaging in modernization was not totally without ambivalence, reluctance, and even the pain of self-denial. Indeed, to borrow the phrase from Octavio Paz, a Mexican poet, East Asians are "condemned to modernization."[3] East

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[1] Berman 1988, 15.
[2] Jim Rohwer writes, "Struck for centuries in lethargy and conservatism, Asians now believe passionately in modernization — probably more than most Europeans and, to judge by the souring mood in America in the early 1990s, perhaps more than many Americans, too." (Rohwer 1996, 32).
[3] Octavio Paz's attitude toward modernization is marked with ambivalence. He writes, "So I am of two minds. I think we are condemned to modernization. If we are

Asia's modernization is a great transformation that involves changes in the economic, political, social, and the cultural order.

Despite the claims made by East Asians that what they pursued was modernization, not Westernization,[4] East Asia's modernization is inescapably Westernization to some extent. Modernity was first achieved in Europe. The first modernity was European modernity.[5] This is what Jürgen Habermas called the Enlightenment project, or "the project of modernity."[6] Until now, strictly speaking, there has been only this modernity, which has found its full expression as a "mode of vital experience," to use Berman's words. The globalization of modernity today can be largely understood as the spread, expansion, or diffusion of Western modernity.[7] Analytically and conceptually, modernization and Westernization are two different concepts and experiences, and Asians' conscious choice to pursue modernization on the one hand and to reject Westernization on the other hand is not difficult to understand. But what is questionable is the possibility of achieving modernization without at the same time acquiring important elements of Westernization. In the late twentieth century, with globalization of modernity reaching a high level, it is not wide of the mark to say that "the Enlightenment dream of a universal rational society has to a remarkable degree been realized."[8] In the process of global modernization, Western values tended to become dominant, and the Westerners, especially the Americans, consciously or unconsciously, tend to promote a universal Western culture, believing that non-Western people should commit themselves to the Western values

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going to be modern, try to be more quick and pacific about instituting it. On the other hand, I say 'condemned to modernize,' because seeing the U.S., Europe, and Japan I think modernization is not a benediction. It can be a kind of refrigerated air-conditioned hell." (Paz 1994).

  [4] As a matter of fact, anti-Western but pro-modern attitudes are not confined to East Asians.

Huntington, who observes the process of indigenization in the revival of religion in non-Western countries, writes, "The revival of non-Western religion is the most powerful manifestation of anti-Westernism in non-Western societies That revival is not a rejection of modernity, it is a rejection of the West and of the secular, relativistic, degenerate culture associated with the West. It is a rejection of what has been termed the Westoxification of the non-Western societies. It is a declaration of cultural independence from the West, a proud statement that "we will be modern but we won't be you." (Huntington 1996a, 101).

  [5] See Therborn 1995a.
  [6] See Habermas 1981.
  [7] See Giddens 1990.
  [8] See Barber 1992.

of democracy, free markets, human rights, and individualism, and the rule of law, and should embody these values in their institutions. Indeed, as pointed out by Huntington, "Minorities in other civilizations embrace and promote these values, but the dominant attitudes toward them in non-Western cultures range from widespread skepticism to intense opposition."[9] Since the United States is the "lead society" of Western modernity in the twenty-first century,[10] non-Westerners' opposition to Americanization is particularly evident. But this should not be seen as the opposition to modernity per se; in fact, the opposition is only to the American mode of modernity. According to Paul Hollander:

> The hostility American culture provokes is in some ways well-founded. Nonetheless, most critics misidentify the problem. It is not American capitalism, imperialism, or mass culture. Rather, it is modernity as represented by the United States.[11]

Put differently, the widespread anti-American sentiment is a manifestation of hostility toward a set of American values and the missionary zealotry to impose them on others. Chalmers Johnson writes, "What is needed for Japan and for all of East Asia is an end to U.S. hegemony." He argues that U.S. ideologues ignore cultural orientations that make the capitalism in many East Asian countries different from that of the U.S. and approvingly cites John Gray's words, "The claim of the United States to be a model for the world is accepted by no other country."[12] Despite the controversial nature of the concept "Asian values,"[13] Asia's rallying call for "Asian values" in the late decades of the twentieth century, should be seen as Asia's determined search for its cultural identity, an Asian search for Asia's own vision of modernity.

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[9] Huntington 1996a, 183-184.
[10] Wagner 1994, 180.
[11] Hollander 1992. Quoted according to Wagner 1994, 180.
[12] Johnson 2001, 10.
[13] Asian values were often depicted by Westerners as the values used to defend authoritarianism in regimes in Singapore and Malaysia, but most people in Asia thought of Asian values as having to do more with strong families, education, and hard work than with autocratic government. See Glazer 1999.

The Modernity Project and its New Debate

In the 1970s, modernization theory of American origin was under attack, and there was silence on the idea of modernity in Western intellectual circles. Discourse and controversy over the meaning of modernity, so lively a decade before, had virtually ceased to exist. But throughout the 1980s, interest in modernity and modernization was revived, and modernity became the dominant theme on the agenda of intellectual discourse. Paradoxically, the revival of heated interest in the idea of modernity was, at least partly, due to the ascendancy of postmodernism, which proclaimed "the end of the modern." Postmodernism, a term defying simple definition, is more strongly based on a negation of the modern, a perceived abandonment, break with, or shift away from the definitive features of the modern.[14] Berman writes:

> Postmodernists maintain that the horizon of modernity is closed, its energies exhausted — in effect, that modernity is passé. Postmodernist social thought pours scorn on all the collective hopes for moral and social progress, for personal freedom and public happiness, that were bequeathed to us by the modernists of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment.[15]

Jean-Francois Lyotard, who is responsible for popularizing the notion of postmodernity, argues that grand hopes associated with a totalizing form of social theory, or grand narratives of modern social theory have lost their credibility.[16] The debate between Habermas, who presented himself as a guardian of "the project of modernity," and the postmodernist theorists, like Lyotard, Baudrillard and others who challenged and rejected the Enlightenment project in one form or another, is well known. Here, my central interest is not whether the modernity project is "incomplete," as modernist Habermas argues, or exhausted, as postmodernists Baudrillard, Lyotard and others would have us believe. The debate between modernists and postmodernists surrounding the modernity project in fact deals only with the problem of modernity of the West. While Western modernity is in the late stages of radicalization, modernization on a world scale has only been with us in the last quarter century. Featherstone rightly puts global modernization in spatial terms:

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[14] See Featherstone 1988.
[15] Berman 1988, 9.
[16] See Lyotard 1986.

The end of modernity, then, would be better referred to as the end of Western modernity. Or, put less dramatically, the end of Western modernity is in sight, the West has 'peaked' with an accompanying sense of exhaustion. But there is no sense of exhaustion in East Asia and other parts of the world which are pursuing their own national and civilizational blend of modernity. Hence it may be more propitious to speak of modernities rather than modernity.[17]

There is no denying that in the globalizing process of modernity, the Enlightenment values, such as freedom, equality, and justice, have become fairly universally accepted in the modernizing East Asia. Especially after World War II, Western modernity powerfully spread its economic, political, and ideological features throughout the world, with a very strong convergence in central aspects of its institutional structures, be it the occupational and industrial structure, the structure of education, or the structure of cities. Each has developed in different modernizing societies and these convergences have indeed generated common problems, such as those of urban and industrial development, educational development, political organization, and urbanization.[18] The wide spread of Enlightenment values and the seeming structural similarities among modernizing societies, however, cannot be taken to mean that a single modern civilization is already in place. As Eisenstadt points out:

> The modes of coping with these problems have differed greatly between these different modern civilizations, and differences are to no small degree attributable to the different traditions — especially basic premises — which became crystallized and continuously reconstructured in these civilizations and to the distinct historical experiences of these civilizations.[19]

Indeed, "globalization," Göran Therborn, a Swedish sociologist, wisely advises, "must not imply any great unifier of the globe." He not only argues that there are multiple routes to and through modernity, but also that there is another global challenge, a challenge to comparative studies "to a de-Westernized, de-centered conception of the global, to grasp the diversity of the modern world."[20] Today, we must see the problem of modernity not in temporal but also in spatial

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[17] Featherstone 1995, 83-84.
[18] See Eisenstadt 1990, 503-504.
[19] Eisenstadt 1990, 504.
[20] Therborn 1995b, 137.

terms. We can no longer talk about modernity in the singular. What global modernization brings about is or will not be a single modern civilization, but different modern civilizations. Notwithstanding the far-reaching influence of Western modernity on the world, it would, as Braudel writes, "be childish" to see the "triumph of civilization in the singular . . . as eliminating the different civilizations."[21] Huntington persuasively argues that "modernization, instead, strengthens those cultures and reduces the relative power of the West. In fundamental ways, the world is becoming more modern and less Western."[22] Paradoxically, the very success of modernization in non-Western societies, in this case in East Asia, has stimulated the revitalization of East Asia's search for identity and cultural expression of modernity.

A Cultural Turn and Global Modernities

For a very long time, culture was a topic conspicuously absent in the discussion and debate on modernization and modernity among mainstream social scientists. The recent focus on the interpretation of the culture of modernism and postmodernism and the study of postcolonialism have restored culture to a prominent place in academic and popular discourse.[23] The cultural theorists of the 1980s could even speak of the culturalization of everyday life as being a defining feature of a new, postmodern age.[24] Indeed, the increasing attention placed on the cultural dimension of social formations has justifiably been called a "cultural turn."[25] Charles Taylor shrewdly observes that "the dominant theories of modernity over the last two centuries have been of the acultural sort," "modernity in this kind of theory is defined by a rational or social operation which is cultural-neutral." He criticizes the accultural theory of modernity for committing what he calls "the Enlightenment package error." This is an error of seeing everything modern belonging to an Enlightenment package. He writes:

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[21] Braudel 1980, 212.
[22] Huntington 1996a, 78.
[23] See Turner 1992, 8 and Robertson 1988.
[24] See Kahn 1995, 9.
[25] See Robertson 1992, 32-48.

The belief that modernity comes from one single universally applicable operation imposes a falsely uniform pattern on the multiple encounters of non-Western culture with the exigencies of science, technology, and industrialization.

Furthermore, he believes:

In short, exclusive reliance on an acultural theory unfits us for what is perhaps the most important task of social science in our day: understanding the full gamut of alternative modernities that are in the making in different parts of the world. It locks us into an ethnocentric prison, condemned to project our own forms onto everyone else, and blissfully unaware of what we are doing.[26]

Jean-François Lyotard argues that the grand narratives of philosophy and social theory do violence to non-Western cultures. For Lyotard, all modern empancipatory narratives are distasteful precisely because they are implicated in the process whereby "other cultures" are dominated and then destroyed by the advance of the West. In particular they do so by means of their "cosmopolitan" nature, by which all localisms are dissolved into universalism.[27] It is now more and more recognized by students of modernity that "the prevailing definitions of 'modernity' have been premised on a set of values which were predominantly Western, male, white, oriented to the individual and ecologically innocent."[28] As rightly observed by Therborn, "Modern historical social development cannot be encapsulated in 'the West and the rest' formula."[29] Indeed, to understand the full gamut of alternative modernities that are in the making in East Asia and other parts of the non-Western world, it is necessary to develop a healthy relation between Western culture and other cultures. In this connection, Vattimo has the following observations to offer:

Today, when for better or for worse these other cultures have gained the right to speak — above all the Islamic culture, with its pressure political and otherwise on the West – we can no longer ignore the problem of the relation between the 'observer' and the 'observed'. The dialogue with different cultures is finally becoming a true dialogue, and it is pointless to liquidate the Eurocentric perspectives which structuralism in years past rightfully meant to defuse: the question today is rather to truly exercise this dialogue beyond a purely descriptive position.[30]

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[26] Taylor 1992, 89-93.
[27] See Lyotard 1985. Lyotard's views are restated in Kahn 1995, 8.
[28] King 1995, 118.
[29] Therborn 1995b, 137.
[30] Vattimo 1988, 401.

Globalization and Asia's Alternative Modernity

In the globalizing process of modernity, what has emerged is the awareness of both the global and the local, that is, globality and locality. Roland Robertson has used the idea of "glolocalization" to make points about the global-local problematic. Globalization is largely defined in terms of homogenization, but Robertson rightly argues that "it makes no good sense to define the global as if the global excludes the local."[31] "The global is not in and of itself counterposed to the local. Rather, what is often referred to as the local is essentially included within the global."[32] The concept of glolocalization illustrates well the phenomenon of the dynamics of global modernization; on the one hand, various features of Western modernity have spread to the non-Western world; thus a seemingly homogenous modern civilization is in the making. On the other hand, at the same time non-Western nation-states or societies have become increasingly conscious of searching for their own cultural identities and their own ways to modernize.

In the last decades of the twentieth century, the rise of East Asia was the most dramatic phase of global modernization. East Asia's search for identity is inseparable from her search for modernity. It is worth reiterating that it is East-Asia's very success in modernizing that has created in Asians a new awareness and assertiveness. East Asia has long been marginalized on the world stage, and its voice was drowned out and unheard in the global discourse of modernity. However, East Asia's success in modernizing and in creating wealth has rekindled Asians' faith and confidence in Asia. John Naisbitt observes:

> This faith in Asia, faith that it can develop its own models, the Asian way, is now shared by many. For many, the term "Asian values" is a rallying call against the perceived evils of Westernization, a desire to reinstate the best of the old ways in the face of rapid, stunning modernization.[33]

In a deep sense, to modernize Asia in an Asian way is to search for Asia's alternative modernity, or to "Asianize" modernity. Ambassador Tommy Koh wrote in 1993, a "cultural renaissance is sweeping

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[31] Robertson 1995, 34.
[32] Robertson 1995, 35.
[33] Naisbitt 1995, 93-94.

across" Asia.[34] In the words of a renowned political scientist, "This renaissance manifests itself in increasing emphasis on both the distinctive cultural identities of Asian countries and the commonalities of Asian cultures which distinguish them from Western culture."[35] Indeed, Asians' self-confidence and assertiveness have much to do with East Asia's successful economic development. This is so in spite of the Asian financial crisis on the eve of the twenty-first century. Huntington observes:

> Wealth, like power, is assumed to be proof of virtue, a demonstration of moral and cultural superiority. As they have become more successful economically, East Asians have not hesitated to emphasize the distinctiveness of this culture and to trumpet the superiority of their values and way of life compared to those of the West and other societies.[36]

Clearly, East Asia's assertiveness has a great deal to do with the global shift in the balance of power between the West and other nations, and this new power relation has led directly or indirectly to a recognition of the possibility of other forms of modernity than that of the West. From a world perspective, the current preoccupation with the postmodern in cultural discourse, as Barry Smart suggests, "may be symptomatic not so much of the demise or exhaustion of the 'modern,' but a belated recognition of its creative, innovative momentum and influence on the Pacific rim and the developing societies of the East."[37] Indeed, China's incredible success in its "modernization with Chinese characteristics" project in the last two decades provides further evidence of the making of an alternative modernity in East Asia.

Global modernization cannot be merely seen as the consequence of Western modernity. It is as much the result of responses and the strong counterforces coming from other cultures and civilizations when the encounter occurs between the West and the others. Edward A. Tiryakian, an American sociologist, wrote in 1984 that "we are in a global axial period of transition," and that "the epicenter" of modernity was shifting from Northern America to East Asia. "What

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[34] Koh 1993, 1.
[35] Huntington 1996a, 104.
[36] For better or worse, the new material success of Asia has given rise to a sort of "Asian universalism" comparable to that which has been characteristic of the West. Prime Minister Mahahir of Malaysia was quoted as saying to the heads of European governments in 1996, "Asian values are universal values, European values are European values." See Huntington 1996b, 28-46.
[37] Smart 1990, 28.

will be essential for East Asia to become an epicenter of modernity is to develop a sociocultural set of beliefs and values that would underlie new sociocultural innovations having universalistic appeal for different sectors, so as to provide an overall upgrading and model for the world community."[38] Whether the epicenter of modernity in the twenty-first century will be in East Asia is a question only history can tell. What is happening today in East Asia is alternative (Asian) modernity in the making. Peter Berger persuasively argues that the emerging industrial capitalism in East Asia is a new mode of modernity that is distinct from Western modernity. He believes that one of the components of capitalist modernity is individualism, but the East Asian model that adheres to values of collective solidarity and discipline is what he calls "a nonindividualistic version of capitalist modernity."[39]

Modernization theorists like Talcott Parsons "assumed that individualism [or as he called it, ego-orientation] is inevitably and intrinsically linked to modernity." But, in the case of East Asia, it shows that "the linkage between modernity, capitalism, and individualism has not been inevitable or intrinsic; rather, it would have to be reinterpreted as the outcome of contingent historical circumstances."[40] The emerging mode of social-cultural formation in East Asia is indeed different from Western modernity. It should be remembered that "modern universalization, however, has to be understood in the typically modern, historicizing manner. The new, universal categories are historically produced and anchored, rather than absolute or logically necessary."[41] Therefore, it is advisable to understand Western modernity as one form of modernity, but not to define modernity as Western modernity. Failing to make this distinction will lead us to commit what Taylor calls the "Enlightenment package error."

In considering whether an alternative modernity is developing in East Asia, it is interesting to note the argument put forward by Francis Fukuyama, who can justifiably be called a modern universalist. Fukuyama achieved immediate worldwide fame after he published the article titled "The End of History" in 1989. Seeing the collapse of communism in 1989 in East Europe and the Soviet Union, he

[38] Tiryakian 1984.
[39] Berger 1988, 6.
[40] Berger 1988, 6.
[41] Fornas 1995, 30.

advanced the claim that we may be witnessing "the end point of man's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." He took the view that "the triumph of the West [. . .] is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism."[42] Nevertheless, in the last few years, while paying more attention to culture, Fukuyama has been arguing that there is not a single path to modernity, and that the "late" modernizers have taken a very different route to development than earlier ones.[43] Moreover, he is now saying "there is no theoretical reason why Confucian social structures could not coexist perfectly well with democratic political institutions," and he even advocates an Asian alternative to Western liberal democracy:

> The essence of the Asian alternatives is a society built not around individual rights, but around a deeply engrained moral code that is the basis for strong social structures and community life.[44]

Tu Wei-ming rightly points out that modernization may assume different cultural forms, and his articulation of the emerging pattern of an East Asian modernity with six salient features under the influence of Confucian tradition[45] can find good empirical support from various studies in East Asian societies. Even in the studies of modernization across nations of Alex Inkeles, who is a modern universalist, there are some revealing statements that run counter to his universalistic position. For example, "Between 1963 and 1991, the proportion of Taiwanese who claimed to have attended an ancestor worship ceremony increased from 39 percent to 75 percent." For the Japanese, a preference for filial piety has been increasing; 61 percent in 1963, rising to 73 percent in 1983. In Baoding, on the Chinese mainland, 95 percent of elders and their children stress the importance of filial piety, while in Hong Kong, "a strikingly large proportion of 88 percent agreed with the idea that government should punish the unfilial [...]."[46] Nathan Glazer writes:

> But by Western standards, Asian values are still surprisingly firm. It is this continuing firmness that has not been taken into account in the

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[42] Fukuyama 1989, 3-18.
[43] See Fukuyama 1995b, 23.
[44] Fukuyama 1995a, 12. See also King 1997.
[45] See Tu 2000, 207.
[46] Inkeles and Smith 1974. See also Inkeles 1997.

recent trashing of their significance. Globalizing undoubtedly affects social and cultural features, and, yes, undermines them. But the rate of undermining is surprisingly slow, and the difference in the rates of change in these key social and cultural characteristics between East and West still gives the East an advantage.

Glazer sees the enduring power of the tradition of the East Asia, and writes, "Tradition maintains itself even in the face of so many aspects of globalization. It is much too early to count out Asian values." [47] Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, using data from three waves of World Values Surveys, which include 65 societies and 75 percent of the world's population, find evidence of both massive cultural changes and the persistence of distinctive cultural traditions. In the report on their study, Inglehart and Baker state:

> What we witness with the development of a global economy is not increasing uniformity, in the form of a universalization of Western culture, but rather the continuation of civilizational diversity through the active reinvention and reincorporation of non-Western civilizational patterns. [...] But values seem to be path dependent: a history of protestant or orthodox or Islamic or Confucian traditions gives rise to cultural zones with distinctive value systems that persist after controlling for the effects of economic development. Economic development tends to push societies in a common direction, but rather than converging, they seem to move on parallel trajectories shaped by their cultural heritage. [48]

Inglehart and Baker's findings of historically anchored "cultural zones" forcefully substantiate Huntington's multiple-civilizations thesis, and are also testimony to the emergence of multiple modernities in the process of global modernization. Indeed, the alternative modernity unfolding in East Asia is part and parcel of the truly dynamic drama of the globalization of modernity, or more precisely, the glocalization of East-Asian modernity.

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[47] Glazer 1999, 27-34.
[48] Inglehart and Baker 2000, 22-49.

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CHINESE MODERNITY

Frederic Wakeman, Jr.

Beijing postmodernist literati notwithstanding, China is in the full flush of second-world modernization.[1] "Globalization" may be, as Bruce Mazlish puts it, a "thin veneer," but it is still a highly prominent surface, visible in the airport culture of China's major cities, the gaudy high-rise towers of Pudong, and the neon-lit karaoke bars flashing throughout the southwestern suburbs of the national capital.[2]

The initial phase of modernization occurred in the first half of the twentieth century, and it was focused on the coastal metropolis of Shanghai.[3] In Wen-hsin Yeh's words:

> It encompassed, as the publishing enterprises of the Commercial Press suggest, a conscious effort by an emerging class of professional writers, editors, publishers, and translators — cultural mediators and interpreters in a broad sense — to map out a new system of intellectual categorization and construct a new genealogy of knowledge. This project of enlightenment was the product of complex dynamics of cultural encounters between China and the modern West. It was instrumental, within the Chinese context, both in the opening up of the spatial horizon that let in the outside world and in the celebration of a Western-engineered material culture.[4]

After the self-imposed autarky of the early People's Republic, when China was parochially international in an anticosmopolitan fashion, the second wave of cultural modernization washed over the country in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. Precisely because of the time warp between cosmetically westernized prerevolutionary Republican China of the 1930s and '40s and the determinedly nativist PRC '60s and '70s, the contrast was visibly spectacular. During the early 1980s,

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[1] For a fascinating (and devastating) critique of "Chinese Postmodernism," see Wang 1996, 233-242.

[2] There is, of course, considerable income disparity between coastal and inland China. According to Beijing's Bureau of Statistics, the Gini coefficient between rural and urban incomes recently reached 0.5. A Gini coefficient of 0.4 is conventionally considered to be a dangerous level. See *Chinese News Digest Summary* 1/08/02, 94.

[3] See Lee 2000.

[4] Yeh 2000, 5.

newly constructed Western-style hotels (Xiyuan and the Great Wall of Beijing, the Hilton of Shanghai, or the White Swan of Guangzhou) were like space capsules seeded throughout dreary urban landscapes of gray, prematurely aging Eastern European-style socialist apartment houses. Launched from the global stratosphere, these chandeliered palaces of modernity momentarily created artificial First-World climates of their own. Teaching then at Peking University, I remember cycling across the city on subzero wintry nights encased in layers of Chinese long underwear to meet foreign friends in such alien capitalist climes, where the first action one took was to make a beeline for the restroom in order to strip off all those extra layers of clothing to avoid perspiring to death in the hotel's overheated bar, stocked with foreign whiskeys and imported hors d'oeuvre. The process was reversed at the end of the encounter, when one said goodnight to one's friends (returning tipsily to their warm bedrooms) and redonned one's knitted underwear before venturing out into the arctic grime of the Chinese city beyond.

In the 1990s the street scene outside the space capsules began to change, quickly coming to resemble the cosmopolitan culture within those privileged compounds where ordinary Chinese visitors had to register in front of security guards pledged to quarantine the People's Republic from foreign cultural contamination.[5]

The first inroads were plebeian: American fast-food chains selling fried chicken and hamburgers along with access to clean lavatories and orderly lines of customers.[6] There quickly followed temples of consumer culture designed to lure the new class of entrepreneurs that flourished during the Deng era of marketization: Maxim's cuisine in Beijing, Christian Dior and Hermes scarves in Shanghai, Shiseido cosmetics in the wide-open entrepots of Shenzhen and Wenzhou. The transformation was nearly instantaneous. China moved from mopeds to Mercedes Benz automobiles in less than a decade, as an automobile culture — already behind the electronic culture that brought CNN by satellite to remote villages — tried to leapfrog over bicycle lanes into the clogged ring roads of the late twentieth century.[7]

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[5] During the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping's government conducted an active campaign against "spiritual pollution" (*jingshen wuran*) from the West.

[6] See Watson 1997.

[7] See Schell 1984.

But what of the concept of modernity itself?[8] When was that construct first devised as a historical category to describe China's present? And why would the creation of such a conceptual condition be relevant to our understanding of Chinese modernity today?

The Historical Conditions of Modernity

According to conventional Maoist historiography, "modern history" (*jindai lishi*) began with the First Opium War of 1839-1841.[9] Preceded by a period of monetized commercialization in the late Ming or early Qing when "sprouts of capitalism" flourished, full-blown capitalism was stunted by the constraints of imperialism, which also inhibited the "self-strengthening" movements of the late nineteenth century as China sought to meet the challenge of Western and Japanese aggression.[10] Thereafter, China's modern history was further divided into "contemporary history" (*xiandai lishi*), from 1919 to 1949, and "current history" (*dangdai lishi*), from 1949 to the present.

The distinction between "modern history" and what came before reflects a key problem in Chinese conceptualizations of their past and present: the tension or conflict between universal human progress and particular Chinese development.[11] In its best-known formulation, that of Joseph R. Levenson, this was a conflict between history (the particular, *meum*) and value (the universal, *verum*).[12] In that construction, which was sometimes rendered psychologistically in terms of an identity crisis, modern Chinese intellectuals "needed to assert the particularity of Chinese history in the face of the overwhelming superiority of scientific civilization and values."[13] Put in even simpler terms,

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[8] Let us remember that modernity as a condition is inherently truncated, contorted, disoriented, and tension-ridden, whereas social scientists out of the Western European tradition expect a certain coherence: modernity in connection with capitalism, industrialization, Enlightenment, and even romanticism. (My thanks to Wen-hsin Yeh for this caveat.)

[9] See Feuerwerker 1967 and Feuerwerker 1968. Japanese Sinology pushes the origins of modernity back to the mid-imperial period, see Fogel 1984.

[10] See Nanjing daxue lishi xi Ming Qing shi yanjiushi bian 1983.

[11] This is the classic question of convergence, see Eisenstadt and Schluchter 1998, 3.

[12] See Levenson 1958-1965, especially volume one.

[13] This is Prasenjit Duara's habile paraphrase of Levenson's argument, which he otherwise questions as reducing the reconstruction of Chinese tradition to "salving the inferiority complex of Chinese intellectuals." Duara 2000, 345.

"modern" Chinese thinkers such as Liang Qichao and Luo Zhenyu discovered at the turn of the twentieth century that China had no "history," but only "dynastic cycles." Strongly influenced by Meiji historiography, they came to believe that Chinese intellectuals needed to create a national history in order to create a nation.

In this regard, a certain fit was created between modern European historicism and Chinese national historicity. As Axel Schneider points out:

> Scholars like Herder, Ranke, and Dilthey argued against the Enlightenment concept of universal and timeless human reason, emphasizing instead the diversity of particular, *historically* grown cultures.... Contrary to the Enlightenment, historicists did not proceed from known universals, but wanted to discover them within the particular. Universal reason, the backbone of Enlightenment, was explicitly denied any role in history and became itself historicised.[14]

The fit was imperfect, however, because of the overwhelming dominance of the Social Darwinist idea of a struggle for survival. "Evolutionary ideas not only led to the collapse of the orthodox view of history, but also undermined the traditional self-perception of China as the center of the world."[15] One way to recover that assurance of centrality was by according China a privileged position as a "proletarian nation" in the universal Marxist march from matriarchy through slave, feudal, capitalist, and finally socialist stages of development.[16]

This Sinification of the Marxian dialectic of history posed two major and nearly intractable problems for Mao's historiographers. First, when did feudalism begin and end? And, second, if China had once been on the road to modern capitalism, why did it fail to reach its goal?

The dating or periodization of feudalism was particularly vexing because, whether one located its beginnings in the Eastern Zhou or during the Qin-Han unification, it still lasted until the nineteenth century — that is, two millennia or more.[17] A period of such endless and repetitive duration simply served to remind one of the old dynastic cycle version of Chinese history: in Hegel's terms, no history at all.

The second issue was nearly as troubling, and just as difficult to explain. How could China have enjoyed such immense commercial

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[14] Schneider 2001, 2-3.
[15] Schneider 2001, 5.
[16] See Meisner 1967.
[17] Under the Mao dictatorship eloquent and erudite dissenters from this historical scheme were silenced one way or another. See, e.g., Young-tsu 1997.

growth in the sixteenth century, and again during the mid-1700s, without breaking through into a stage of industrial capitalism? The economic historian Fu Yiling treated it as a paradox: "both developed and stagnant" (*you fazhan you tingzhi*).[18] Philip Huang conceived of the process in a Geertzian manner: "agricultural involution," suggesting growth without development.[19] The solution, as mentioned above, was to argue for stunted development, which was no more than a form of victimization. The deus ex machina here was simply imperialism. China's economic explosion from the 1580s to the 1770s (slipping over the disastrous mid-1600s) established the endogenous roots or sprouts of independent capitalist development, but these were eventually nipped in the bud by imperialist economic aggression that supposedly destroyed handicrafts, crippled native industry in the treaty ports, and opened China to foreign investment and the exploitation of cheap supplies of labor. There was a fledgling bourgeoisie, of course, but they were unknowingly in thrall as "compradores" to the foreigners who dominated international concessions along the coast and used legal extraterritoriality to establish their dominion alongside warlords and Nationalist reactionaries.

According to Mao Zedong, once China moved from a semicolonial stage (the era of unequal treaties when the great powers shared China's human and natural resources among themselves) to a fully colonial position (the period of military occupation by Japan during the War of Resistance), a "national bourgeoisie" did emerge. In the fully exposed face of imperialism, this patriotic element within the capitalist class was prepared to form a united front with the proletariat and peasantry against the Japanese to fight for a New Democracy. After the Japanese were defeated, the struggle continued against unalloyed capitalists and their political arm, the Guomindang, to carry out a social revolution under the Communist Party and the people's democratic dictatorship to make the great leap forward into socialism. In that sense, Chinese modernity was fully to be achieved by Leninist means, that is, by political leadership rather than through independent social development. The ultimate dialectic of history was power (which grew out of the barrel of the gun), not economics (which awaited five-year plans and Soviet-supported industrial investment).[20]

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[18] See Yiling 1982; Yiling 1956.
[19] See Huang 1980; Huang 1985; and Huang 1990.
[20] See Mao 1964; Schram 1969.

Ends and Means

Inherent to the Maoist historical formulation of modernity was the notion of China's exceptional cultural characteristics. Indeed, this essentialism was a perduring theme in all discussions of modernity in China. During the 1950s it amounted to a direct denial of the convergence theory of modernization, but its articulation long preceded W. W. Rostow and post-World War II stages-of-growth economic development theory.[21] To appreciate the spurious appeal of this essentialism, it is necessary to turn back to the dilemma the Qing faced after their defeat at the hands of England and France in 1856-1860.

During the self-strengthening effort after the Opium Wars, imperial defenders of the Confucian tradition employed the Neo-Confucian distinction between substance (*ti*) and function (*yong*) to formulate a conservative policy of instrumental westernization: "Chinese learning as the substance, foreign learning as the function" (*Zhong xue wei ti, yang xue wei yong*).[22] Their hope was to use Western technology to preserve a nativist essence — to protect Chinese culture with foreign guns.

The futility of that position was evident at least as early as 1867 to Manchu conservatives such as Woren, and then glaringly obvious to the Reform Generation of 1898. Understanding Western gunnery meant learning Western mathematics, which in turn entailed changing the traditional curriculum until then determined by the imperial examination system that tested the Confucian classics. It was impossible, in other words, to wall off the essence of Chinese learning from the new functional instruments borrowed to preserve it. The abolition of the traditional exam system in 1905 severed the ideological connections between central state authority and local elites, helping drive the latter into provincial reform and revolution by 1911. It was but a short step from the Xinhai political revolution to the cultural revolution of the May Fourth Movement of 1919, when China's salvation seemed to many young iconoclasts to depend upon a total rejection of tradition, "closing down the shop of Confucius," and an all-out espousal of a new enlightenment project in the form of "Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science."[23]

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[21] See Rostow 1960.
[22] See Teng, Fairbank et al. 1963; Chang 1900.
[23] See Chou 1960.

For a brief period, during the heyday of the May Fourth "new culture movement," universalism appeared to have triumphed in a strictly linear sense:

> Standard accounts of the May Fourth Movement, intent on pinpointing the dawning moment of Chinese modernity in a temporally linear sense, present its iconoclastic spirit as the inevitable outcome of systematic clashes between two incompatible ways of life: those of the old and the new. The prime targets of the iconoclasts, from this perspective, were the salient features of Chinese tradition. Whether referred to as feudal or traditional, "culture" was understood as a body of doctrines and norms with a particular internal coherence. Traditional culture — whether this meant the expression of a certain stage of Chinese development or the quintessential state of Chineseness over time — was understood in terms of coded texts rather than evolving practices, a pejorative rather than a positive view.[24]

Indeed, this "advent of modernity" was by the end of the May Fourth Movement deeply imbedded in the Chinese historical consciousness.[25]

> In the popular May Fourth parlance, to be "modern" means above all to be "new" (*xin*), to be consciously opposed to the "old" (*jiu*).... This intellectual posture of newness does not by itself represent anything new, for in traditional China there were indeed recurrent debates between "new" and "old".... What makes for the qualitative difference in the May Fourth formulation is rather its implicit equation of newness with a new temporal continuum from the present to the future. In other words, the notion and value of "newness" are defined in a context of unlinear time and a unilinear sense of history that is characteristically untraditional and Western.[26]

It was in this characteristically Western sense of the modern that Chinese Marxists made a virtue of China's backwardness. As a victim of imperialism, "the highest form of capitalism," China paradoxically stood in the very vanguard of the exploited as a "proletarian nation."[27] The end of history, Communism, thus became the means of attaining ultimate modernity in both a specifically Chinese and universally Marxist manner.

This, in essence, constituted the intellectual grounds for the Maoist

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[24] Yeh 1996, 4.
[25] See Sun 1986, 44.
[26] Lee 1991, 159.
[27] See Meisner 1967.

sinification of Marxism-Leninism. As a "proletarian nation" — albeit without a large industrial proletariat — China could leap over the aborted capitalist stage and move directly into socialism in the early 1950s. This intensely voluntaristic vision of modernity enabled the Chairman to mobilize the "poor and blank" peasant masses to serve as the shock troops of rural and urban revolution even so far as to suggest to the world at large that China could reach a communist stage much sooner than the Soviet Union. In practice, the People's Republic challenged the revisionist modernity of the USSR by espousing populist, egalitarian, and permanent revolution. The result was the debacle of the Cultural Revolution.

Socialism with Chinese Characteristics

Deng Xiaoping's decision to proceed to "marketization" (*shichanghua*) once again led to a fundamental tension between westernization (here, read "democratization") and "mere" economic growth. In this new version of the old *ti-yong* dichotomy, the formula of "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" sought to reduce modernity to acultural function, ideologically neutral technology, and global universalism. "Socialism," or regime stability, was dissonantly read as cultural essence, political commitment, and nativist particularism.

This unstable formulation not only fit Karl Mannheim's definition of a "cant mentality"; it also fatuously reproduced the fundamental futility of the ancien regime's self-strengthening effort to compartmentalize modernity on the one hand, and tradition on the other.[28] "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" also, in a benign version of the Great Leap Forward, virtually ignored Marxist stages of production in order to vault over the automobile age directly into cyberspace. The Internet merely sharpened the contradiction because of the tremendous technical difficulty of controlling access to information even if the agents of the state could put their electronic hands on each and every portal leading into China. In fact, the hesitancy of the Party's shaky balancing act might have led to a high-wire fall had the rope not been tightened by Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin's turning the ratchet of chauvinistic nationalism. As it was, a kind of schizophrenia ensued. On the one hand, the economic opening led to all of

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[28] See Mannheim 1936.

the appurtenances of hotel-lobby capitalism: cellular telephones, hasty deals, quick fortunes. On the other hand, the regime tried to limit CNN programs to hotels where 85 percent of the guests were foreigners while bolstering an increasingly repressive regime that used police-run insane asylums to "doctor" dissidents. The police themselves, needless to say, were increasingly corrupt and autonomous under the nominal control of a Party determined not to — and terrified it would — lose ultimate authority over state and society.

The Limits of Chinese Modernity

What after all is this version of Chinese modernity? Succinctly put, it is:

- A weak public sphere, typified by an extremely hazy line between private (*si*), official (*guan*), and public (*gong*) realms.
- A strong society, characterized by the open revival of primordial ties after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
- A strong state, operating out of a legacy of social control that has dealt for centuries with sectarian dissident movements little different from the *Falun Gong*.[29]
- Feeble individual rights within a nominally powerful demos.
- Continuing high degrees of government economic regulation and licensing, with a consequent level of corruption now approaching Russian Mafia-like dimensions.[30]
- Fervent chip-on-the-shoulder nationalism.
- A deep political and social division between urban and rural sectors, characteristic of many Third-World countries (if we may eschew the politically correct North-South nomenclature many contemporaries prefer).
- Unprecedented rates of growth in China's GDP within an ideologically charged void.
- Consequent alienation, anomie, and political estrangement.

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[29] See Wakeman 1977.
[30] The new modernity calls for new controls, i.e., new regulation. Permits and licenses are a prime medium for a corruption so ubiquituous as to wound the system grievously.

Whatever the reassurances of the utilities of globalization — modern airlines, posh hotels, fancy department stores — the ultimate state of contemporary Chinese modernity is one of restiveness.[31]

It is (to use one of the neologisms of the 1990s) a "post-new era" (*houxinshiqi*), in which "the masterminds truly had a great fall."

As intellectuals faced the inevitable destiny of a retreat into the academy, a new cultural space opened up. This is a space populated by rock music, karaoke bars, dance halls, stars and fans, TV soap operas and popular magazines, practitioners of *qigong*, and on its margin a transformed neorealism that no longer challenges or critiques social mores.[32]

Is postmodernism then simply postsocialism?[33]

Western optimists — many of whom risk a business stake in China — hope that all of those cell phones presage the withering away of the proletarian dictatorship. That is hard to imagine in a country with 70 million Communist Party members whose leaders proved their mettle by shooting down their own youth in 1989 for daring to ask for concessive negotiations.

It is always possible, of course, that the optimists' best friend is rampant corruption, which delegitimizes the regime in important and fundamental ways. Pessimists invariably see the opposite: rising rates of discrepancy between city and countryside, rampant signs of rural unrest as harbingers of the revolt of the hinterlands, the growing bankruptcy of a political order than relies more on its riot police than even bread and circuses.[34] But both count in the end on an emerging civil society that, in my eyes at least, seems to be more a Western figment than a Chinese reality.[35] To be sure, risk analysts can discount these troubling signs and look for evidence of "civility," acceptable rules of capitalist behavior that our own accounting houses (Arthur Andersen above all) claimed to be imposing upon China's wayward enterprises. The truth lies somewhere in between the political demise of this last generation of Moscow-trained leaders and the newly

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[31] One has to ask, after all: is this modernity a product of too many zigzags through Chinese history, or is it a function of late modernity, of China pursuing a chimera with cultural goals that first had to be translated into Chinese? (My thanks to Wen-hsin Yeh for this troubling question.)

[32] See Wang 1996, 266.

[33] Zhang 2000, 354.

[34] See Wakeman 1994.

[35] See Wakeman 1993.

formed elite of Wharton MBAs and Chicago Economics Department doctorates who are trying to find out who, after all, is on the other end of that digital telephone call in the first place.

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PART F

THE MODERNITY OF EUROPE

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EUROPEAN SELF-UNDERSTANDING
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Hartmut Kaelble

The concept of multiple modernities presented by S. N. Eisenstadt in this volume is a recent interpretation of the long-term past strongly embedded in the context of the world. One hundred or even fifty years ago few Europeans would have accepted this concept, especially the evaluation of the dangers of modernity and the idea of a particular modernity existing in each civilization. Some inherent dangers of modernity were perhaps also seen by a substantial number of Europeans around 1900 or 1950, though different ones from those Eisenstadt mentions. Those observers did not see variations in modernity in all civilizations. They would have applied the idea of modernity only to Europe, the United States, and perhaps Japan. Today, there are vigorous, though not necessarily predominant, intellectual and political trends in Europe to see the role of Europe in the world much as Eisenstadt does.

What happened during the last half of the twentieth century to open the European mind to concepts similar to that of multiple modernities in Europe? Was this because European identities and the European view of the position of Europe in the world changed fundamentally as a result of decolonization, the division of Europe, the decline of Europe as the center of the world, and globalization? Or was it because the European modernity became in fact much less peculiar and because Europe learned from and took over as much from the modernity of non-European or non-Western societies as non-European societies took from Europe?

This paper treats these two aspects of change during the twentieth century, first the large variety and the change in European self-understanding, and second the change in European particularities, especially social and cultural particularities. I argue that the main factor making Europeans more open to any concept of a multiple world was the change in self-understanding, whereas the change in social and cultural particularities was much less discussed publicly and hence attracted less attention. It still played a role, however, as the context in which Europeans acted and was often unconsciously important for their view of the world.

In presenting this argument I face two important, but unavoidable, limits. In treating the self-understanding of Europeans I refer primarily to the public debates on European civilization, in which Europe was often compared with other civilizations. Only a small share of Europeans participated in these debates as writers or readers, and the debates did not necessarily reflect the feelings and thoughts of the average European.[1] I rely primarily on writers who visited non-European civilizations and whose views were based on their personal experiences of the non-European world. I rely less on armchair speculations by European writers on what was to be the global role of Europe.

A second limit covers the European peculiarities. My discussion is largely limited to social rather than political peculiarities, and even so I am able to treat only a few examples because of space limitations.

European Self-Understanding

Varieties of Twentieth Century Views of Europe

In no period of the twentieth century was an identical view of Europe held by all Europeans. Also, the Europeans who participated in the debate about European civilization expressed a variety of views on the role of Europe in the world. The concepts were different at least in four respects. First, they differed in their evaluation of modernity and progress. Second, they differed in whether the assumed European civilization was consistently superior to all others or in their assessment of the modernity of each civilization. Third, they differed in whether they conceived of the world as antagonistic or pluralistic, that is, as a Europe continuously threatened economically, culturally, or politically by other civilizations or as a Europe not necessarily defined in contrast and in conflict with others. Fourth, Europe was continuously compared with other civilizations by some, whereas others saw it as basically inward looking. All these differences do matter for the question of how the debate by Europeans on European civilization came closer to the concept of multiple modernity during the twentieth century.

In the twentieth-century debate, five concepts were discussed. I

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[1] The article summarizes the conclusions of my book, Kaelble 2001.

describe them as clearly different, though they were often mixed up by individual authors.

European Superiority

A first view saw European civilization as superior to all others. This superiority was seen as stable, lasting global leadership by Europe, based on advanced European mentalities or even on biological characteristics. "1914: a very solid civilization, united, splendid," wrote the historian Lucien Fèbvre in retrospect in his Paris lectures on Europe during World War II. "Nobody thought that it could ever decline."[2] Europeans usually did not discuss how other civilizations could achieve the European level of modernity. European superiority was seen as comprehensive, a cultural as well as a political, a military as well as an economic and scientific, superiority. The core of Europe's superiority was seen differently by different participants in the debate. It could be scientific innovation and cognition, economic performance, the process of civilization, religious uniqueness, the autonomy of the individual, the refinement of life styles, the quality of living standards, or even mere racism. Each political milieu had its own variant of European superiority, but they all agreed on the idea of a superior Europe. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were the period in which this concept was most popular.

To the idea of a comprehensive European superiority belonged a strong interest in other civilizations, and the success of travel reports, missionary reports, exhibitions on so-called primitive cultures, ethnological museums, and scientific research on other civilizations. The idea of European superiority was not an inward-looking one. It was based on European expansion and on intensive contacts with other civilizations, varying from encounters and hybrid societies to genocide and wars. A minority of participants in the debate on European civilization attacked this positive valuation of European superiority and saw the inexpansive, noncommercialized, nonmodern civilizations such as China or India or the Muslim world as superior in a fundamentally different way. This critique in a way was also an integral part of the debate on European superiority.

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[2] Quoted by Wessel 1993, 37.

The Threatened Europe

A second and contrasting view saw Europe as a civilization under menace, threatened by other, superior civilizations. The menace could be economic and would lead to the destruction of Europe's economic independence. It could be also cultural and would lead to the danger of European dependence on other cultures. It could be political and military and would lead to the supremacy of other civilizations. The relationship between civilizations in this view was often seen as fundamentally antagonistic. Civilizations and nations were seen by nature to be in continuous struggle and conflict. This assumption normally excluded an attitude of understanding and learning from other civilizations. It often led to distrust, suspicion, and hatred of members of other civilizations, and compassion and love for, as well as understanding of the members of one's own. Hatred was seen as an instrument to create loyalties and identities. "The hatred of America can have an arousing effect among Europeans (and does no harm at all)," wrote Erika and Klaus Mann in 1929, only shortly before their exile to the United States, "It is productive, provided it is passionate enough. Whenever we are seething with hatred of an existing power, there is an ethical impetus."[3] This view of a threatened Europe was held throughout much of the twentieth century, although perhaps less so at the end.

Europe as Part of the Global Modernization

A third view regarded Europe as part of a universal modernization of the world and as part of the modern First World. This view was clearly different from the view of Europe as superior, however, for various reasons. Europe was not seen here as the leader in the process of modernization, but as a junior partner or a secondary actor behind the United States or, less frequently, behind the USSR. Only as a past pioneer in the process of modernization was Europe still seen as a leading actor. But this was a role that was irreversibly gone. Being no longer the most advanced and most powerful civilization Europe was not seen as threatened economically or culturally by other civilizations. In addition, it was assumed that nonmodern societies could and should join the process of modernization. The lead in modernity by

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[3] Mann and Mann 1929, 98.

the First World was not seen as perennial. Quite opposite: one of the major tasks of the international policies of modern societies was to encourage the process in nonmodern societies by education, by capital investment, and by the transfer of innovations. To be sure, a feeling of superiority toward nonmodern societies existed. But in contrast to the idea of European superiority, any lead in modernity was seen to be transitory.

Finally, the characteristics of modernization were typically also seen in a new and different way. Human rights and stable democratic institutions, economic growth and productivity, mass education, urbanization, high average income and standard of living were now seen as primary indicators of modernization. The other side of this view was also different from the other side of the concept of European superiority. The criticism of progress and modernity was rarely oriented toward a euphoric image of preindustrial life. It was normally a plea for another modernity. It was argued that modernity could also be an obstacle and a danger to growth, a threat to human rights, a reason for misery and poverty, and a danger to the environment and health. An alternative modernity could reduce or eliminate these dangers. Hence the categories of modernity as well as the criticism of modernity were different from what were seen in the concept of European superiority. This view of the global role of Europe became important only after World War II, but could already be found in the interwar period.

Europe as One Civilization among Others

A fourth view saw Europe as one civilization among others, neither superior to nor threatened by others, but often as representing one variation of modernity. This self-understanding was based on European self-confidence rather than any feeling of superiority or inferiority. Normally this view saw Europe in intensive exchange with other civilizations: exchanges of ideas, of goods, of people, of life styles, in encounters, alliances, compromises, and hybrid societies rather than unavoidable conflicts. Nevertheless, this view was still based on comparison and on the assumption of important differences between Europe and other civilizations. This concept usually did not assume that predominant common processes would weaken or even eliminate all differences between civilizations, and differences were seen as more important than in the view that saw Europe only as part of a global modernization process. Differences mattered.

One might discern two variants of this view of Europe. One aimed mainly at understanding other civilizations, at being conscious of their inner logic, at having crucial encounters with them, at giving as much autonomy as possible to immigrants from other civilizations, and at relinquishing criticism of others' policies based on their divergence from European values. The second variant of this view aimed mainly at learning from the other civilizations, transferring to Europe and adapting values, innovations, knowledge, and life styles. This self-understanding is in many ways close to the concept of multiple modernity, though it emerged in other contexts.

European Unity in Diversity

A fifth view was different from all the others in that it compared Europe much less with other civilizations. This view was primarily inward looking. According to this view European civilization contained more internal diversity than any other. Demonstrating this diversity through history was the main interest of the proponents of this view. They were much less interested in exploring whether the Arab world or India or Latin America was in fact internally more diverse than Europe. This view was sometimes combined with the theory that Europe's diversity and internal competition were major reasons for European innovations and for the pioneering global role Europe played in the early modern period. Unity in diversity was the paradoxical formula often used by supporters of this view.

This view consisted not just of the statement of important internal European differences, but was more specific. It regarded internal varieties as a particularity of Europe, and appreciated these differences. In this more rigid sense this view is relatively recent and can generally be found only since the 1980s. It was sometimes a reaction against the rising power of the European Union and its aim of standardizing and homogenizing European society and culture. Europe's diversity was expected to limit the power of the EU. Sometimes the appreciation of internal diversity in Europe was the consequence of a new philosophy of the European Union that appreciated productive competition between European countries and the learning from diversity. It was also partly a reaction to the increasing cultural and religious diversity by the immigration to Europe after World War II and the end of the colonial era and the subsequent rise of Muslim, Indian, Chinese, and Caribbean minorities.

The Change of European Self-Understanding during the Twentieth Century

Elements of each of these variants of European self-understanding can be found in the entire twentieth century. Hence any change in European self-understanding was not simply a process of moving from one concept to another. But at the same time, there were distinct trends of change in European self-understanding usually related to changes in historical context. Three eras of European self-understanding can be discerned, departing from the history of the debate on European civilization rather than from turning points in general political history. They are the era of doubts before World War I, the era of crisis from World War I until the 1960s, and the era of the return of confidence since the 1960s. One could subdivide these eras into more and shorter periods, but for a short presentation of change these broader categories demonstrate the main tendencies more clearly.

The Era before 1914

Before World War I, most Europeans who participated in the debate on European civilization still believed Europe was superior to all other civilizations. But already some doubts were being raised. A lively debate emerged on the modernity of Europe compared with that of the United States, on the limits of the European economic dynamic compared with the American dynamic, and on the limits of European liberties for women, for the young, and for the lower classes compared with American social liberties. Some European writers attacked the European limits, which they thought would threaten European superiority. They were afraid of an American economic hegemony. Other writers defended the limits. They were afraid of a destruction of European values. It is interesting that already in this era still other writers argued that American and European mentalities were just different and presented different approaches to modern life. But this interpretation was still far away from the idea of multiple modernities, because it was still closely linked to the idea of European superiority.

The doubts about European superiority were related especially to three aspects of the historical context. First, many Europeans did not believe as strongly as before in the idea of progress, or if they did, they expressed many doubts and qualifications. Important intellectual trends against the liberal interpretation of the world became more

influential during the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century in philosophy and the social sciences as well as in the arts. This was crucial, since the belief in European superiority had been always combined with a belief in human progress, with Europe as the most advanced civilization in the world.

Moreover, after the American Civil War, the United States became a new challenge for Europe. Around 1900 the American population had become as large as that of the largest European countries and the productivity of the American economy had overtaken that of most European countries. So the European economic and cultural lead was no longer as clear as before. Many Europeans traveled to the United States. In addition, it became apparent that in East Asia Japan was rising as a new non-European power, which demonstrated in the war against Russia in 1905 that it was able to defeat a large European power. Finally, the rearmament of Europe and the numerous diplomatic crises during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries raised widespread fears of war. These internal wars were to weaken Europe and were to shake further Europe's superiority.

The Era between 1918 and the 1960s

The second crucial era, during which modern European self-understanding began, was the period between 1918 and the 1960s, that is, the interwar and the postwar period. This was the period of the most severe and fundamental crisis of European self-understanding. "We, the civilized nations," wrote the French poet Paul Valéry in 1919, "we know now that we are perishable [...] and we see now that there is room for all of us in the abyss of history."[4] The belief in lasting European superiority was given up slowly over half a century, and by the end of that time had been replaced by a strong feeling of inferiority. After 1918, Europeans who discussed the cultural and social peculiarities of Europe almost unanimously saw Europe in a fundamental decline. In their view, the crisis consisted of a moral decline and the end of the idea of Europe as the harbinger of global progress, of the humanitarian shock after the atrocities of the two world wars, of the sharp fall in the European standard of living and economic productivity, of the fear of an American economic and cultural hegemony, and of political or military menace by the Soviet Union. This idea of a

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[4] Valéry 1995 (1919), 531-33.

Sample caricature from the satirical journal Simplicissimus

Europe in deep crisis is also visible in many caricatures. One example
is enclosed.

The idea of European superiority was given up only very gradual-
ly. For a long time many participants in the debate on European civi-
lization were still convinced of a residual superiority, especially in cul-
ture. Some Europeans believed in more refined European arts, others
in a more refined life style, others in a more vivid intellectual life of
higher quality, still others in the superiority of European sciences or
the ingenious European personality. But it slowly became clear to
almost all Europeans that large and crucial parts of European eco-
nomic, political, and military superiority were disappearing forever.

In this era between World War I and the 1960s, European writers
started to identify publicly with Europe rather than with their country
of origin or residence. I want to cite some examples. The British
colonel and writer J.F.C. Fuller developed this new European identity
during a visit in the United States in 1926: "I no longer felt an English-
man [...], I now felt that I was a European; that I belonged not to a dif-
ferent country, but to a different civilization."[5] The famous French
writer Simone de Beauvoir had the same feelings of European identity
during her visit to the United States in 1946: "The term 'European,'
which I never used in France, here I use it. When I finished a discus-
sion with Americans, it seemed to me that all the people of Italy,
France, and Spain, as well as the German Jews, were children of the
same 'patrie,' which is also my 'patrie.' They all had a sense for the
same values."[6] The Austrian sociologist Louise Alexandra von Simson
who lived in exile in the United States, a "happy exile" as she called it,
also identified herself with Europe. She wrote in 1962: "It is astonish-
ing that in the United States one totally forgets the European national
differences which in Europe seem to be such important demarcation
lines... The unity of Europe became evident and made us feel as Euro-
peans sharing a common culture and a common language."[7] This new
identification with Europe was, however, still vague in its substance. It
built on diffuse ideas of a common culture, common values, a com-
mon Roman and Greek heritage, and/or a common medieval past. It
was extremely difficult to develop a more precise and more substantial
identity in this period of enormous diversity within Europe and of a

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[5] Fuller 1926, 22.
[6] de Beauvoir 1988, 77f.
[7] von Simson 1981, 68.

lack of any supranational institutions. This self-understanding was also confined to a small minority of writers. But it was the beginning of a concept born in a period of deep crisis.

The deep crisis of European self-understanding was related especially to three aspects of the historical context in this period. The first was the economic and political decline of Europe, the fallback of the European economy and the European standard of living behind the United States, and after World War II decolonization and the end of Europe as the center of the world.

The second aspect was the experience of the atrocities of two wars, the many millions of soldiers and civilians killed, the enormous physical destruction, the moral defects, and the European ethnic cleansing culminating in the Nazi genocide. Even though one country, Germany, provided the main momentum for World War II and the genocide, and even if some nations did not take part in war crimes and the genocide, the moral superiority of Europe as a whole had been compromised in the eyes of many Europeans.

The third aspect of the historical context was the division of Europe and the difficulty of seeing it as still one civilization. The division was partly political, that is, the division into a) democracies, which had a promising start in 1918-19, but which declined thereafter, were divided by quarrels over frontiers, minorities, and reparations, and reappeared only after World War II; b) right-wing dictatorships that took over in one country after another, beginning with Italy in 1921, continuing with Germany in 1933, Spain in 1936, and Estonia in 1937, ending only the 1970s with the end of Franco and Salazar; and c) the communist Soviet Union and then, after World War II, the Soviet block, ending only between 1989 and 1991. At least until the middle of the twentieth century, Europe was also divided more than before in social and economic terms between the dynamic industrial central area comprising Britain, Sweden, France, the Benelux countries, Germany, Bohemia, Switzerland, and Northern Italy, and the stagnating agrarian periphery in northern, eastern, and southern Europe.

The Era since the 1960s

The third era for the rise of European self-understanding began gradually around the 1960s and 1970s. In this period it changed in various respects.

First it often became more positive. The debate on Europe was carried on not only in periods of crisis that lasted until the middle of the 20th century, but European issues became part of the everyday news. Europe was increasingly seen as having strengths as well as shortcomings. It was clear that the European Union was far less powerful than a state. But Europeans gradually realized that a European actor other than the nation-states existed. This more positive European self-understanding after the long crisis was, however, not a return to the feeling of superiority of the period before 1914. The feeling of superiority was definitely gone and has become "ridiculous," as the European writer Max Frisch put it already in 1948.[8] Three concepts of the role of Europe in the world became the prevailing ones: an identity of Europe as one civilization among others that were seen on equal terms, very close to the concept of multiple modernities; an identity of Europe as a junior partner in a worldwide process of homogenous modernization led by the United States, an identity that was strong particularly between the 1950s and the1970s; and an identity that was centered around Europe, was much less comparative, and saw Europe as the civilization with extreme internal diversity and competing concepts, a Europe whose unity consisted of diversity.

Second, the European self-understanding became more related to politics. It did not refer as exclusively as before to common cultural and social values, to a common historical heritage, to common social behavior and structures, but centered around more precise political aims such as the stabilization of democracy, peace, a high standard of living brought about by a common market, and social security. European self-understanding was also partially linked to rising expectations for a European political power center that had not existed before, the European Union. To be sure, the expectations for the union were frequently disappointed, since its actual power was limited, but these political expectations persisted.

European self-understanding became also more influenced by European policies. The European Union tried to create a European identity in three ways. First, from the beginning of European integration the European institutions tried to improve in many ways the situation of those who migrated within Europe, for example, by improving social security for them, by establishing free trade in the entire

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[8] Frisch 1962, 182f (note in the diary july 1948 in Paris).

European Union, by reducing controls at the borders, by improving the international transfer of money, and by giving scholarships to students in other European countries. Moreover, the European Union tried to establish since the 1980s European symbols: the European flag with twelve stars, the European day, the European anthem, the symbols on the euro bills and coins, the European passport. Finally the EU established a European citizenship, consisting of a full catalogue of human and citizen rights, with the European Charter for fundamental rights in 2000.

Finally, the public debate on cultural and social peculiarities of Europe reemerged during the 1980s and 1990s after a long period of quasi-silence since the 1960s due to the Cold War, the intellectual attractiveness of classical modernization concepts that divided the world into a modern and a traditional part, and the rise of nationalism throughout the world. The new debate had to do with the newly opened question of the borders of Europe in the East after the fall of the Berlin Wall and with the debate on the enlargement of the European Union. It had also to do with the factual inappropriateness of the former division of the world into a modernized First World, a badly defined Second World, and a Third World, or into East and West. Civilizations seemed to become a new appropriate concept for understanding the world. The debate also had to do with the extension of the influence of the European Union into the social and cultural spheres beyond an economic market. So the debate on European civilization became more and more linked to politics. The concept of the European identity as a purely cultural identity in contrast to the political national identities became gradually less important and also less appropriate for historical analysis. This, however, might have been a European particularity of the 1980s and 1990s.

The change in European self-understanding was linked to various crucial changes in the historical context during the post-1960 era.

The relationship between Europe and the rest of the world changed fundamentally in this period with the fall of the European colonial empires, with the definite end of Europe as the political and economic center of the world, but also with the basic shift of Europe from the most important source of emigration to one of the most important immigration areas. This immigration also led to a new experience of non-European civilizations in everyday life. A totally new way of meeting other civilizations and a new push for European self-understanding emerged. What did not happen during this period

was also important. There was no major cold or hot war between Europe and another civilization. The historical Cold War was a clash of Western Europe and the United States with a semi-European power and created a certain Atlantic identification. But the identification with Europe in the second half of the twentieth century was not based on antagonism with another civilization, neither with the Arab world nor any other civilization.

In addition, as I have mentioned, during this period a European political actor gradually emerged. The early institutions of European integration, the European Iron and Steel Community of 1950 and the European Economic Community of 1957, were not yet seen as general European actors by most of the European public, since they consisted of only six member states and dealt only with economic issues. But when Britain and Spain had joined the European Community and when the power of the European Union was extended to fields of activity beyond economies, the EU was more and more considered the main European political actor.

Moreover, the change in European self-understanding was also linked to the rapprochement of European societies, economies and politics that occurred especially in Western Europe. Not only did Western Europe become more homogeneous, since it consisted, after the fall of the Franco and Salazar regimes, only of democracies. Social differences between European nations were mitigated during the second half of the twentieth century, for example, differences in real income, in agrarian and industrial employment, in urbanization, in student rates, in the share of female students at secondary schools and universities, in the share of population protected by public security, and in social expenditure. Transfers between European countries, economic flows, migrants, tourists and business travelers, and foreign students increased. Communication improved because of the rapid increase in the number of Europeans speaking foreign languages. European commonalties to which I come back in the second part of this paper became more distinct, less blurred by divergences between nations or groups of nations. Western Europe and Europe could be more easily seen as entities.

Finally the character of common European history changed fundamentally. In the first half of the twentieth century it had consisted mainly of common catastrophic wars and a common catastrophic economic crisis. In the second half of the twentieth century it consisted of a common liberation in 1944-45, a common unique age of economic prosperity, European peace, common democratic values, com-

mon mass consumerism, the new personal experience of the European space through travel and tourism, and also of the Cold War and the fall of the Wall in 1989. So this common history was in the most distinct possible contrast to the first half of the twentieth century, although it was rarely discussed.

In sum, for various political and social reasons, a view of Europe emerged that was close to the concept of multiple modernity. This was not the only view, but it became much more accepted than it had been 50 or 100 years earlier.

European Social and Cultural Particularities in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century

Did this view appear also because European social and cultural particularities changed during the second half of the twentieth century? Did particularities emerge that could less easily be interpreted as indicators of a global lead by Europe in modernity? For this difficult question I shall not present a global analysis of social change in all major civilizations, but instead will discuss in an exemplary way some European social particularities.

The history of twentieth-century European social particularities is rarely treated by historians or other social scientists, partly because the "eccentric" twentieth century, the century of catastrophic wars and ethnic cleansing in Europe, does not lead us to think of European commonalties, partly also because the national paradigm is far more deeply rooted than other political entities in the minds of historians and social scientists. For these and other reasons what is presented here as European social peculiarities is not always accepted. The general public in Europe normally is also not aware of these social commonalties of European societies, which are rarely elements of a European identity.

Some further observations on what I mean by "European peculiarities." First, social and cultural peculiarities are not seen in a mechanical sense, as perfect commonalties existing in all European countries. European peculiarities and commonalties are defined in the same way national peculiarities usually are, that is, as representing major trends in large parts of European society. In addition is the question of time, so important for historians. This paper concentrates on short-term changes in European social peculiarities rather than on very

long-term secular mental or symbolic structures as treated in a convincing way by S.N. Eisenstadt. Even though the second half of the twentieth century in Europe was a relatively uneccentric period without the catastrophic wars and fatal economic crisis of the first part of the century, the European social peculiarities did not simply persist. Some already existed before 1945 and weakened thereafter, others emerged only during the second half of the twentieth century. So this paper does not necessarily treat the "longue durée," long-term persistent structures. Moreover, what is said about European peculiarities is also not hypothetical and speculative, but tested against evidence in history. So I in fact discuss only six exemplary European social particularities here: the European family, the European work, the European social milieus, the European city, the European welfare state, and European consumerism. Other social particularities, especially the social history of religion, the social history of the public and of the intellectuals, the social history of public bureaucracy and of attitudes toward law, the social history of business and management, the social history of industrial relations, and the social history of migration and of minorities, would take too much space. It is not possible to relate these social particularities to one single basic factor and to put European society into one single formula.

Now, to my examples. First, the European family. British and Austrian social historians demonstrated that a peculiar European family household had developed since the early modern period or the Middle Ages. The momentum can be seen in the independence of young European couples from their parents. Marriage in Europe led to the establishment of an independent household. As a consequence, three-generation households were much rarer in Europe than elsewhere; the age at first marriage of men as well as of women was distinctly higher because an independent household needed more professional independence and more savings. For the same reason, the rate of nonmarriage was more substantial in Europe than elsewhere; the late age of marriage also led to a lower birth rate. At the same time, specifically European family attitudes and habits developed: an especially strong intimacy in the family and an especially strong separation of the nuclear family from the neighborhood and from the other relatives; strong emotional links between spouses and between parents and children; a more distinct crisis of adolescence, which prepared young people for their separation from their parents' household. This European family developed especially in Northwestern

and central Europe and spread to the rest of the continent only dur-
ing the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It was regarded as part of
European modernity that was more advanced and more modern than
modernities in other parts of the world.

In the context of multiple modernities, it is important that this
European family is considered by social scientists as an important pre-
condition for European expansion, mainly because the independent
European nuclear family was more ready to migrate and to settle in
other areas and on other continents than the large family was. During
the second half of the twentieth century this family model became
global rather than European. To be sure, European particularities
did not totally disappear. The age of first marriage is still distinctly
higher in Europe than in the United States or in Eastern Europe, and
birth rates are still distinctly lower in Europe than in the rest of the
world. But if there are any European particularities, they have
become variants of a global nuclear family household and global fam-
ily values.

A second social peculiarity of nineteenth- and twentieth-century
European societies was the strong impact of industrial work. The pro-
portion of industrial labor in the active population was much higher
in Europe than in all other industrial societies. Only in European his-
tory can a distinct period be found in which industry was the largest
employment sector. For some countries, such as Britain, Germany,
and Switzerland, this period of industrial society lasted many decades
and started during the nineteenth century. For Europe as a whole it
started in the 1950s and ended in the 1970s. As a consequence, Euro-
pean societies were much more strongly characterized by purely
industrial cities such as Sheffield, Vervier, Gelsenkirchen, and
Katowice. Industrial workers were clearly more numerous in Europe
than elsewhere. Working-class culture, working-class quarters, and
the trade unions had a much stronger impact in Europe than else-
where. To be sure, beginning in the 1970s tertiary labor became
more important than industrial labor in Europe, too. The Central
European societies, in which high proportions of industrial labor were
preserved during the communist era, have followed this path in a bru-
tal way since 1989, but industrial work is still more important in
Europe than elsewhere. Only Japan became similar to Europe in this
respect. Perhaps because of this tradition of much industrial labor,
the separation between work and nonwork outside the household
became more distinct in Europe than elsewhere, especially after

World War II. During the week, working hours became fewer in Europe than elsewhere. During the year, the holidays were longer in Europe and a particular European holiday culture emerged. Europeans worked for fewer years, entering the labor market later, and retiring was earlier, and the proportion of women who never worked was larger than elsewhere in the world.

This European social particularity had been strongly linked to a global economy in which Europe was the world's workshop, while other parts of the world sold it raw materials and were markets for European industrial products. This global economy was a basic condition for the role of Europe as the political center of the world. In this global economic division of labor only the European orientation toward industrial work was regarded as modern. This orientation has become much less distinct since the 1970s, though some elements, especially the attitude toward work, persist.

A third social peculiarity consisted of the impact of unique social milieus on European society. The most important of these milieus were the European middle class, with its peculiar family and economic values, its strong internal connections forged by marriage, education, associations, and culture, and with its strict social distinction of the aristocracy from the lower classes; the European working class with its peculiar culture, with its solidarity in individual crises and with its more or less strong links to the labor movement; the European lower middle class, with its strong sense of economic independence, strong family ties, mobility into and out of the lower middle class, and its peculiar lower-middle-class culture; the European peasant stratum with its strong orientation toward the preservation of family property, its social isolation and strong family ties, its weak formal schooling and professional training, its clear separation from urban culture, and its peculiar life styles and values. European societies were characterized not only by these individual milieus, but also by very strict lines of demarcation separating them on the one hand and exchanges and interdependencies between them on the other. For our context of multiple modernity it is important that these European social milieus also had been linked to the European hegemony in the world. The rise of the European middle class would not have occurred without the enormous profits and the outstanding professional opportunities associated with European expansion. The rise of the European working class would not have occurred without the rise of the European industrial factory and European industrial exports.

European class society, via the reflections of Marx, had also become an important intellectual criterion for modernity. All these milieus were weakened in most European societies by economic prosperity, the rise of the welfare state, and the rise of mass consumerism in the 1950s and 1960s. Elements of these milieus — buildings, streets, parks, monuments, pubs, drinks, and food — persist, but the former social logic has largely disappeared.

Besides these three basic social particularities that weakened or disappeared during the second half of the twentieth century, other European social particularities emerged or were reinforced during this period.

One social peculiarity that was reinforced was the European city, a classic topic of historical writing on European society. On the one hand, in contrast to most other modernizing societies, Europe saw relatively modest urban growth during the second half of the twentieth century, since European cities had grown extremely rapidly before World War I, population growth had slowed, and migration into cities was relatively limited in most of Europe, with the exception of most of Eastern Europe. Europeans who usually consider the 1960s and 1970s the era of dramatic urban growth do not compare their own with non-European societies. Wild, uncontrolled, unplanned urban expansion was much rarer in twentieth-century Europe than elsewhere. The middle-sized city was more important in Europe than in the Americas. On the other hand, the European upper classes kept an urban life style, often continuing to live in the centers of cities, and therefore built up more political pressure than in many other societies for keeping up the quality of urban life and for avoiding urban decline, criminality, drugs, and lower-class immigration. This upper-class urban life style seemed to vanish during the 1960s and 1970s. But in the 1980s and 1990s, especially the young unmarried and partly also the old rich returned to the city centers. Because of the political pressure they exerted, but also because of generally stronger state intervention, the power of municipal city planners or of state intervention in city planning was in general substantially stronger in Europe than outside it. A specific quality and style of urban life in the city centers was guaranteed. To be sure, the methods of state intervention changed during the second half of the twentieth century. The 1950s and 1960s were the era of massive public urban renewal projects aimed at replacing the nineteenth century Victorian, Hausmannian, or Wilhelminian city, with *la défense* in Paris or the city cen-

ter of Rotterdam perhaps the best known examples. The 1980s and 1990s were a period of much more circumspect renovation of city centers, of much smaller projects, often public-private partnerships. As a context for European self-understanding, however, it is important that this European particularity did not single out Europe as the only or most modern society in the world. European urban growth and urban policies were just a variant of a global process of urbanization that was even more rapid and more spectacular in other parts of the world.

A fifth social peculiarity of Europe was closely related. After World War II the modern welfare state emerged in Europe and was more developed there than in other industrial nations. Welfare expenditures in relation to GDP in most European countries were higher than in most non-European industrial societies. The proportion of the active and nonactive population protected by the modern welfare state was distinctly larger in Europe than in industrial societies elsewhere. Moreover, the European welfare state had a longer history than the welfare state in other societies. In pioneering countries such as Britain, Sweden, Germany, Austria, and Hungary it had already started in the late nineteenth century. The modern postwar European welfare state built on this longer tradition. In addition, after World War II the important models for the further development of the welfare state always came from Europe, especially from Britain and Sweden. Even in the crisis of the welfare state during the later 1970s and 1980s, distinct European peculiarities emerged. The alternatives to the public welfare state were not only the family and the market, but also to a much stronger degree than outside Europe the idea of the nonprofit, unbureaucratic small public associations, an idea that built on a long European tradition of "friendly societies," "secours mutuels," and "Genossenschaften."

Finally, the national European welfare state in this period took on more transnational elements, partly through permanent discussion of other European concepts and the permanent circulation of ideas, partly also through the supranational social policy of the European Union, which opened the closed national welfare states for citizens from other European countries or for immigrants in general and established a European system of fundamental social rights.

This social particularity did not single out Europe from other societies as more modern, because the welfare state in Europe had been much discussed since the 1970s and normally would be seen as a vari-

ant of social security rather than as an indicator of an advanced Europe. Hence it could possibly be seen as one of several models of social security under discussion in the global debate.

A sixth social peculiarity of Europe developed only after World War II: mass consumerism. To be sure, it followed the same basic principles as American mass consumption, that is, the global model of consumption. The standardization of consumer goods, the change in household expenditure, the commercialization of sales, the blurring of lines of social demarcation by consumption, the new discourse on the quality of consumer goods — could be found in all consumer societies. However, various European particularities emerged and persisted in the second half of the twentieth century. First a peculiar European consumption style emerged in food, drinks, clothes, household machines, cars, furniture, housing standards, and housing styles. Holiday culture remained different from consumption styles in the United States or Japan.

Moreover, the structure of consumption in Europe always was different from that in the United States. Motor cars, telephones, and television sets, the main indicators of mass consumption, remained less numerous, and books and newspapers more numerous in Europe, even when full mass consumerism had emerged. European expenditures for food and clothing remained higher and expenditures for rents, transportation, communication, and security remained lower than in the United States. Different urban planning for public transportation, a more established cultivation of the family home, the use of food and clothing to mark social distinctions, as remnants of the peculiar European social milieus, and the more substantial state intervention in social security were the main reasons for these lasting European consumption patterns.

Finally a skepticism among European intellectuals about consumption persisted. They often did not share the American optimism about the advantages of mass consumerism. European characteristics of mass consumption also cannot simply be seen as a mitigation of European national differences by a common Americanization. On the one hand, the bulk of European imports of consumer goods came from other European countries rather than from the United States. Only a small proportion of imports, though with strong symbolic importance, such as Coca Cola, Lucky Strikes, management methods, movies and comics, and fast-food restaurants, came from America. On the other hand, what was seen as Americanization, especially in

the 1950s and 1960s, such as the introduction of the motor car, high-
ways, supermarkets, and canned or prefabricated food, often had
originally been invented in Europe and reimported in a modernized
form. The term "Americanization" in the debate on modernity was
partly used to keep out these reimported, formerly European trends.
This social particularity of Europe is not only less distinct than the
more traditional and weakening social particularities. European con-
sumerism is just a variant of a global process of mass consumerism,
with no claim to being more advanced than in other societies.

It may be that the awareness of these later social and cultural partic-
ularities, which go along more easily with the idea of multiple moder-
nities, was reinforced by transfers within Europe, by professional
migration and travel, by tourism, by student exchanges, by interna-
tional marriages, by exchanges between sister cities, by regular meet-
ings of national politicians, top administrators, and representatives of
the civil societies because of the rise of international European enter-
prises and the rise of the supranational integration in the European
Union, as well as by the transfer of ideas, commodities, and life styles.
Through these means Europeans could see their countries' similarities.
Europeans probably had more trouble detecting any European partic-
ularities in the 1950s, when transfers were much fewer.

Summary

I have explored whether multiple modernity is a purely scientific con-
cept or whether its crucial elements can be found in the history of the
debate by Europeans during the twentieth century on European civi-
lization. Scientific concepts normally are far more complex than
arguments in public debates. This is true also in this case. But one
crucial element of the concept, that is, the idea of a variety of moder-
nities in different civilizations rather than one single or a few
advanced modern societies, has been frequently used in the debate by
Europeans on European civilization. It was a rare argument before
1914, when Europeans were still convinced of the comprehensive
superiority of European or Western civilization over all other civiliza-
tions and when "European" excluded any sort of modernity in other
societies. When they were critical of Western modernity before 1914,
Europeans sought and appreciated nonmodernity in Asian and
African civilizations. The argument for a variety of modernities was

also rarely used in the deep crisis of European self-understanding between World War I and the 1960s, but it has become more important and more attractive to Europeans during the last thirty years or so. Around 2000 it was clearly not the only view of Europe held by Europeans, but it was an important one.

I have presented two basic reasons for the rise of the argument close to the concept of multiple modernities. On the one hand, this has to do with various aspects of the historical context of the second half of the twentieth century, with the awareness of the end of Europe as the global political center, with decolonization and the division of Europe, with globalization in which Europe is an actor, but far weaker than before 1914, with finished goods, and even software programs, rather than just food and raw materials, coming from other civilizations. It also has to do with immigration and the experience of non-European cultures, as far as they were maintained or reinvented by immigrants in everyday European life rather than being experienced in ethnological museums, in travel reports, in travel outside Europe, and in European colonies. In sum, it has to do with many experiences that finished the belief in Europe's lasting superiority. To be sure, all these experiences could also be interpreted in a different way, but they have led to the idea of variants of modernities in all or most civilizations.

On the other hand, the rise of this idea has also to do with the changing character of European social and cultural particularities. I have tried to show, in discussing some selected ones, that social and cultural particularities still important after World War II were singling out Europe or the West and could easily be interpreted as showing Europe and the West leading in modernity. This is true of the European nuclear family and its values, of the rise of industry in Europe, of the European social milieus and milieu conflicts. Other social and cultural particularities that became more apparent later — the European city, the European welfare state, and European consumerism — did not distinguish Europe in the same way, since urbanization, the institution of social security, and consumerism were global tendencies that made it more convincing to see European particularities as a variant of a global modernity.

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CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE OR COMMUNITY OF MEMORY?
SOME REMARKS ON THE COLLECTIVE IDENTITY OF EUROPE

Bernhard Giesen

Introduction

Today Europe needs to reflect on its collective identity more than ever before. It can no longer assume a self-assured superiority with respect to other civilizations: the age of a triumphant Europe ruling and teaching the world is gone. But neither can Europe retreat into an isolationist position. In a global context it has to face and interact with significant others — political powers, civilizations, hegemonic regimes etc. — and as is common in encounters with outsiders, Europe has to reflect on its own identity.

In addition to seeing a decline in its hegemonic position and the demise of its missionary zeal, Europe has changed its structural foundations. In contrast to the last millennium, today's Europe is less a cultural discourse than a political organization, carried less by intellectuals than by politicians, corporate executives, and the European administration. But even on this political level, Europe cannot — at least not while claiming democratic foundations — dispense with a conception and a representation of its collective identity. Only if we presuppose the collective identity of the demos can we then account for responsibility and historical continuity, decide about membership and citizenship, assume the sovereignty of the people, and imagine the unity of collective decisions — in short, conceive of a body politic beyond the volatile coalition of strategic interests.[1]

This categorical assumption of collective identity, however, has to be separated from its particular representations and organizational forms. The latter depend on and vary with social relations and historical situations. They are constructed and contested; they can be challenged and exchanged. Constitutions may change and histories may be debated, symbols may be transformed and monuments may be destroyed, but these variations occur on the level of representation —

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[1] See Giesen 2001.

they do not affect the continuous existence and identity of the nation or of another collectivity without which we cannot imagine either sovereignty or history.

In the following I explore collective identity in its cultural and constitutional representations. I start with the question whether Europe can be constructed on the basis of a constitutional practice or procedural form. To explore the degree to which collective identity can be based on a constitution alone, I will outline a repertory of ***constitutional regimes*** provided by European history. I then raise the question whether the European Union revives the tradition of early modern city leagues or of hegemonial empires, whether it is a regime of enlightened absolutism or an emerging supernation state — comparable to the United States of America.

Next, I present ***Europe as a cultural movement*** and distinguish among three conceptions of that movement: Europe as the translation of an embodied heritage, Europe as missionary universalism, and Europe as a community of memory.

I then outline a major turn in the ***collective memory of contemporary Western societies*** — the turn from triumph to trauma, from the memory of heroes to the memory of victims and perpetrators. This turn toward a moral construction of a European identity was politically activated in the joint European sanctioning of Austria after Jörg Haider's right-wing party FPÖ entered the Austrian government in 2000.

My concluding remarks address the question whether this turn in the collective memory toward the trauma of victims and the guilt of perpetrators is a European or Western peculiarity.

What is the Nature of the New Beast? European Identity as a Constitutional Regime

Sovereign political organizations like the European Union may conceive of their collective identity in terms of their basic constitutional practices, their patterns of legitimacy, and their demarcation of citizenship. This refers to a ***procedural model of collective identity***, as suggested by Jürgen Habermas in his famous idea of *Verfassungspatriotismus*, that is, constitutional patriotism. Instead of imagining a collective identity, i.e., a demos that precedes the constitution, the procedural model of collective identity assumes that the long-term practice

of citizenship, the routines of coping with cultural diversity, and the firmly established patterns of legitimacy and sovereignty will provide an integrative tie of belonging and collective self-understanding.

This attempt to ground the body politic in the practice of political traditions lends salience to the well-established paradigms of state-hood and sovereignty provided by European history. In the following I will distinguish between four of these paradigms.

The **European city-state**, as it emerged in late medieval times, is, according to Max Weber, regarded as a peculiarly European institu-tion. The European Union, as a confederation of sovereign states, is in this respect comparable to former European city leagues like the *Hanse*, the Flemish cities of the fifteenth century, or the *Lega Lombarda*. Monetary and banking institutions, the protection of property and the legal supervision of contracts, treaties of cooperation and associa-tion between cities, and even a trend toward a unified jurisdiction and constitutional frame opened up large spaces of safe and accountable commercial exchange, but did not construct a new centralized politi-cal sovereignty on top of the city governments. The political order of these city leagues and associations was a polycentric network within a vast rural periphery that with increasing distance from the cities allowed for independent local forms of political authority. Migration and economic exchange between the urban centers and the rural periphery were common, the cities opened their gates to a multitude of immigrants and foreigners, and they allowed for vast cultural het-erogeneity.

Contemporary intergovernmentalists occasionally present these early modern city constitutions as a promising paradigm for a liberal avenue to European integration.[2] There are, of course, some striking similarities between the early modern city leagues and the contempo-rary European community: the dissociation between a fragmented and multilayered political order on the one hand and expansive and unifying market dynamics on the other, or the diversity of languages within the community and the elitist nature of governance.

But there are also strong barriers impeding an easy transfer of the city league model to the supranational administration of contempo-rary Europe. Most important among them is the thrust for inclusive and egalitarian citizenship that has ascended to the status of a trope

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[2] See Majone 1996.

for modern political discourse. Citizenship in the early modern city leagues was, however, a special privilege granted to a relatively small part of these cities' populations. Although not entirely inaccessible to outsiders, the status of full political citizenship was highly exclusive and contrasted clearly with the open and inclusive nature of the city as a marketplace that aimed at attracting as many merchants, traders, buyers, and laborers as possible. This conception of citizenship as a republican corporation mirrored in a way the exclusivity of the aristocratic world outside the city walls.

Another structural difference results from the increasingly strong center of modern European governance in Brussels. The new sovereignty of the European government as well as the sheer size of the centralized bureaucracy contrasts strikingly with the polycentrism of the early modern city leagues. These city leagues were confederations at the most and had no central authority of their own. Instead they relied formally on the supreme authority of the emperor or of a prince – but they could also occasionally support his adversaries, turn against the ruler, and defeat him.

In distinction to the city league model the second historical paradigm — the ***traditional empire*** — was provided with exactly this feature: a strong center embodied in the person of the emperor, administered by a large bureaucracy and carried by a dominant ethnic or national group. Around the center extended a graded and stratified belt of nations that accepted the authority of the ruler more or less voluntarily. We may call this political order the Habsburg model, but the ancient Roman Empire, prerevolutionary Russia, the Ottoman Empire, the Napoleonic Empire and the British Empire can also serve as illustrations.[3] Empires have, by definition, changing and insecure frontiers in contrast to the sharply demarcated and stable boundaries that are typical of the modern nation state. After a period of expansion or conquest this frontier is protected against invasions by unruly barbarians by a zone of military fortresses or fortifications like the Great Wall of China or the Limes built by the Roman Empire. In most cases the degree of political control decreases in relation to the spatial distance from the center. The political system of empires therefore has to allow for the coexistence of various national groups, ethnic and religious communities, languages and cultures.

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[3] Even the rule of the Staufian emperor Frederic II came close to this model for the political system of empires. See Eisenstadt 1993 and Mann 1986.

In direct consequence, the basic rights of citizenship in empires have to be inclusive and decoupled from ethnic or religious ties. In the mature Roman, British, and Habsburg Empires citizenship could not longer be confined to a tiny elite in the core nation.

This constitutive multiculturalism of empires comes, however, at a price: it is not the ruled, but the person of the ruler who is the sovereign political subject. The integrative bond of the empire is provided by the sacredness of the emperor's personal or dynastic authority, and not by a public debate about the common good or by constitutional rules that the citizens have agreed upon.

This does not prevent a close relationship between the ruler and the people: the emperor represents the people and the people can conceive of their collective identity only by referring to the all-embracing authority of their ruler.

Again, there are some structural similarities between the traditional European empires and the new European community: the stratification between core nations and peripheral nations, the expansive and shifting frontiers, and the fortification of the boundaries to prevent immigration of unwanted outsiders — more for economic than military reasons today. But there is one major difference: the idea of sovereignty in traditional empires was based on the personal rule of the emperor, on the sacredness of his descendants or his personal charisma, whereas in contemporary Europe sovereignty is tied to democratic foundations and the legitimacy of the administration in Brussels is almost entirely of a bureaucratic or legal type. Charismatic leadership rarely appears today on the European level; instead it remains tied to the national arena. Not surprisingly, the political center in Brussels has no face, no founding myth, no heroic narrative.

The reasons for this are easy to discover if we consider the Weberian concept of charisma. Charisma results from followers' belief in the extraordinary qualities of a leader and it has to be corroborated in social communication. However, there is no common European public sphere (in the strict sense) that could provide an arena of communication in which a transnational charismatic figure could emerge. There are common political agendas and issues, but they are debated in separate national public spheres. There are specialized transnational public spheres, but they relate only to functional elites or necessary cultural communication.

In contrast to the traditional empires, which were based on a diversity of nations, the European ***enlightened absolutism of the mod-***

ern territorial state aimed at the construction of a uniform internal space and a uniform citizenry.[4] Here, too, the political sovereign was the prince and not the people. Citizens were imagined as passive subjects of the ruler and here, too, the center was regarded as the source of identity, authenticity, and innovation. But the mission of the ruler was not just to establish and expand a peaceful realm for his subjects. Instead, he had to extend the rule of law, to modernize the state and its institutions, and to extract maximum taxes from a limited population.

The citizens in enlightened absolutist states were, however, not only objects of accounting, taxation, and policing matters, but also subjects who had to be educated and enlightened in order to respect the law, to develop science and technology, and to stimulate trade and crafts and the production of goods. Law and education became the core arenas of citizenship in enlightened absolutism.

The people were transformed from a group of locally varying peasants and craftsmen into uniform and equal citizens of a state.[5] Enlightened absolutism not only discarded local and regional differences, but also disregarded the religious and ethnic diversity of the citizens. These differences were banned from the public sphere of the state and enclosed in the privacy of the citizens. Thus the distinction between public and private became the core institutional device for coping with cultural diversity.

Again, there are strong institutional similarities between the political order of enlightened absolutism and the current state of the European Union: the strong bureaucratic center that claims to represent reason and rationality; the missionary rhetoric of progress and modernization; the attempt to stimulate economic growth as the prime motive for political integration; the institutional protection of a large internal market against imports; the bureaucratic standardization of products and services; the thrust to overcome the diversity of national and local identities and to turn the people of different nations into European citizens; and finally the sense of being in competition with "outside organizations" like the United States or Japan.
But although the model of enlightened absolutism seems to come closest to the constitutional practice of the European Union, it is still

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[4] For a critical perspective on the modernizing efforts of absolutist states, see Scott 1998.

[5] See Scott 1998.

incompatible with the central trope of modern political discourse — the idea of a sovereign demos. Even if the EU operates according to the model of enlightened absolutism, it faces the challenge of the deficit of democracy.

This idea of the sovereign demos is at the core of the **modern nation state**. Though the idea of the nation is not a modern invention, the nation as the ultimate sovereign actor of politics is, indeed, a decisively modern, Western and European idea. It emerged in the seventeenth century and became an undisputed master narrative of history and state formation in the first half of the nineteenth century.[6] In the "spring of nations" these were seen as naturally given collectivities that, like sleeping giants, could awake, rise, break the chains of foreign domination, and determine their own fate. Thus the revolutionary uprising against the monarch or against foreign rule became the most important foundation myth of the modern democratic nation. Revolutions are, by definition, ruptures in the continuity of constitutional and legal rule, a relapse into a state of nature, which can be conceived of as Hobbesian violence or Rousseauian paradise.[7] Only if we presuppose that the demos, the people, the nation, exists in this state of nature, that is, independently of and prior to any constitution, legal system or public sphere, can we account for the idea of democratic sovereignty in distinction to the idea of justice and common welfare that is at the core of the constitutional paradigms outlined above.

We have to assume this collective identity of the nation and to represent it in the discourse of political culture in order to decide who is to vote on the constitution, on citizenship rights, and so on. The phrase "we, the people" in its most elemental sense implies boundaries against outsiders, against strangers, even against alleged "enemies of the people." Thus the a priori notion of collective identity seems to be indispensable for the idea of democratic sovereignty. If European politics is to be grounded in a democratic conception of sovereignty, it cannot escape the question what is the demos.[8]

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[6] See Giesen 1998.
[7] See Koselleck, Meier, Fisch, and Bulst 1984.
[8] See Eder and Giesen 2001.

Cultural Heritage as the Foundation of the European Demos

Referring to a past revolution is, however, not the only way of constructing the preconstitutional demos. It can also be grounded in culture and communication, in language and religion. National identities have been successfully built on the assumption of a cultural unity, a common language, and common folkways. And despite its internal diversity of languages and religious confessions, of regional folkways and national traditions Europe, too, can claim a common cultural heritage, carried by intellectuals, by monks and artists, by philosophers and scholars, who, in periods of internal conflict and crisis, appealed to an embracing unity of Europe in contrast to the scattered political map. This cultural construction of Europe was always a matter of relatively small intellectual elites whose members communicated in a nonvernacular language — usually Latin — across political boundaries. Since Augustine distinguished between the earthly and heavenly cities, the tension between the mundane realm of politics and the otherworldly realm of religion and culture has been a distinctive mark of European culture. The distinctions between imperium and sacerdotium, between earthly power and heavenly salvation, between mundane reasoning and the transcendental order, were among the core oppositions that shaped and structured the European discourse about politics and history and were embodied in the conflict between pope and emperor. The two realms were not conceived of as independent of each other. Instead, the transcendental order claimed to transform politics and history and the political order claimed to be grounded in eternal and sacred foundations. The cultural construction of Europe, too, was patterned by this axial age tension between history and transcendence: it was carried by intellectuals and grounded in spheres that transcended mundane politics, but it challenged the existing political order or justified claims to power.[9] Thus, the cultural construction of Europe tended to exceed the range of political authority and to reach out for a universal mission.

But the cultural idea of Europe not only embraced the fractionated and divided realm of politics. It also claimed the unity and continuity of a heritage that in itself was based on ruptures and discontinuity. Historically, the power of the European cultural movement emerged mainly from its ability to absorb and include, to assimilate and merge

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[9] See Eisenstadt 1986.

seemingly inconsistent symbolic elements into an embracing unity. While the intellectuals' call to unity was rarely able to overcome political feuds and cleavages, it was fairly successful in blending cultural diversity and ruptures into the unity and continuity of a tradition. But this unity did not repress or ignore the diversity of its elements. To the contrary: European culture was aware of its internal tensions and able to turn its polycentrism and internal inconsistencies into a major impetus for change. Thus, the coexistence of unity and diversity marks the core of European cultural dynamics.

Europe as Translation

The famous concept of *translatio* refers to this continuity between past and present as the transfer of a cultural heritage from Greek antiquity to contemporary Western civilization, as an assumed continuity in contrast to a history of political conflict. This cultural heritage was embodied in particular objects, places, and territories. The European movement tried to control these places and objects that were considered its sacred core — here the term "movement" can still be used in its original spatial meaning.

The first center of Europe (a Greek term) was the eastern part of the Mediterranean region. Its constitutive boundary ran between the Greek culture and barbarian outsiders.[10] Although the term "Europe" was rarely used by Greek authors before Alexander the Great, the fractionated Greek principalities and republics considered their commonality — in distinction to barbarians — to be grounded mainly in culture. This cultural identity was seen as an aesthetics embodied in objects, statues, buildings, and even human bodies. The masterpieces of Greek art were replicated and translated and, in many cases, survived only as Roman copies of the lost Greek originals. In particular, after Augustus and during the so-called Hadrianic renaissance, Greek art and literature were considered to be the undisputed aesthetic ideal.

But translation occurred not only in art and aesthetics. Roman culture in particular was also a field of deliberate religious hybridization and syncretism. The gods of the classical world were not omnipresent; instead, their sacred presence was concentrated in particular places and objects, in temples and statues. This allowed for coexistence and

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[10] See Baldry 1965.

multiculturalism. The statues of Latin deities were sent as gifts to the temples in newly conquered colonies and the statues of foreign gods, in return, were venerated in Roman temples.

Later on, aesthetic movements of classicism and renaissance venerated the heritage of antiquity that was — until the famous "Querelle des anciens et des modernes" in the seventeenth century — seen as the insurmountable summit of aesthetics. This aesthetic foundation of Europe was carried by an international community of artists who were united not only by a common reference to the classical heritage but also by a Europe-wide commonality of style that reflected communication among artists across political boundaries. Gothic and baroque architecture, Renaissance and impressionist painting, romanticist poetry and operas originated in a particular region or were started by a small group of artists, composers, or writers, but were quickly copied and translated into new fields and regions. Although the embodiments of aesthetics in objects can be subject to ownership rights and spatial translations, the style itself can be reproduced almost without limitation. Hence the invention of a single genius can be quickly turned into a Europe-wide pattern. In European art, literature, and music, differences between epochs and styles matter more than regional or — later — national traditions. The differences in local traditions did never fade away entirely, but they were regarded as folkloric elements superseded by the unity of the epoch and the omnipresence of the classics.

This aesthetic idea of Europe extended not only to the artists but also to collectors and the educated public that admired the classical masterpieces and recognized a Europe-wide commonality of taste and erudition in distinction to those uneducated outsiders who were not able to relate to the heritage of the classics. Therefore princes and cities competed for the favors of the most renowned European artists, artists crossed political borders and their works were traded far from their place of origin, museums took pride in displaying a vast range of European masters, and the political attempt to restrict musical concerts to the compositions of national composers was widely mocked as parochial narrowmindedness. Music, science, and art are not confined within national boundaries, but address a transnational public.

The second major translation occurred in the appropriation of the Roman imperial tradition by Frankish and later Saxon chiefs.[11] Again

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[11] See Ullmann 1969.

the European culture was conceived in spatial terms. After the coronation of Charlemagne by the pope in 800, Europe moved westward. Its constitutive frontier now ran between Latin Christianity and the Muslim empires that controlled most of the southern and eastern coasts of the Mediterranean.[12] Until the sixteenth century and the conflict with the expanding Ottoman Empire, this eastern frontier was the focal point of reference for Christianity. Instead of merging Greek and Roman traditions in a common civilization of late antiquity, the two were now separated by the great schism.

The political transfer of the imperial tradition from Byzantium to the West was backed by the cultural appropriation of the Christian heritage as embodied in the relics of the Christian martyrs that were traded or stolen in Byzantine or Muslim cities in the East and in the crusaders' attempt to conquer the holy places in Palestine.[13] Here, too, the translation of culture was closely connected with material objects and localities — the sacred was not everywhere, but concentrated in particular objects, in statues and churches, in relics and sacred sites.

The translation of an imperial heritage was not only embodied in movements of conquest and transfer but also supported by a discourse about the unity of Europe "avant la lettre". This discourse was carried by monks and scholars like Widukind of Corvey and Lupold von Babenburg, Dante Alighieri, and Marsilius of Padua, who advocated the imperial cause — frequently in opposition to the papal claim of supremacy.[14] The hegemonial claim of the Holy Roman Empire was not just a matter of political power but it was grounded in the spiritual unity of Latin Christianity, and the papal claim to represent the invisible God in the visible world had to be respected by the power holders. Thus imperium and ecclesia — embodied in emperor and pope — staked competing claims to cultural as well as political leadership. Their claims were supported and challenged, debated and denied by intellectuals, scholars, legalists, and theologians.

These intellectuals communicated through a transnational network. Monks traveling between the centers of medieval scholarship, knights on a crusade or on a pilgrimage, bishops convening in a papal council or humanist scholars debating at a princely court not only dis-

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[12] See Delanty 1995 and Pirenne 1987.
[13] See Geary 1978.
[14] See Gollwitzer 1964; Leyser 1992; Reuter 1992; and Wallach 1972.

covered regional differences of origin but experienced the strong commonality of Latin-speaking Christians, in contrast to the local commoners and their vernacular tongue on the one hand and to the non-European foreigners on the other. Europe appeared not only as a translation of imperial authority but also as a transnational community of Latin-speaking monks and scholars, noblemen and office holders, clergymen and artists.

The third major translation of Europe can be seen as a turn toward a western frontier carried by Portuguese and Spanish conquistadors a well as Dutch and English traders who crossed the Atlantic, lured by the New World's treasures or in pursuit of religious perfection. Here, the constitutive boundary ran between the primitive peoples of the New World and the Christian conquerors who ventured out from the Western shores of the Old World and — despite their internal competition — remained aware of their common European identity and superiority.[15] Religious mission and trade capitalism transformed the Atlantic Ocean into an Inland Sea of the European colonial empires. Here, too, the movement of European culture was originally seen as a spatial expansion, as the transfer of arms, statues, dresses, tools, ships, and horses to the newly conquered territories. In reverse, the gold of Peru and the silver of Mexico, the slaves from Africa and the cotton from the New World were the material objects of a translation that was moved less by political claims and aesthetic ideals than by the desire for riches and treasures. The age of global European hegemony and exploitation had begun.

Europe as a Missionary Movement

This idea of translation contrasts with the idea of a European mission, which is based on discontinuity between past and present and assumes an invisible and categorical unity instead of an embodied, visible, and tangible heritage.

The idea of a European mission is strongly represented in Reformation Protestantism, in its iconoclasm and abstention from splendor and personal mediation. Cromwell had proclaimed "the western project" as a missionary conquest of the Caribbean, but in the missionary conception Europe was gradually decoupled from its territorial ties and gained a temporal connotation. The *res publica christiana* could and

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[15] See Bitterli 1993; Chiapelli 1976; and Gollwitzer 1964.

should finally include every human being. European Christendom was turned into a universal community in relation to a God who was invisible and omnipresent, inaccessible and beyond description. The sacred core of European culture could no longer be seen as embodied in particular places and objects. It became a missionary project that referred to all human beings and to all global regions. Europe was still a cultural movement but instead of moving cultural objects, it moved persons from outside into the community.

The universal claim of the missionary movement, however, allowed for internal diversity. In contrast to the discourse of Pre-reformation Christianity that communicated on the basis of a single language, Reformation Protestantism allowed for a variety of vernacular languages — the universal message of salvation was taught in many tongues.

But the Protestant missionary zeal and the counter-Reformation also divided Europe into religious camps that fought each other in devastating wars. As a response to the confessional wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, intellectuals engaged in a new discourse about the unity of Europe. This discourse imagined Europe as a realm of peace devoid of religious fanaticism and devoted to reason and the rule of law. It was to be carried by a small elite of enlightened princes, noblemen, scholars, officeholders, and merchant capitalists. Pufendorf or Erasmus, Leibniz or Bodin, Comenius or Spinoza did not yet address a large public, and they did not imagine their readership as having national contours. They traveled between the princely courts, switched allegiances, communicated in several European languages, and wrote for a small, educated audience.

This missionary universalism also shaped the process of modernization and rationalization that is commonly associated with the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. The movement was carried by intellectuals who traveled between the centers of scholarship in Europe and frequently published abroad to escape censorship. New publications of famous authors were quickly translated and available to a Europe-wide readership. Although Paris and Leyden, London and Königsberg, Edinburgh and Göttingen had their own intellectual climate, the Enlightenment was a decisively transnational movement.[16]

The polycentrism of the European Enlightenment is mirrored by the vision of Europe as a system of balanced powers that impede

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[16] See Darnton 1982; Giesen 1998; and Gay 1966.

hegemony for any particular state and that are guided by the princi-
ples of reason and respect for freedom of thought. This Europe as
imagined by the Enlightenment gave rise to the idea of a universal
human nature and reason, as well as to the conception of a natural
world to be described by empirical science and the conception of
progress as the guiding principle of history. The constitutive bound-
ary between Europe and the other was even more temporalized and
decoupled from the ties of descent and territory. It did run between
the ***European vanguard of history*** and the backward "races" of
outsiders, but could also hint at the backwardness and decadence of
the European center and the natural innocence of the periphery. The
"noble savage" could be closer to human perfection than the Euro-
pean — in particular, at times when the Europeans seemed to oppose
the rule of reason and natural order. The Enlightenment was a Euro-
pean movement that transcended territorial boundaries and aimed at
a universal community of mankind. Everybody's true identity was
European, and it was the task of education and emancipation to fur-
ther awareness of this identity. Thus what started as a genuine Euro-
pean movement dissolved into a free-floating discourse that appealed
to every human being everywhere and every time.

Contemporary criticism frequently accuses the Enlightenment of
being insensitive to cultural differences. The contrary is true. The
Enlightenment was strongly interested in all variations of human soci-
ety. It gave rise to a comparative perspective on human civilizations
and, possibly for the first time, it took the position of the other in
order to focus on the peculiarities of the European culture. In its
refined forms it still remains the most complex intellectual endeavor
to account for differences between one's own community and others.

The third version of the missionary movement in European culture
can be seen in the thrust for civil and human rights that, starting in
the nineteenth century, has ascended to the status of a global ethic of
international responsibility and intervention. This movement
responded to the historical experience of the French Revolution and
created a unity of discourse that fueled political movements against
the anciens régimes throughout Europe.

The politicized intelligentsia of the nineteenth century created net-
works with nodes in Paris, London, Zürich, and St. Petersburg.[17]

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[17] It is less easy to find such nodes in Germany or Italy, where networks of small
university towns fulfilled the same function.

Their cause was the defense of human rights and the call for civil rights: their strategies varied from pamphleteering to full-fledged subversive activism. Such networks created a counterunity to the *Metternich* system, which tried to restore the old European order by censorship, police, and privilege. Their success was limited, but was taken as a model by the European workers' movement, which, though it started as an international movement, was essentially European.

The idea of human rights provided the metanarrative for a better Europe, the postwar consensus underlying the restructuring of Europe after World War II. More important than its impact on the reconstruction of postwar Europe, however, was the complete decoupling of the cultural movement from its place of origin. Human rights are by their very definition universal and unalienable rights that transcend not only territorial boundaries, but also the frontiers of civilization and culture. Consequently the human rights movement responds to violations all over the globe. What had started as a European cultural movement has now become global ethics.

Europe as a Community of Memory

Neither the idea of *translatio* and embodied heritage nor the idea of Europe as a vanguard of universal history can provide a distinct European identity today. The idea of a European mission faces strong objections from non-Europeans. But its opposite, the idea of an inimitable heritage, will also provoke frowns because it is a highly exclusive claim. In this situation Europe can return to its particular historical past and conceive of its identity in terms of **collective memory**.[18] I have already mentioned the revolution as the founding myth of the modern demos. In the heroic uprising against the princely rule or foreign domination, the people relapse into a state of nature and constitute themselves as the ultimate political sovereign. In this respect the collective identity of the demos precedes analytically the constitution and the political practice of citizenship. In the memories of triumphant or tragically failed revolutions this democratic sovereignty is renarrated, represented, and reenacted.

But it is exactly this memory of a revolutionary birth of the demos that is lacking in the European case — there is no common memory of a heroic uprising that includes all European nations. The memory of a

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[18] See Assmann 1999; Connerton 1989; Giesen 1999; and Nora 1984-1986.

triumphant uprising is almost exclusively tied to single nations, that is, it systematically undercuts the notion of an embracing European identity. Even the memory of a tragically failed revolutionary uprising is related to a particular nation that rebelled against an oppressor, usually another European nation. Whether triumphant or tragic, the memory of past revolutions can hardly unite all European nations.

But the reference to triumphant foundations, to heroes and revolutions, is not the only path of collective memory that could give rise to a European identity. In modern Western nations the triumphant founding myth is increasingly being replaced by reference to a traumatic past, to the collective memory of victims and perpetrators. New national memorials and museums rarely commemorate triumphant victories, but recall the victims of the past. This turn from triumph to trauma has been preceded by a major change in the monuments representing the embodiment of the nation in the hero. After World War I monuments to anonymous soldiers replaced the once victorious heroes who had faces, names, and stories – at first as a tragically failing hero, than as a nameless victim who ranges among other depersonalized victims of ethnic cleansing and genocide.[19] The new national memorial of the reunited Germany in Berlin is such a memorial to anonymous victims, a memorial constructed by the nation and for the nation of perpetrators. In remembering a collective trauma it includes victims as well as perpetrators and it can do so because it represents the collective memory of the German nation instead of hinting at the personal guilt of individual perpetrators, very few of whom are still alive. Individual suffering and guilt on the one hand and collective trauma and responsibility on the other are decoupled here.

The turn from memorializing heroes to remembering victims and perpetrators, from triumphant to traumatic foundations of collective identity, is also reflected in official rituals performed by representatives of the state. The famous kneeling gesture performed by former German chancellor Willy Brandt in front of the Warsaw Ghetto memorial 30 years ago, engendered today a political culture of ritual apologies.[20] So, in a strange way, the figure of the perpetrator becomes an archetype of collective identity, not only in Germany.[21] Representatives of many European nations have since officially

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[19] See Koselleck 1997.
[20] See Cunningham 1999.
[21] See Gisen 2002.

acknowledged their nations' involvement in the *Shoah*. France is more concerned with issues of collaboration than with the myth of resistance. Norway's President Bruntland admitted that more young Norwegians died in the ranks of the *Waffen-SS* than as victims of the German occupation. Poland has discovered its genocidal involvement in Jedbabwne, the pope has apologized for the nonintervention of the Roman Catholic Church, and even the Italian neofascist leader Fini laid down flowers at the site of the murders of the *Fossi Adratici*. Compared with these solemn confessions of guilt and its representation in monuments, museums, and public debates, the traditional celebrations of triumphant memorial days are increasingly reduced to the status of local folklore.

The spread of a new culture of ritual confessions of guilt centers around the Nazi genocide of the European Jews not only as a German issue but also as a collective European trauma that relates to many nations as victims and collaborators and even includes the Allied forces, because they did not prevent the genocide by bombing the railroads leading to the death camps. This secular shift from triumphant to traumatic foundations of collective memory contrasts sharply with the postwar attempts to purify one's own community by shifting the guilt to one nation and within that nation to a limited group of criminal if not demonic perpetrators. Today the turn towards a collective memory of trauma blurs the once clear-cut separation between the nations of perpetrators and the nations that could remember themselves as victims. This extends to the German nation, which today not only clearly acknowledges its guilt, but has also started to rediscover and remember its own victims — the victims of bombing raids and of ethnic cleansing after the war. A new traumatic memory of perpetrators and victims now unites the European nations and provides for a tacitly assumed moral consensus: an European collective identity based on the horror of the past.

Today, the burden of collective trauma is accepted by European nations because most of the individual perpetrators are already dead and therefore out of the reach of jurisdiction. By decoupling collective identity from the sum of individual identities, the present of the European Union has been separated from the European past of war and genocide. Of course, one can observe right-wing extremism in most European societies today, but this is treated as political deviance that could never succeed in entering a national government.

That is why the new European identity based on a collective mem-

ory of Nazism was challenged when the right-wing party FPÖ, led by
Jörg Haider, entered the Austrian government in 2000. Not the mere
existence of right-wing extremism, but the official representation of a
member state by a party that is considered to be riddled with Nazism
was the reason for the sharp critique. We may consider the European
response to the new Austrian government to be grossly exaggerated
— Haider is a right wing populist not much different from the French
Le Pen or the Italian Fini — but the Austrian case provided an excel-
lent opportunity to emphasize the new collective identity of European
nations. Stigmatizing the Austrian government also showed where
the line would be drawn for future candidates for membership in the
European Union. Thus for the first time an encompassing identity for
the European Union was expressed in moral terms without falling
back into a missionary triumphalism.

A European Heritage?

Why did this secular shift from triumphant to traumatic memories
occur in Europe? What conditions fostered it, and, in particular, why
should this memory of a collective trauma be considered a European
peculiarity? Indeed the trauma of genocide and the collective respon-
sibility of the perpetrators are by no means unique to Europe. But the
official response of Turkey to the Armenian genocide or the Japanese
reaction to the international pressure to apologize for the Nanjing
massacres differs greatly from the European response to the *Shoah*.
The Turkish and Japanese reluctance even to admit the crimes can
hardly be explained by a phase of latency in which a nation is ridden
with haunting individual memories and cannot bear to face the brutal
conversion of its triumphant heroes into criminal perpetrators. In
Europe as well as in Japan or in Turkey the perpetrators are dead and
out of the reach of jurisdiction. Also the rise of international media
networks, which has increased sensitivity about triumphant manifes-
tations of national identity, extends to Japan as well as to Europe.

   But neither is it simple chauvinism that prevents these nations from
admitting their genocidal crimes. Instead their reluctance or refusal
hints at different religious foundations of collective identity. The
Judeo-Christian tradition starts with the idea of the original sin that
passes from generation to generation until the redeemer appears and
dissolves the bonds of collective guilt. In the Christian tradition this

messiah is embodied in the person of Christ. Christ represents the ultimate innocent individual, the son of God who sacrificed his life to remove the burden of collective guilt from his people.[22] Because he is innocent, his suffering does not result from retaliation and revenge but instead represents the ultimate sovereign act of the divine hero. For the individual person this myth of original sin and redemption is turned into the ritual of confessing the guilt. The confession of guilt not only relieves the confessor of the burden of guilt; it also purifies him. If the confessing individual proves to be innocent, but nevertheless takes on the burden of collective guilt, he sanctifies his own mundane individuality, he performs Christomimesis *and — as a political leader — partakes of the charisma of the hero*. Thus the European ritual of confessing guilt for sins of the past relies on a mythology that remains even if the political representatives performing the ritual are utterly secularized individuals who ignore the cultural origin of their actions.

In contrast, Japanese confessions of guilt are limited to individuals, who are blamed for having brought shame on the collectivity, the nation, the family.[23] Here, the relation between individual and collective identity is reversed: it is only the individual who can be guilty, humiliated, and ashamed, whereas the embracing collectivity cannot be imagined as other than innocent. The reason for this remarkable difference can be found in the axial contrast between the this-worldly deed and otherworldly salvation in the European case and the Japanese perspective, in which the confession of guilt cannot be alleviated by the promise of salvation.[24] Furthermore, the European heritage of moral universalism transfers its moral perspective to international relations, while from a Japanese or Chinese point of view these are totally different spheres.

Even with respect to the spread of rituals of mourning and confessions of collective guilt European identity relies on a cultural heritage that continues to influence life today, even if the Europeans are no longer aware of it. Of course, the Christian myth of the redeeming sacrifice of the innocent is not the only possible foundation of European identity. Others — the Enlightenment, the idea of civil equality and civil rights, the individual as the source of creativity and carrier of

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[22] The myth of the divine king sacrificing himself was quite common in African kingdoms too. See Eliade 1963.

[23] See Benedict 1974.

[24] See Eisenstadt 1996 and Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995.

rights in contrast to the authority of the state, the separation of state and religion, the constitutional nation state — are of similar importance and have been exported to other areas of the globe — mostly even without keeping a mark of their European origin. But confessing the collective guilt of the past may provide a European identity that can neither be accused of missionary triumphalism nor regarded as darkening the future of Europe.

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PART G

APPROACHES IN ECONOMICS

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MULTIPLE MARKET ECONOMIES: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN STRUCTURING BUSINESS SYSTEMS

Richard Whitley

The Development and Continued Divergence
of Varieties of Capitalism

During the twentieth century a number of distinctive forms of capital-ism have become established and continue to be reproduced as differ-ent systems of economic organization. Despite numerous claims of growing convergence and the globalization of managerial structures and strategies, the ways in which economic activities are organized and controlled in, for example, postwar Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan differ considerably from those prevalent in the United States and the United Kingdom. They also vary significantly among them-selves.[1] Equally, substantial variations in types of dominant firm, cus-tomer-supplier relations, employment practices, and work systems remain across the regions and countries of Europe despite the efforts of "modernizing" elites in the postwar period.[2] Convergence to a sin-gle most effective type of market economy is no more likely in the twenty-first century than it was in the highly internationalized econo-my of the late nineteenth century.[3]

Indeed, insofar as the international economy does continue to become more integrated, it can be argued that societies with different institutional arrangements will continue to develop and reproduce var-ied systems of economic organization with different economic and social capabilities in particular industries and sectors. They will there-fore specialize in distinctive ways of structuring economic activities that privilege some sectors and discourage others.[4] An example of such specialization is the late-twentieth-century U.K. economy, which has strong international capabilities in financial services and architecture[5]

[1] See Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton 1997; Whitley 1992.
[2] See, for example, Herrigel 1996; Kristensen 1997; Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre 1986.
[3] See Kenworthy 1997; Wade 1996; Whitley 1998.
[4] See Hollingsworth and Streeck 1994; Sorge 1991.
[5] See Winch 1996.

but relatively weak ones in complex assembly manufacturing and construction.

The various varieties of capitalism have been characterized and analyzed in a number of ways. Some researchers, for example, have contrasted broad models of cooperative or "Rhenish" capitalism with the excesses of neo-American capitalism.[6] Others have extolled the virtues of competitive managerial capitalism in the American mode over the more "personal" variant in the United Kingdom and, less emphatically, the "cooperative managerial" one in Germany.[7] One particularly useful way of comparing systems of capitalism has been the contrast of coordinated (CME) and liberal market economies (LME).[8] This highlights how differences in welfare systems, employment law and conventions, the organization of business associations, training systems, financial markets, and legal systems generate different incentives for individuals and firms to pursue distinctive strategies.

Simplifying greatly, CMEs encourage cooperative, long-term investments in firm- and industry-specific skills that develop organizational competences in coordinating knowledge and skills across internal and external organizational boundaries to develop continuous but incremental innovations. LMEs, in contrast, reward more short-term and adversarial behavior by both individuals and firms that generates more generic skills and considerable labor mobility between firms. Such economies facilitate the rapid use of new knowledge and skills to seize radically new opportunities. The dominant institutions in CMEs are seen as solving the organizational problems involved in pursuing high-quality incremental innovation strategies, whereas those in LMEs enable firms to focus more on developing radical innovations in newly emerging technologies.[9]

As a result, countries that have developed institutional frameworks similar to the idealized CME, for example Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland, have been highly effective at developing incremental product and process innovations in established technologies in the chemical and machinery industries. In contrast, societies with dominant institutions more similar to LMEs, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, have been more effective in developing discon-

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[6] See Albert 1993.
[7] See Chandler 1990.
[8] See Hall and Soskice 2001; Soskice 1999.
[9] See Soskice 1997; Whitley 2000.

tinuous innovations in newer technologies such as biotechnology and microprocessors.[10] They have also been more effective in developing competitive business service firms that are highly dependent on the specialist skills of particular individuals.[11]

This approach to the comparative analysis of institutions and innovations identifies some of the critical linkages between the organization of financial and labor markets, firms' priorities and strategies, and patterns of change in two idealized types of market economy. There are, however, important institutional variations within these two broad varieties of capitalism, such as the very different systems of skill formation in Germany and Japan, and the relative importance of national and sectoral coordinating institutions in Scandinavia and Central Europe.[12] Also, of course, a number of systems of economic organization that do not fit neatly into this dichotomy have developed in late-twentieth-century capitalism, such as the pattern developed in France and elsewhere.[13]

Additionally, the variety of firm types and strategies within each kind of market economy is sometimes greater than the contrast between CME and LME would suggest. The United States, for instance, has developed both large integrated firms pursuing largely autarchic innovation strategies and smaller specialist research-based firms introducing radical innovations in close cooperation with the public science system. Also, the nationally coordinated market economy of Sweden developed a considerable number of specialized software producers in the late 1990s[14] that resemble the startups of Silicon Valley more than established large firms. These variations suggest that the CME/LME dichotomy needs further development and differentiation to encompass the variety of ways in which institutional arrangements impinge on firms' strategies and result in contrasting patterns of development.

Varieties of Institutional Environments

When one is seeking to contrast and explain major differences in systems of economic coordination and control — or business systems —

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[10] See Casper 2001.
[11] See, for example, Tylecote and Conesa 1999.
[12] See Kitschelt, Lange, Marks, and Stephens 1999.
[13] See Boyer 1997; Hancke 2001.
[14] See Casper 2001; Glimstedt 2001.

between market economies, the institutions governing four arenas are particularly important. These are the state, the financial system, the skill development and control system, and dominant conventions governing trust and authority relations. These institutions deal with both the kinds of resources — especially human ones — that are available to privately owned economic actors in any particular market economy and the terms on which they are available, as well as, of course, with the sorts of people who become owners of private property rights. Their central features are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1
Key Institutional Features Structuring Business Systems

The State
1. Cohesion, prestige and autonomy of the state and its willingness to share risks with private owners
2. Significance of independent organized associations between families and the state
3. Extent of formal regulation of markets

The Financial System
4. Capital market or credit based

Skill Development and Control Systems
5. Strength of public training system and of state-employer-union collaboration
6. Strength of independent trade unions
7. Centralization of bargaining

Trust and Authority Relations
8. Reliability of formal institutions governing trust relations
9. Predominance of paternalist authority relations
10. Importance of communal norms governing authority relations

The State

Many features of state structures and policies influence forms of economic organization, but three summary ones are particularly significant. First, the overall cohesion, prestige, and autonomy of the state executive and bureaucracy, sometimes referred to as the strength of the state vis a vis social interest groups, landed elites, etc., can be combined with their commitment to coordinate economic development

and willingness to share investment risks with private economic interests. This feature can be termed the extent to which *states dominate the economy and share risks* such that businesses become dependent on state policies and actions. Some, such as many Anglo-Saxon states, have neither the wish nor the ability to actively coordinate economic processes. Others, like perhaps post-1950s Japan, pursue "developmental" policies but do not commit large resources to sharing private sector investment risks.[15] A few, such as the post 1961 South Korean state, do both.[16] Clearly, where the state is both strong and an active sharer of risks, private firms must invest considerable resources in managing relations with the executive and bureaucracy.

A second significant feature of political systems is the extent to which the state encourages the establishment of important intermediary economic associations between individuals, firms, and the state. This can be summarized as the degree of *state encouragement of intermediary associations*. Some European states, for instance, appear unable to tolerate such groupings, whereas others, like the German and Austrian, seem to positively encourage their formation and to develop quite strong corporatist forms of intra- and intersectoral organization. Such corporatist arrangements vary in the extent to which they are organized nationally or sectorally and in their inclusion of labor unions, but all encourage interfirm cooperation and alliances.

Thirdly, there are significant differences in the extent to which states directly, or indirectly through business associations, regulate market boundaries, entry, and exit, as well as set constraints on the activities of economic actors. They are here termed the extent of *formal regulation of markets*. In many countries, for instance, states regulate which kinds of organizations can offer financial services and how they can sell them, as well as where they can do so. Similarly, licenses to undertake certain trades are often issued only by national and local state agencies after appropriate skill certificates have been acquired. In other countries, such powers are sometimes delegated to industry associations and quasi-statutory bodies. Product, capital, and labor markets, then, are variously regulated across states, and this affects their segmentation, the intensity of competition, the mobility of resources, and the flexibility of firms.

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[15] See Johnson 1982.
[16] See Amsden 1989; Wade 1996

Financial Systems

Financial systems also vary on a number of dimensions, but the critical feature here deals with the processes by which capital is made available and priced. In particular, is it allocated by capital markets through competition, so that lenders and users remain relatively remote from one another, or is it provided by some set of intermediaries that deal directly with firms and become locked into their particular success? *Capital-market-based* financial systems, as characterized by Zysman,[17] mobilize and distribute capital primarily through large and liquid markets that trade and price financial claims through the usual commodity market processes. Because many, if not most, investors and fund managers deal in portfolios of shares that can be readily traded on secondary and tertiary markets, they are only weakly committed to the growth of any single firm in which they own shares. As a result, they have only a relatively short-term and narrow interest in its fortunes. This encourages a strong market for corporate control in capital-market financial systems, as ownership rights are easily traded and owners have little incentive to retain shares when offered considerable price premiums for them by acquisitive predators.

Credit-based financial systems, on the other hand, typically have weak and fairly illiquid or thin capital markets, which play only a minor role in mobilizing and pricing investment funds. The dominant institutions here are either large, universal banks, as in Germany, or a combination of commercial banks and long-term credit banks coordinated by state agencies and ministries, as in France, Japan, and some other countries.[18] Because of capital shortages during periods of high growth, and/or state control of interest rates to support economic development, demand for investment funds often exceeds supply in these systems. As a result, banks and/or the state allocate capital through administrative processes to particular sectors and activities, such as export industries or the heavy manufacturing sector. Since shares are not easily traded, owners, bankers, and trust managers become locked into particular borrowers' fates and so have to be more involved in decision making and the detailed evaluation of investment plans than in capital-market-based systems. This, in turn, means that they have to deal with a considerable amount of informa-

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[17] See Zysman 1983.
[18] See Cox 1986.

tion about their customers' businesses and develop considerable expertise in them. Once financial intermediaries have developed that expertise, they have a vested interest in using it to provide new services and play a more active role in firms' growth planning. They thus become even more committed to particular enterprises and develop a common community of fate with them.

This distinction became somewhat less significant in Europe and East Asia in the last few decades of the twentieth century as industrialized economies' growth rates declined and successful firms were able to fund investment from internal cash flow and the corporate bond markets. Instead, the major contrast in financial systems has become more focused on the concentration of shareholdings and insider versus outsider domination of firms.[19] In the arm's length financial markets of the United States and the United Kingdom, ownership has become even more fragmented and remote from the managements of individual firms, while many large firms in continental Europe and East Asia remain controlled by majority or large minority shareholders.[20] Such insider-controlled businesses may have to pay more for minority shareholders' investments, but develop much closer connections with their major shareowners and controllers than outsider-controlled ones.

Skill Development and Control Systems

The system for developing and controlling skills comprises two broad and interrelated sets of institutions. First, there is the system that develops and certifies competences and skills: the education and training system. Second, there are the institutions that control the terms on which the owners of those skills sell them in labor markets and how those markets are organized. In comparing education and training systems, two aspects are especially important: first, the extent to which practical skills are jointly organized and certified by employers, unions, and state agencies, and second, the degree of integration of practical learning in firms with formal learning in educational institutions. In their comparison of work organization and control practices in France and Germany, Marc Maurice and his colleagues drew a contrast between unitary and generalist education systems, such as

[19] See Tylecote and Conesa 1999.
[20] See Becht and Roell 1999; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1998.

the French and Japanese, and dual, specialist ones, such as the German and some other Continental European ones.[21]

In the former, children are successively filtered by academic examinations in the general educational system and only "failures" enter state practical training organizations, which are often poorly funded and have low social prestige. In the latter, practical skill training integrates theory and practice, as well as employers, unions, and state education, and is seen as different from, but not greatly inferior to, the grammar school system leading to university entrance. The specialist training system, at least in Germany, combines some elements of traditional apprenticeship with college-based formal instruction and is cooperatively managed by representatives of labor, capital, and the state.

While the specialist-generalist contrast is too simple to summaries all the important differences between education and training systems, there are two critical differences that impinge greatly on business system characteristics. First, there is the extent to which the systems develop publicly certified, relatively standardized, broad practical skills that combine currently usable capacities with more general knowledge and aptitudes that facilitates future learning and improvement. Second, the extent to which employers, unions, and the state are jointly involved in developing and managing such training varies considerably. These two dimensions can be summarized as the extent to which there is a *strong, collaborative public training system* that develops broad, cumulating, publicly examined and certified skills.

Two critical features of the organization and control of labor markets are the extent to which the availability of skills and capabilities is controlled by trade unions and professional associations, and how bargaining is structured. The first dimension can be summarized as the *strength of independent trade unions*. Their overall power and significance is obviously important in employers' ability to change strategic priorities, technologies, and markets; it also affects their labor management strategies. How much *bargaining is centralized* at sectoral or national levels affects the internal cohesion and coordination of employers' groups and union federations. To be effective representatives of collective interests, central federations typically gain control over constituent members in highly centralized bargaining systems and usually firms develop interdependent linkages in dealing with

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[21] See Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre 1986.

industrial relations issues. This facilitates collaboration between economic actors, as they have to work together on a continuing basis.

Norms and Values Governing Trust and Authority Relationships

The norms governing trust and authority relations are crucial because they structure exchange relationships between business partners and between employers and employees. They also affect the development of collective identities and prevalent modes of eliciting compliance and commitment within authority systems. Variations in these conventions result in significant differences in the governance structures of firms, the ways in which they deal with each other and with other organizations, and prevalent patterns of work organization, control, and employment.

How trust is granted and guaranteed in an economy especially affects the level of interfirm cooperation and tendency to delegate control over resources. Although there are significant variations in how competence, contractual and goodwill forms of trust are developed in different cultures,[22] the key feature here is the strength of formal social institutions generating and guaranteeing trust between relative strangers. In particular, the extent to which the owners of property rights, and the economic actors they control, feel able to rely on impersonal institutionalized procedures when making business commitments is crucial for collaborative relations within and between firms. It also affects the perception and management of risk.[23] Where such procedures are weak or judged unreliable, personal and particularistic connections become especially important in organizing exchange relationships.[24]

Superordinate-subordinate relations are typically governed by a number of norms and rules, as Eckstein and Gurr have shown,[25] so that authority patterns vary across cultures and political systems. A far-reaching distinction can be drawn, however, between *formal* and *paternalist* political cultures. The former a) restrict superordinate discretion through formal rules and procedures to a fairly narrow range of issues and actions, b) acknowledge the independent and

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[22] See Mako 1992.
[23] See Zucker 1986.
[24] See Hamilton, Zeile, and Kim 1990; Redding 1990.
[25] See Eckstein and Gurr 1975.

autonomous status of subordinates as individuals able to make rational decisions, and c) involve subordinates in the choice of superordinates and in decision making. The latter typically treat subordinates as children who cannot be expected to know their own best interests and act accordingly.[26]

Paternalism in turn can be divided into two major kinds: *remote* and *reciprocal*. Remote paternalism implies a high degree of social and moral distance between leaders and their followers, with little direct reciprocity expected of superordinates in return for subordinates' deference. Common and shared interests are rarely invoked as the basis for compliance and superiors often claim a moral superiority that requires no further justification, as in the virtuocracies of Confucian China and South Korea.[27] Reciprocal paternalism, on the other hand, involves much closer links between superordinates and subordinates, with reciprocal services expected of superiors through direct patronage and a strong belief that leaders and led share a common community of fate, as in modern Japan.[28]

Formal authority can also be further subdivided into a number of kinds, but perhaps the most significant contrast is between *contractual* and *communal* forms. This distinction focuses on the extent to which authority rests on widespread and diffuse appeals to common interests as opposed to highly specific and narrow agreements between discrete contractors. Communal forms of authority imply relatively high levels of mutual trust and commitment, with a shared understanding of priorities and interests, and often rely on expertise as a key quality of superordinates. Contractual authority tends to presume more adversarial relationships and a dominant pursuit of self-interest. The former seems to have become institutionalized in some Scandinavian and Continental European countries, whereas the latter is found more in Anglo-Saxon societies.[29]

These features of institutional structures are interrelated as shown Table 2. For example, societies in which strong states play a major role in coordinating economic development and share risks with the private sector tend not to develop strong intermediary associations. Employers' associations and labor unions are usually weak in such countries. On

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[26] See Beetham 1991.
[27] See Pye 1985; Silin 1976.
[28] See Haley 1992; Iwata 1992; Rohlen 1974.
[29] See Lodge and Vogel 1987.

Table 2
Linkages between institutional features

		1	2	3	4a	4b	5	6	7	8	9	10
Dominant, Risk Sharing State	1		−	+	−	+		−				
Strong Intermediary Associations	2			+				+		−		
Strong Market Regulation	3											
Capital Market Financial System	4a					−				−	−	
Credit-Based Financial Systems	4b											
Strong Collaborative Public Training System	5							+		−	−	
Strong Unions	6									−		
Centralized Bargaining	7											
Low Trust in Formal Institutions	8											
Paternalist Authority Relations	9											
Communal Formal Authority	10											

the other hand, markets are often heavily regulated since this is a major way in which state agencies coordinate development. These kinds of states tend to be associated with credit-based rather than capital-market-based financial systems, for two reasons. First, they are typical of late industrializing economies in which capital is scarce and more readily mobilized through the banking system. Second, it is easier for the state to influence economic development through the financial system when it is dominated by banks rather than capital markets.[30]

These kinds of interconnections limit the number of distinctive combinations of institutional features that develop and distinguish at least five major kinds of institutional frameworks. For instance, the

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[30] See Zysman 1983.

combination of a strong state with weak intermediary associations and strong regulation of market entry and exit can be characterized as a *dirigiste* type of business environment in which business development is highly dependent on the state. Where the state is less directly involved in the economy through ownership and/or credit allocation, and coordinates economic development with more independent industry associations, business is more autonomous. In these *state-guided* and *corporatist* environments, intermediary associations are often encouraged by state agencies to take on coordinating and regulating functions, although these do not always include labor organizations.

Where strong intermediary associations have developed, they typically engage in bargaining and negotiation with each other, with strongly institutionalized procedures limiting opportunistic behavior. Such procedures depend on considerable trust between social partners and widespread belief in their joint dependence on cooperation to gain group objectives. Commitment to relatively impersonal associations and an institutionalized ability to mobilize loyalty to collective goals are important features of these kinds of societies. When combined with strong public training systems, as in many Continental European countries, these institutional features are conducive to collaboration between economic actors.

Conversely, low levels of state risk sharing and economic coordination are often combined with capital-market-based financial systems in what might be termed *arm's length* or differentiated business environments. In these contexts, institutional arenas and elites are organized quite separately according to their own particular logics. Social relationships tend to be regulated by formal rules and procedures that treat actors as discrete individuals pursuing their separate interests, as exemplified by classical contracting. Authority and trust relations are here governed by formal institutions that limit mutual obligations to contractually specified duties. Collaboration between employers, unions, and other groups is difficult to establish in such societies, because collective actors are typically adversarial in their relations with each other.

Finally, cultures in which trust in formal institutions is low and loyalties are focused on the immediate family limit the growth of intermediary associations and the development of exchange relationships governed by formal procedures. Capital markets are unlikely to be significant sources of investment funds in such societies, and the largely personal nature of authority relationships restricts the development of strong labor unions. Social relationships in these cultures tend to be

Table 3
Features of five distinctive institutional frameworks

Types of inernational frameworks

International Features	arm's length	dirigiste	corpora-tist	state-guided	particu-laristic
1. Dominant, Risk Sharing State	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO
2. Strong Intermediary Associations	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO
3. Strong Market Regulation	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
4a. Capital Market Financial System	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
4b. Credit-based Financial System	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
5. Strong Collab-orative Public Training System	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
6. Strong Unions	VARIES	NO	YES	NO	NO
7. Centralized Bargaining	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
8. Low Trust in Formal Institutions	NO	VARIES	NO	NO	YES
9. Paternalist Authority Relations	NO	VARIES	NO	YES	YES
10. Communal Formal Authority	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
Typical Business System	Compart-mentalized	State-organized	Sectorally coordinated	Alliance coordinated	Fragmented

highly personal and particularistic, so we can speak of their business environments as *particularistic*. The distinctive features of these five institutional frameworks are summarized in Table 3.

The Institutional Structuring of Market Economies

These differences in dominant institutions generate and reproduce distinctive forms of economic organization that constitute separate kinds of market economy. In very broad terms, systems of economic coordination and control — or business systems — differ in eight key ways that summaries relationships between owners and controllers of economic resources, the roles of ownership and alliance coordination, and employer-employee relations. Considering, first, relations between owners and controllers of private property rights and controllers of economic resources and activities, i.e., salaried managers, an important dimension for distinguishing between economies concerns the extent of owners' direct involvement in managing businesses. Three major types can be distinguished here: a) *direct* control of firms by owners, b) *alliance* control, in which owners delegate considerable strategic decision making to managers but remain committed to particular firms, and c) *market* or arm's length portfolio control. Owner-managers of family businesses — whether artisanal elements of industrial districts or the massive South Korean conglomerates (*chaebol*) — typify direct control. Bank and allied companies' ownership of some shares in Germany and Japan exemplify alliance control, and the Anglo-Saxon pattern of institutional portfolio investment illustrates the market type of owner control.

The scope of ownership integration of economic activities also varies greatly across market economies. Two further dimensions for comparing ownership relations across business systems, then, concern a) the extent of *ownership integration of production chains* in a number of sectors and b) the degree of *ownership integration of activities across sectors*. The largest *chaebol* in South Korea have been both vertically and horizontally diversified, but the smaller ones tend to focus on vertical integration rather than unrelated diversification.[31] In contrast, many large German firms are also quite vertically integrated but limit their

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[31] See Fields 1995.

horizontal diversification to technologically and/or market-related fields.[32] Chinese family businesses have been characterized as pursuing opportunistic diversification, which is typically horizontal, although backward integration from retailing and distribution to manufacturing in light consumer goods industries is also a common pattern of development.[33]

The integration of activities through alliances, obligations, and similar nonownership linkages applies to three sets of interfirm relationships. First, there are those between members of a production chain. This can be termed the extent of *alliance coordination of production chains*. Second, there are those between competitors, which can be characterized as the extent of *collaboration between competitors*. Third, there are alliances between firms in different industries that can be summarized as the extent of *alliance coordination of sectors*. In each case, the key contrast is between zero-sum, adversarial contracting and competition, on the one hand, and more cooperative, long-term, and mutually committed relationships between partners and competitors on the other.

Finally, employer-employee relations and work systems vary in a number of ways, as the extensive literature on Fordism, labor processes, and industrial relations shows. The key contrast here, though, is between those societies encouraging reliance on external labor markets in managing the bulk of the labor force and those encouraging more commitment and mutual investment in organizational capabilities. This can be summarized as the degree of *employer-employee interdependence*.

Patterns of work organization and control can be distinguished primarily in terms of the discretion and trust employers grant to the bulk of the workforce in organizing and carrying out tasks, summarized here as the degree of managerial *delegation to, and trust of, employees*. The pure case of scientific management removes all discretion from manual workers and fragments tasks to simplify them for unskilled and easily replaced employees. Responsible-autonomy strategies, on the other hand, trust manual workers to carry out tasks with more discretion and independence from managers.

These eight characteristics of business are connected in systematic ways to the institutional features outlined above, as summarized in

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[32] See Feldenkirchen 1997; Herrigel 1996.
[33] See Hamilton 1997; Redding 1990.

TABLE 4
Connections between Institutional Features and Business System Characteristics

Institutional Features	Business System Characteristics									
	Direct Owner-Controlled	Alliance Owner-Controlled	Market Owner-Controlled	High Vertical Integration	High Ownership Horizontal Integration	Low Alliance Vertical Integration	High Competitor Collaboration	Low Alliance Horizontal Integration	High Employer-Employee Interdependence	High Delegation to Workers
The State										
1. Dominant, Risk Sharing State	+	−	−	+		+	−	+		
2. Strong Intermediary Associations			+		−	+	+			
3. Strong Market Regulation					−		+	+		
The Financial System										
4a. Capital Market Based	−	−	+		+	+	−	+−		
4b. Credit Based		+	−	+	−		+		+	
Skill Development and Control System										
5. Strong Collaborative Public Training System			+	+	+					
6. Strong Unions					−				+	+
7. Centralized Bargaining (by Sectors)					−		+			
Trust and Authority										
8. Low Trust in Formal Institutions	+	−	−		+	−	+	−		
9. Paternalist Authority Relations	+	−	−			−				
10. Communal Formal Authority					−		+	+		

Table 4. The positive and negative signs in this table indicate that, other things being equal, the presence of such features is likely to encourage or inhibit the development of the specified business system characteristic. Given the complexities and interdependences of any market economy, it is often easier to be clear about the business system characteristics discouraged by specific institutional arrangements than about those that will become established in practice. At any particular time, the detailed pattern of firms and markets that dominate any one market economy is contingent on a variety of idiosyncratic factors, such as wars, the distribution of natural resources, and geopolitical developments.

Considering first the connections between institutional features and forms of owner control, direct owner control is strongly encouraged in societies in which trust in formal institutions governing relationships is low and authority is predominantly paternalist. Without strong mechanisms ensuring that owners can rely on managers to carry out their instructions and act in their interests, it is unlikely that they will readily delegate control over their property to salaried employees. Similarly, if authority in a society is more personal and direct than formal and procedural, owners will be expected to exercise direct control over employees. A high level of state dependence also encourages direct control, because owners typically manage political risks directly with decision makers and would find it difficult to implement agreements through third parties. Since state coordination and guidance are usually not transparent and public, remote owners would be disadvantaged if they left political negotiations to managers.

Conversely, market-based forms of owner control are feasible only when trust in formal procedures is high and authority is predominantly procedural. They are less likely in credit-based financial systems because these typically lead to considerable interdependence and lock-in between the owners and controllers of financial assets and managers of enterprises. They are, though, strongly linked to the existence of liquid capital markets in which assets can be easily traded and managed as items in a portfolio. Relatedly, they are unlikely to be widely institutionalized in economies with a dominant risk-sharing state because of political risks.

Ownership-based integration of production chains usually involves investment in capital-intensive facilities, and hence high fixed costs and associated risks. It therefore will be encouraged by state risk shar-

ing and by a financial system that locks capital providers into capital users. Credit-based systems do this, as do some capital markets dominated by individual shareholders who do not trade their shares easily and frequently. Capital markets where control over assets is concentrated in the hands of salaried fund managers competing for assets on the basis of relative performance of the portfolios under their care, on the other hand, are more liquid. They institutionalize a market for corporate control driven by short-term financial returns in which final beneficial owners are separated from nominee controllers.[34] Large-scale investments whose returns are long term and uncertain are unlikely to be encouraged in these sorts of markets.

Horizontal diversification within ownership units, on the other hand, will be more encouraged by capital-market-based financial systems than by credit-based ones, because firms in these economies internalize risk management and they are not constrained by alliances with banks and/or other controllers of voting rights. In addition, whereas capital markets facilitate the acquisition of firms in quite different sectors, credit-based financial systems tend to inhibit hostile takeovers because of the greater interdependence between banks and firms. Formal regulation of markets also inhibits such diversification into technologically and market-unrelated fields, as do strong unions and centralized bargaining on a sectoral basis, since these institutional arrangements restrict industry entry and exit as well as increase the interdependence between firms and sector-based skills. Communal conceptions of authority additionally restrict unrelated diversification, because managers depend on employees' perception of their commitment to particular industries and skill bases for their own authority.

Alliance forms of economic integration are, broadly speaking, discouraged by strong, risk-sharing states antagonistic to intermediaries between citizens and the state. This is essentially because high business dependence on the state inhibits horizontal associations and collaboration between social and economic organizations that might be seen as threatening state dominance. They are also unlikely to be widespread in societies where reliance on formal procedures and agreements is low, because trust between strangers is difficult to develop and sustain. Alliance-based coordination and integration of activities between ownership units require an ability to rely on organizational commitments rather than short-term informal and personal

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[34] See Lazonick and O'Sullivan 1996.

reciprocity. Relatedly, since capital-market-based financial systems facilitate strong markets in corporate control, and hence radical changes in ownership and strategic direction, alliance-based forms of economic coordination are unlikely to be significant where such markets dominate.

Similar arguments apply to variations in the degree of collaboration between competitors, but other institutional features also impinge on this characteristic of business systems. In general, such collaboration is encouraged when industry membership is stable and widely known, because reputations for implementing or breaking business agreements are directly affected by firm behavior and are important for business success. Market regulation, thus, encourages competitor collaboration by stabilizing entry and exit, as do credit-based financial systems and strong sectoral bargaining structures. Cooperative public training systems and centralized bargaining additionally favor such collaboration by forcing employers to work together in implementing and jointly controlling these systems. This emphasizes their interdependence and common interests within particular sectors.

High levels of sector commitment and focus can also encourage employers to develop long-term connections to employees. As firms concentrate on competing within particular industries, they increasingly come to rely on firm- and sector-specific capabilities and skills. Where entry and exit are regulated and constrained by training and bargaining systems, investment in employee development and quality-focused innovation strategies will be less threatened by free riders and price-based competition than in economies where barriers to entry are low and ownership and control of businesses are readily traded on capital markets. The combination of market regulation, credit-based financial systems, and strong sector-based training and bargaining systems, then, encourages employer-employee interdependence. Similarly, where the state has established a strong public training system that produces high-level skills with employer involvement and the unions are strong, employers are both encouraged and forced to develop long-term links with employees.

State antipathy to intermediaries will limit the growth of powerful unions, and so employers' need to make long-term commitments to their core labor force. Low levels of trust in formal institutions also reduce employer-employee interdependence, since owner-managers in such cultures are reluctant to rely on the continued support of their

staff without personal connections to them. High levels of certified skills and strong unions also encourage considerable delegation of task performance to workers, especially where employers are involved in the definition, development, and assessment of expertise. Communal authority relations additionally favor employee discretion by repro-ducing common identities and loyalties so that managers can rely more on workers' perceptions of joint interests than where authority is purely contractual. Paternalism and low trust, conversely, discour-age such delegation, because workers are viewed as needing instruc-tion and being unreliable in following organizational interests.

These connections between dominant institutions and business sys-tem characteristics mean that not only do systems of economic coor-dination and control follow the dominant logic of the environment in which they become established, but also that significant changes are constrained and guided by dominant institutions. Major alterations in the nature of firms in an economy, for example, are unlikely to occur without related changes in its financial and political systems. Where, then, institutional inertia is high, major changes in business systems are improbable, especially in the characteristics most closely connect-ed to central institutions in the society. Correlatively, when institu-tional change does take place, as in Germany and Japan after World War II, it is likely to have significant effects on the dominant form of economic organization.

Two other major sources of change in business system characteris-tics are conflicts and contradictions between component parts, sectors, domestic institutions, and interest groups on the one hand and shift in external influences and competition on the other. Although business systems are relatively cohesive configurations of particular characteris-tics of firms and markets, the degree to which their features and those of closely connected institutions are mutually reinforcing and coherent does, of course, vary, and different firms and sectors do develop alter-native ways of organizing economic activities as they compete and cooperate over time. Also, ways of dealing with issues in one aspect of firms' operations, such as the management of financial risks, may con-flict with common practices in other areas, such as employment poli-cies and ways of managing employees when introducing technological changes. These alternatives and conflicting pressures can lead to sig-nificant changes in associated institutions over time, resulting in the development of new forms of economic coordination and control, especially in areas that do not threaten central institutions and in

economies where institutional sectors are not highly integrated and interdependent. Similarly, changing growth rates of different sectors and alterations in the relative power of competing groups in a society can affect different elites' priorities and mobilizing capacity.

Equally, growing international interdependence and competition have both diffused alternative patterns of economic organization across market economies and intensified the direct comparison of business systems and institutional arrangements. Thus the relative performance of firms, markets, and institutions has become easier to assess internationally, and different kinds of market economies increasingly compete as alternative ways of structuring economic activities. As a result, business system characteristics in some societies are changing, particularly those connected to relatively weak institutions — such as those controlling the allocation of labor in deregulated states — but these changes remain piecemeal and limited as long as dominant institutions do not change significantly.

In contrast, where institutions are highly integrated and mutually reinforcing, international interdependence is unlikely to have a major impact on business system characteristics. Indeed, the dominant pattern of economic organization is more likely to structure how internationalization occurs and to limit its effects, as seems to be the case in Japan, despite a decade of recession. This particular case highlights the strongly interconnected nature of institutions and economic coordination and control systems in some postwar market economies, including the nature of family relationships and gendered labor markets, which restrict piecemeal changes. It also emphasizes the limited effect of external pressures on cohesive business system characteristics in the absence of reinforcing domestic institutional pressures.

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INCORPORATING CULTURE INTO THE EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK FOR ALTERNATIVE CAPITALISMS

Gordon Redding[1]

Weber clearly established the role of rationality in the analysis of societal variations in economic behaviour in his depiction of the evolutionary history of Western capitalism, yet he never fully discussed the concept in one place. I examine the issue here in the context of theories in socioeconomics that attempt to deal with large-scale comparison of societal systems, and specifically Whitley's business systems theory. I propose that the analysis of the institutional fabric of a society, as the framework shaping that society's business system, might benefit from addressing the cultural component specifically. The cultural component would, in this formulation, include rationality as an aspect of culture alongside two other features: the norms governing the horizontal and vertical ordering of the society. Rationality is seen, in line with Weber's thinking, as comprising three components. *Formal* rationality, concerned essentially with logic and calculation, has a distinct existence separate from the social. *Value* rationality is the sum of societal ideals about core reasons for existence and core principles of life. *Instrumental* rationality is concerned with the best means for achieving the ends implied in the *value* rationality. I contend that major variations within the latter two components help to explain much of the cross-societal variation in the shapes of institutional fabrics, and of the outcomes in business system structure and performance

The idea of multiple modernities, as proposed by Tu, rests on three connected assumptions: the continuous presence of traditions as an active agent in defining the modernizing process; the relevance of non-Western civilizations for the self-understanding of the modern West; and the global significance of local knowledge.[2] This latter point is amplified with the contention that even the local knowledge of the

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[2] See Tu 2000.

West, taken implicitly by so many to be the only generalizable form, is in fact so varied that it can only be generated at the most superficial level. The societal contrasts between Britain, France, and Germany illustrate this point. The focuses of attention in this set of ideas are thus traditions, civilizations, and local knowledge, all of them aspects of the troublesome and very loose notion commonly called culture. This paper examines the role of culture in such explanatory frameworks and proposes a means of connecting it to economic reality while attempting to avoid the traps that surround its use.

Problems Associated with Culture in Societal Analysis

Three seemingly endemic problems hinder the adoption of culture as a convincing explanatory variable in explanations of the evolution of societal forms and especially systems of economic behaviour. They are (a) monocausalism, attributing too much to culture, (b) unidirectionalism, not seeing culture as a living and adjusting thing, and (c) assuming culture is coherent when it may be full of contradictions. A further and related feature typical of sociology is the overwhelming attention paid to structures, which has left the question of culture as a poor relation.[3] This may be partly due to the ease of researching the more fixed and tangible features seen as structural, compared with the much more nebulous features of the ideational world. The bias introduced by this convenience has arguably prevented researchers from addressing the problem that ideational determinants may bear equal weight in any broader analysis. Surrounding these problems is the wider dilemma of the necessary complexity of explanation in social science, and the need for an approach that uses units of analysis able to handle such complexity.

Monocausalism has been particularly evident in the Asian values debate, both before and during the Asian crisis. Beforehand, the exponents of the argument, led by Lee Kuan Yew, claimed that Asian economic success rested on Asian values. Among these were typically a Confucian work ethic, propensity to save, entrepreneurship, social loyalties, and acceptance of paternalistic authority. As the crisis unfolded, new analysis became popular and seemingly irrational behaviours, which caused the collapse of economic wealth, were

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[3] See Archer 1996, xii.

blamed on the same values. Thus Asians trusted too much in personal relations, relied too much on familism, were too prone to take risks, and were not professional, rational, and objective like the bankers, nearly all of whom came out of Western societal and economic traditions, who now controlled their destinies. In such debates there is an implicit direct link from the realm of values to the realm of economic action, and the assumption that values cause the results, as if all the possible features in between were not there or not acting.

Similar explanatory naiveté is visible in debates on the much earlier Weberian explanation of comparative economic success. Usually without a close reading of Weber, commentators have been prone to see his depiction of the Confucian late-nineteenth-century failure to produce vibrant capitalism in China as illustrating cultural weakness in comparison with Protestant cultures. This has been corrected in detail, recently by Pye who illustrates Weber's much more sophisticated argument, but qualifies it with other key determinants of economic success.[4] Among these, for example, are access to the world economic system and its markets, which is commonly overlooked in explaining Asian economic success.[5]

The problem that derives from unidirectional arguments takes the form of a commonly expressed despair at the inability of a culturally defined region to "develop." It is what Peter Berger once referred to as the ancient-curse theory of culture, in which perhaps an entire continent might be condemned as beyond hope of modernization. Prime candidates for such categorization are often Africa, the Arab world, and in some accounts Latin America. The unspoken assumption here is that culture does not change, and by implication that it does not take in influences from other aspects of society and evolve by amending or adding values and ideals. Although culture, where it exists in clear form, does tend to have longstanding continuity, the evidence for its capacity to absorb influences and adapt itself is strong. Postwar Germany and Japan both display radical value-system changes deriving from internally generated revisions in societal values. So too did Taiwan, under Japanese and then later American influence, display a capacity to change in line with external ideas and influences. The simple point here is that culture is part of a larger set of processes that go into the making of a society and it cannot be disconnected and iso-

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[4] See Eisenstadt 1968; Schluchter 1981; Swedberg 1998; and recently Pye 2000.
[5] See Rohwer 2001.

lated from those processes. It is a component of a living system and will change along with its wider host context and the external world.

Another feature of the problem of unidirectionalism is the insidious implication of racism that can accompany accounts with strong cultural bias. As Landes has pointed out:

> ... culture, in the sense of the inner values and attitudes that guide a population, frightens scholars. It has a sulfuric odor of race and inheritance, an air of immutability. Criticisms of culture cut close to the ego and injure identity and self-esteem. Coming from outsiders, such animadversions, however tactful and indirect, stink of condescension.[6]

The third problem, that of the cohesiveness of culture, occurs when cohesion is assumed, an issue discussed at length by Archer. She points to what she terms the Myth of Cultural Integration, "one of the most deep-seated fallacies in social science ... the ... assumption of a high degree of consistency in the interpretations produced by societal units." In other words, if culture is socially constructed reality,[7] there is no inevitability that the process of such construction will produce consistency of interpretation or of action. Archer makes a distinction between two arenas: the *cultural pattern*, seen in terms of the logical consistency or degree of internal compatibility between its components; and *uniform action*, which expresses the ideals in the former and may or may not display social uniformity. As she explains:

> The former concerns *the consistency* of our attempts to impose ideational order on experiential chaos; the latter concerns the *success* of attempts to order other people. Logical consistency is a property of the world of ideas; causal consensus is a property of people.[8]

This separation of the cultural question into two domains is parallel to a distinction made earlier by Lockwood[9] for use in the analysis of social structures, the distinction between system integration and social integration, and Archer's position is that the current theoretical deficiencies in the sociological analysis of culture derive from the conflation of the two. For progress to be made, the Myth has to be disentangled and demolished. A new framework for cultural analysis then needs to be constructed and for this Archer offers four guides:

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6 Landes 2000.
7 See Berger and Luckmann 1966.
8 Archer 1996, 4.
9 See Lockwood 1964.

1. There are logical relationships between components of the cultural system (which is the corpus of all things capable of being grasped, deciphered, understood, or known by someone, using a common language).
2. The cultural system exerts causal influences on the sociocultural level (the level of interaction between people).
3. There are causal relationships between groups and individuals at the sociocultural level.
4. There is elaboration of the cultural system due to the sociocultural level's modifying current logical relationships and introducing new ones.

It is perhaps not surprising, given these strictures, to find that the concept of culture, although widely used in nonspecialist contexts, is not part of the core terminology in many of the most advanced treatments of comparative societal analysis. One thinks here of its avoidance in classic works by Parsons,[10] Berger and Luckmann,[11] Giddens,[12] and Whitley.[13] Even so, there is now a movement to change that, and the phenomenon of the "cultural turn" associated with postmodern thought is bringing it back. Ray and Sayer[14] attribute this to a combination of forces, including the turn away from materialism and Marxist-influenced political economy; the turn toward local knowledge; postcolonial studies; the decline of socialism and the widening of the political agenda to include issues such as recognition; the embeddedness notion; and the constantly intriguing challenge of explaining new and successful forms of economic culture. The field of socioeconomics is largely dedicated to the incorporation of culture into economic explanation.[15] So, too, leaders in the fields of economics and political science, especially those concerned with comparative national performance and with economic history, have often come to acknowledge that the cultural effect cannot be denied. Landes[16] has said that culture makes all the difference in economic history. Huntington[17] has argued

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[10] See Parsons 1949.
[11] See Berger and Luckmann 1966.
[12] See Giddens 1984.
[13] See Whitley 1999a.
[14] See Ray and Sayer 1999.
[15] See Smelser and Swedberg 1994.
[16] See Landes 1998, 516.
[17] See Huntington 1996.

for the crucial effect of a civilization on economic and social life within it, and the inevitability of significant contrasts between such units. Putnam[18] has explained convincingly the roles of norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement in fostering the workings of democracy. Porter[19] has analysed the microeconomics of prosperity in terms of values. Williamson[20] has acknowledged the need in transaction-cost economics to incorporate more sociological variables at both the institutional and the individual level. Work on trust by economists, now a major field of interest, is an acknowledgement that a cultural feature has important ramifications for the material world.

It is, then, fair to argue that although culture as such is not always openly analysed as a variable in its own right, it nevertheless continues to return, like grass growing through concrete. Those using it as a component of their explanations need to address the weaknesses that can accompany it, and in particular the challenges posed by Archer. Its place in a wider framework needs to be justified, and for that purpose I now turn to the business systems literature.

Business Systems or Varieties of Capitalism

One of the most significant groupings of scholars working on the topic of business systems is based in the European Group for Organization Studies (EGOS), following a strong European interest in the question going back to the work of the Aix group led by Maurice.[21] More recently, initiatives based on the work of Whitley[22] have explored the question both geographically in Asia and Europe, and in terms of aspects of the theory that Whitley has developed as an integrating framework. A parallel school of thought has emerged in the field of political economy, addressing varieties of capitalism in which the role of the state tends to be given more prominence.[23]

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[18] See Putnam 1993.
[19] See Porter 2000.
[20] See Williamson 1994.
[21] See Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre 1982.
[22] See references for Whitley (1992a, 1992b, 1999a, 1999b, 2000), and Whitley and Kristensen 1996.
[23] For example, see Berger and Dore 1996; Crouch and Streeck 1997; and Hall and Soskice 2001.

In none of this work, except Whitley's, is there a complete theoretical framework capable of including the range of variables that seem appropriate to the patterns of determinacy that the accumulation of disciplines suggests as minimal. More particularly, there is no clear attempt to incorporate the issue of culture as an explanatory factor in its own right, although it is clearly accepted within Whitley's model as a feature of the institutional fabric. That this challenge is widely acknowledged is evident in a recent review of the comparative management literature by Child, who restates the need to incorporate both ideational logics and material logics in any frameworks that explain alternative societal systems of management and organization.[24]

The challenges in explaining the evolution of alternative systems of capitalism — in other words, the economic, managerial, and organizational bases for multiple modernities — are as follows:

1. defining the system of business in such a way that comparison between such systems can be systematized, and in such a way that the definition itself contains explanatory power, i.e., the workings of the system can be understood reasonably comprehensibly as a "type" with inner coherence and character.
2. establishing the main determinants of the way in which such systems of business emerge (in crude terms their main causes), and following notions such as the embeddedness of social action and the structuration of society, to trace the patterns of determinacy that originate in the institutional fabric of society.
3. including in the arena of institutions the role of ideas and values, following the idea suggested in the metaphor of Etounga-Manguelle: "Culture is the mother; institutions are the children."[25]
4. including the influence of the universal material logics of economics and technology, and of ideational logics that might penetrate a society from other societies.
5. allowing for an explanation that conveys the dynamic nature of the processes of interest, and the historically evolutionary, or path-dependent, nature of managerial action.

These challenges are exacerbated by a more mundane consideration, the multidisciplinary nature of the explanatory task. Academics tend

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[24] See Child 2000.
[25] Etounga-Mangelle 2000, 75.

to avow strong interest in multidisciplinary work, but find it very diffi-
cult in practice for two reasons. Career and reward systems do not
encourage wandering outside one's discipline. And knowledge of
what other disciplines are doing is often weak. It takes much to
achieve genuine interdisciplinary exchange and cross-fertilization,
although the benefits to understanding are often great.

An additional set of questions flows from the use of such an
explanatory framework. These questions surround the practical
implications of seeing how capitalist systems are alternative to each
other. At the national level there are inevitable policy implications
that stem from comparisons, and they may well lead to desires to
amend the institutional fabric, including the values, or the structure of
the business system itself. These are visible in industrial policy, and in
areas such as education, trade, investment, technology, and innova-
tion.

At another level, there are serious implications for policy and strat-
egy in organizations, particularly in large organizations that make
investments across societies and that require managers to operate
across business systems. This would include the application by local
managers of systems and procedures developed in another system.
Many of the practical difficulties corporations experience in becom-
ing global occur because they are unaware of these contextual and
often historical forces.

The Richard Whitley Model

Whitley's model is explained elsewhere and will only be summarized
here. One of its main components is a definition of a business system in
terms of three interconnected elements. These are the principal mecha-
nisms whereby economic behaviour is coordinated and controlled. The
first is the structure of ownership and the units that such ownership
tends to pull together into regularly found forms of organized action.
These might be legal firms that are focused, legal firms that are diversi-
fied, networks of various shapes and sizes, loose alliances, tight
alliances, private structures, or public structures. The second feature is
the form of coordination across the economy between the units. The
third is the form of coordination of human willingness to cooperate
within the units through the processes of management. These three
connected aspects of coordination of economic action provide the basis

for generalizing about the business system itself, and for comparing the various systems Whitley has identified and defined.

The system as defined above is then seen as evolving in constant interaction, both ways, with the institutional fabric of society. In the most recent form of the model, Whitley sees this determining context as made up of four components, namely (1) the state, (2) the financial system, (3) the skill development and control system, and (4) trust and authority relations. These features themselves are also interrelated. Connections and inter-dependencies between the two layers — the business system and the institutional system — are what account for the evolution of distinct recipes, solutions, or combinations. In a number of clear cases, where free-market processes allow much cause and effect to flow relatively unhindered, patterns have stabilized because they more or less work. This means that they produce wealth and societal progress. They are thus reinforced and the differences between them are also reinforced. Using this formulation, six ideal types are identified as having emerged historically to date. It is hardly necessary to add that the evolution continues and the systems are not fixed in their present modes. At the same time such evolution can only be slow, given the totality of what is involved, and the path dependent nature of any adjustments.

In earlier development of the model[26] Whitley distinguished between proximate institutional features and others that he saw as background features, the latter referring especially to trust and authority relations that are seen as cultural.[27] He did not however separate them specifically into two clear levels, one antecedent to the other in determinacy, even though this is implied in the labeling "background" and "proximate." Nor did he specifically treat the question of completeness in the coverage of the cultural, or background, influence, and for this reason I propose both to separate and to extend the cultural components of his analysis.

An Amendment to Whitley

My main proposal is to add a variable to deal with differences between societies in the field of rationality. This is based on an

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[26] See Whitley 1992a; Whitley 1992b.
[27] For example, see Whitley 1999a, 58.

assumption that can be stated simply but that entails some complexity later. The assumption is that societies vary in what they perceive as the reasons for the existence of firms (or equivalent economic structures), and for other aspects of economic behaviour. These variations in agreed upon purposes for economic action are accompanied by variations in a society's capacity to cause people to act accordingly. This goes to the core of a key definitional issue Weber identified in his discussions of rationality, namely the difference between value rationality and instrumental rationality. It also echoes the advice of Archer noted earlier, which is that it is necessary to disaggregate the discussion of culture between (a) consistency in the ideational order and (b) consensus on action.

I see issues covered in Whitley's discussion of trust and authority relations as additional to, rather than overlapping with, this concern with rationality, and so retain them to make a trio of components. **Rationality** encompasses the question of purposes and the consensus over achieving them. **Authority** represents the aspects of culture that support the societal structure of vertical order. **Identity** in a similar way represents the norms and values governing horizontal order. It is inevitable that the three components are in constant interaction, and that these analytical separations are for convenience only.

I make two assumptions here. One is that the three components are reasonably exhaustive of the cultural domain and capture all of the main dimensions normally treated in research on the impact of culture on economic behaviour. Secondly I assume that their influence on the evolution of the institutional fabric is logically prior: culture is the mother and the institutions are the children.

There are also two features to be taken into account in discussing the evolution of alternative business systems, and they both relate to the workings of influence discussed under the convergence debate. One is the influence of the material logics of price and technology, which have a capacity to penetrate all business systems to an unknown degree. The understanding of the extent of this penetration will lie at the heart of future research in socioeconomics, and may remain controversial.

The second feature is the influence of external ideas penetrating a business system (as, for instance Japanese management in the United States in the 1980s, and vice versa in the 2000s). These influences

Figure 1: The Evolution of Business Systems (after Whitley)

cannot be excluded from the account and I propose to acknowledge them specifically.

Figure 1 makes these additions to Whitley's framework without amending its central logic. In this paper I will now concentrate just on the issue of rationality as a variable, as the other categories and connections have been discussed in detail in the literature cited above.

Aspects of Rationality

In contrast to economics, which sees rationality as an assumption applicable to all transactions, some disciplines see it as a variable. The resolution of this contentious issue lies in disaggregating the idea and unpacking it, after which there may be grounds for accepting that each side may be right because they are discussing different things.

In a broad sense, rationality as a "way of life,"[28] or as an "achievement of civilization"[29] is a variable, in that it may be seen to accumulate so that some societies have more of it than others. The rise of Western civilization is attributed by many to an increase in the amount of rationality in use, and the absence of it will be adduced as a hindrance to progress. An example is visible in discussions of China.[30] In another sense it varies between locations, such that Weber could speak of "the specific and peculiar rationalism of Western culture." He made the significant point that, by way of illustration, there could be a rationalization of mystical contemplation that, viewed from other areas of life, could seem irrational. Each field, with its own rationality, could be so "in terms of very different ultimate values and ends, and what is rational from one point of view may well be irrational from another."[31]

In pursuing the notion, Weber first separated *formal* from *substantive* rationality. He then separated *substantive* rationality into two components, naming them *value rationality* and *instrumental rationality*. It is in this latter division that we find the solution to the challenge posed by Archer about how culture should best be analysed (i.e., by distinguishing purpose and its cohesion from action and the consensus over it).

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[28] Gellner 1992, 136.
[29] Stinchcombe 1990, 313.
[30] See Boisot and Child 1988; and Lubman 2000.
[31] Weber 1930, 26.

Formal rationality exists independently of the use of it. It is the calculation, the logic, the objective, scientific basis for rational choice, and it exists in the abstract as a set of intellectual tools. Its use tends to be accompanied by certain styles of behaviour, such as the scrupulous use of objectivity, a methodical approach, and formal debate of issues, but it nevertheless depends entirely for its relevance on its practical usefulness to those who wish to apply it to the solution of a problem whose origin lies outside it.

Substantive rationality has a quite different nature, and is about the reasons for the system's shape and functioning. More specifically, it is about who benefits, how, and why. The present-day shareholder-value debate sits right in the centre of such a field. In Weber's terms *substantive* rationality is:

> ... the degree to which the provisioning of given groups of persons with goods is shaped by economically oriented social action under some criterion (past, present, or potential) of ultimate values, regardless of the nature of those ends.[32]

In the resolution of such debates, formal rationality would not monopolize the process of decision. Instead it would share the field with other criteria of ultimate ends, such as ethical, political, utilitarian, and egalitarian, and results would be measurable against those criteria. The scales of such *value rationality* and *substantive goal rationality* are endlessly varied.

Figure 2 illustrates how Weber further pursued this point by splitting the components of *substantive rationality* into *value rationality* and *instrumental rationality*. The word "substantive" is a translation of the German "*materiale*," which conveys much of the meaning in this elusive but important concept. It suggests rationality being put to use in practice, and manifest in its application. It is rationality given substance, as opposed to rationality lying available for use in abstract mathematical formulas. Weber divided it into the *value* component, which is concerned with ends, and the *instrumental*, which is concerned with means, the crucial defining aspect of the latter being deliberate planning. Weber also saw that action that is instrumentally rational (*zweckrational)* does not account for all economic behaviour, i.e., being consciously planned. Much happens that is essentially value-rational (*wertrational)*, for instance many things that are bound in tradition.

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[32] Weber 1922, 85.

The formation of the institutional fabric of society

SUBSTANTIVE RATIONALITY

VALUE RATIONALITY

Material progress

Impersonal market logics

Calculation as an ideal

Reason before force

Foresight

ENDS

INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY
The carriers of material progress

Primary	Secondary
Applied rationality	Company as instrument of ownership
Componentiality	
Multi-relations	
Makeability	Professions plus professionalism
Plurality	
Progress	Grouping and expression of interests
Societal view	
Bureaucratic order	Rule of law
Legitimate private sphere	Having government administration
Human rights	The discipline of markets

MEANS

FORMAL RATIONALITY

Theories and techniques of calculation

Money-based accountablity

Search for principles of efficient coordination

CALCULATIONS

Figure 2: The Workings of Western-Style Rationality (an interpretation of Weber)

Noting that Weber introduced no specific term for the kind of economic action that flows from value rationality, Swedberg[33] considered that Weber's intention was to treat the distinction between *value* and *instrumental* rationality much like the distinction between *formal* and *substantive* rationality; in other words, to see them as not necessarily coinciding in all respects. They work in parallel but in different ways, and they are intertwined. I propose here to treat the *value* component as related to the setting of societal goals, and to the expression of the values and ideals that derive largely from that world view. The *instrumental* component is that which is concerned with the planning, implementation, and effective coordination of action and the shaping of the institutional fabric. Alongside, as it were, are the collections of values and norms that shape the society's horizontal and vertical order, i.e., the cultural components of Identity and Authority.

Calculation, Ends, and Means

Formal rationality, as earlier stated, is concerned with **calculation**. *Value* rationality is concerned with **ends**, and *instrumental* rationality is concerned with **means**. An outline of their workings in the context of Western development is included in Figure 2.

Value rationality is essentially about a society's notions of what is important to it. It includes ethics, cosmology, and religion, and their effects on priority setting. In attempting to clarify its functioning Weber noted:

> Interests (material and ideal) not ideas directly determine man's action. But the world views, which were created by ideas, have very often acted as the switches that channelled the dynamics of the interests.[34]

The human search is for both material and spiritual goods, in other words for (a) well-being and longevity and (b) meaning and salvation. This search serves to create the institutional realm, which in Schluchter's interpretation[35] mediates between ideas and interests, being embedded in both, and "only through institutionalisation do

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[33] See Swedberg 1999, 281.
[34] Weber 1920, 280, cited in Schluchter 1981, 25.
[35] Schluchter 1981, 27.

material and spiritual wants receive socially relevant solution." In this process the institutional sphere is seen by Weber as having relative autonomy *(Eigenrecht)*, and its own dynamics.

Value Rationality: The Rationale for Ends

There is no systematic account in Weber of the institutional realms and value spheres, but Schluchter proposes a summary in terms of four partial orders, which he believes do not distort Weber's reasoning.[36] These are:

1. The natural order, which is tied to natural reproduction, especially family and kinship, and which is at the core of the much larger educational order.
2. The economic order, which meets the recurrent, normal wants of everyday life.
3. The cultural order, of which religion is the most important element.
4. The political order, which protects social life on a territorial basis internally and externally.

Within these, it would be possible to fit, reasonably exhaustively, the processes of evolution of institutions and to study how societal ideas and values come to shape the institutions of capital, human capital, and social capital. The quality of these institutions as facilitators determines the material success of the business system. The quality of these institutions as reflectors of the core values of the society determines their legitimacy as cultural artefacts and will have a bearing on their adaptiveness under both local and external pressures to change.

To take an illustration, the Japanese system of financing industry, i.e., the institutional category of Capital in the Japanese case, grew out of ideals for the formation of society that left the state in a key coordinating but not commanding role in capital allocation. It included also notions of corporate identity that assumed networking and widespread collaboration. It also assumed long-term perspectives on risk, and strong ethical obligations to key employees. It assumed the transfer of private savings, based on family thrift, into the industrial

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[36] Schluchter 1981, 28.

capital system. It saw the essential purpose of the firm as the long-term stable employment of a core set of people, and the respect accorded executives was based largely on their capacity to live up to that ideal. Related values affecting the psychology of competition, both locally and internationally, would shape the details of the workings of the capital system. The closeness of fit between the Japanese value sphere and the consequent institutional realm is suggested in the distinct nature of the Japanese capital system.[37] The difficulty it now has in adjusting is a natural consequence of this embedding.

Turning now to the Western case in the illustration, I propose that five components of value rationality might illustrate the workings of the evolutionary process. These are habits of the mind of special significance in shaping Western capitalism. They express important ideals around which the economy is shaped. They define what it is about. They are therefore selected from a wider and more general set.

The idea of material progress. For a society to pursue material progress with the intensity witnessed in the Western case it must have a fundamental belief in the possibility of such an advance, a mindset in contrast to that described by Foster[38] for the great majority of the world's peasant populations. This latter is seen by him as "the image of limited good" and it is founded in the experience of subsistence living in relatively closed communities, and the consequent coming to terms with a surrounding universe in which the total quantity of good available to the society is perceived as fixed, and social ideals form around living with that. In Western societies, there has grown an understanding that progress, growth, invention, and betterment are not just possible, but central to the economic system. The total amount of good is permanently expandable. In a sense this becomes its core rationale. Firms must grow, people must attempt to accumulate greater wealth, and the quality of life should keep on improving.

The impersonality of the market. The market is impersonal in that someone entering as a buyer or seller does not carry into the transaction a set of signals about his or her social position that affect that transaction. More or less anyone can buy from anyone. The people transacting are seen in the abstract. They are also free and independent.

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[37] See Calder 1993.
[38] See Foster 1965.

Their rights and duties are strictly equal and their personal circumstances mainly irrelevant. In the preindustrial condition, social status largely determined what an individual did, not the other way around, and it was the contribution of the capitalist market system to reverse this. The source of such reformulated identities was money, which allowed entire populations to detach themselves from their backgrounds and reinvent themselves. This was a radical redesign of the basic ordering framework of society[39] and it released huge volumes of new energy that served to legitimate it. But it rested on a collective understanding of its value, in other words the contribution it made to achieving what was believed to be a better society. Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* would become its bible, and its impact on value formation in many countries would be high. At the centre of this set of beliefs is the core ideal of personal freedom.

The use of calculation. As noted earlier, formal rationality, in a set of calculative techniques, exists independently of its use. At the heart of rationality in the world of business is commercial bookkeeping as the basis of capital accounting, and this mechanism is served by three ancillary ideals: (a) the continual adaptation of means to ends, (b) the intelligent calculation of probabilities, and (c) the reliability and standardization of information. In each of these activities questions and answers are most commonly formulated in money terms. To say that accounting is the language of business is to say that it defines the terms, and their meanings, with which business issues are debated and decided. In the process it establishes the key value of scientific calculation as the basis for deciding matters.

Reason and argument replace force. This is a wider extension of the principle of calculation. Gellner makes the point that reason is not just a mental route to a supposed truth or set of legitimate principles, it is also a lifestyle.[40] It rests on method and precision, tidiness and order, above all in thought. Separable issues are dealt with one at a time, so as to avoid conflating criteria. The latter have to be impartial and stable, not arbitrary. Achievement is steadily progressive. Procedures are desacralized. Innovation is adopted when needed. Labour is divided and specialized. A rational accounting for success and failure is

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[39] See Platteau 1994, 538.
[40] See Gellner 1992, 136.

sought. Dealings between people are guided by the free choice of ends by both parties, and by their individual assessment of the advantages. The organization of society is not given, but is the sum of the free and rational contracts. Such an ideal, with all its manifestations, is not permanently on display in all cases in a Western economy, but it is unquestionably established as one of the most influential sets of guiding principles for personal, social, and organizational conduct.

Foresight. Foresight stands in contrast to mental worlds of seemingly more focused vision in which the future does not need to be brought forward into the present. The kind of consciousness of time that is capable of spanning past, present, and future and is measurable on a wristwatch "is alien to the overwhelming majority of traditional societies in the Third World, and quite possibly to all of them."[41] There are arguably two main drivers of the habit of using foresight. First, the use of technology has tended to raise the investment needed in most economic processes, and has increased the significance of forecasting risk. Second, administration, as manifest in bureaucracy, is largely a means of reducing uncertainty, and of bringing under control, in predictable patterns, the behaviour of potentially very diverse components. The diversity includes people and their behaviour, but also less animate features such as currencies, commodity values, and technical changes. Such attempting of control will inevitably lead to taking a view forward into the new period being prepared for. The value being expressed here is, at base, that of mastery.

The examples just given of components of *value rationality* in the Western case could be supplemented with others whose sources might be psychological, political, legal, or ethical. They are offered not as a comprehensive statement of the workings of this aspect of culture, but more as a means of illustrating the shaping of a core set of purposes by the fusion of separate contributions. The end to which they all point, in the Western case, is the central, driving purpose of material progress based on principles of open competition, and the incorporation of individual contribution and motivation through systems that express the principles of reason and personal freedom. Mastery of the natural world, seen in the use of science and technology, is a component of the same set of ideas. Ethical principles such as fairness and

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[41] Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1973, 134.

equality and political ideals such as democracy might appear as quali-
fiers at different times and places.

Although there is a widespread assumption that such ends are uni-
versal to all societies, there is counterevidence that the world is not so
simple. Of course societies will normally wish collectively to improve
their conditions, but the meaning of improvement may be subject to
wide interpretation. No discussion of Korean ends would be complete
without reference to the centrality of state identity and performance
in comparison with other states. No explanation of German manager-
ial ideology could exclude the communitarian nature of much think-
ing. For Japan, the ethics of the Tokugawa period, and especially the
consciousness of specific bounded social responsibilities, would need
to be included as a component of the overall aim being sought. As
Lodge and Vogel have shown, national ideologies are both complex
and constantly shifting, and they also have very complex interconnec-
tions with what we are referring to here as the institutional fabric of
society.[42] Lodge and Vogel conclude, from a study of nine industrial-
ized countries, that:

> Because ideological systems have such great staying power, they great-
> ly affect how leaders, managers, and ordinary citizens analyse and
> respond to their environment. The ideological framework may be
> implicit and people may not even be aware of the assumptions they are
> making, but the impact of ideology is nonetheless profound.[43]

To consider the largely nonindustrialized world of Islam, or the com-
plex value domains of India and China, is of course to add greater
variety again, and such contrasts are now having to be folded in to the
world of business practice, as globalization proceeds to carry into
those arenas the Western assumptions of so many corporations.

Instrumental Rationality: The Rationale for Means

The second of the divisions of *substantive rationality* is what Weber
termed *instrumental*. The phrase suggests devices for accomplishing
purposes, the shaping of the instruments to achieve the ends envis-
aged. This is about means and why they are chosen. These are the
ideas that become intimately associated with the formation of institu-

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[42] See Lodge and Vogel 1987.
[43] Lodge and Vogel 1987, 302.

tions, and that, in some versions of explanation, are themselves insti-
tutions. For instance, is bureaucracy an idea or an idea operating as
an institution? Without entering a complex debate, I simply assume
here that even though culture and institutions are intertwined, it is
convenient to consider ideas as cultural and ideas manifest in regular
patterns of behaviour as institutions. The justification for examining
the contents of instrumental rationality is simply that attention needs
to be paid to the *rationale within institutions* if their evolution is to be
comprehensible and predictable. Such rationale deserves understand-
ing, and so is identified here as a field of analysis and influence. The
ideas are taken to be distinguishable from the social structures they
produce.

The primary carriers of modernization have been proposed as two:
technological production and the bureaucratically organized state.[44]
These have been supplemented by a series of secondary carriers such
as urbanization; a "mobilized" stratification system; the private
sphere as a key context of individual life; scientific and technological
innovation; mass education; and mass media. The primary carriers
are seen not just as the main agents of modernization, but also as the
"primary carriers of modern consciousness." They are in some sense
stronger than the secondary carriers because there are more intrinsic
linkages between them and clusters of consciousness. As Berger, Berg-
er, and Kellner observe, "They are more firmly tied together and
therefore more difficult to take apart."[45] Any attempt to restructure
consciousness will succeed in inverse proportion to its closeness to the
primary carriers. The "themes of the symbolic universe of modernity"
which derive from these two primary carriers are seen as follows:

From Technological Production
1. The application of rationality
2. Componentiality: reality in separable components
3. Multirelationality: an enormous variety of relations with people,
   objects, and abstract entities
4. Makeability: life as a problem-solving enterprise
5. Plurality: multiple spheres of meaning
6. Progressivity: onward and upward, and acceptance of change

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[44] See Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1973, after Weber.
[45] Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1973, 98.

Figure 3: The Separation of Ends and Means and the Fields of Rationality

From the Bureaucratically Organized State
1. Society itself seen as both problematic and manageable
2. Bureaucratic order as a means of absorbing plurality
3. Private sphere legitimised alongside the public sphere
4. Human rights related to bureaucratically identifiable rights

It is important here to consider how this set of primary carriers, and their clusters of subsidiary rationales, are different from the earlier category called value rationality. There is, at first glance, some overlap between the sets, as for instance between material progress within value rationality and progressivity within instrumental rationality. The answer lies in the difference, proposed here for analytical convenience, between ends and means. In practice much running together occurs, but the two frameworks of thought do have different ramifications for social reality. The description, given earlier, of the general intention of Western societies as they develop was an amalgam of the ideals given under value rationality. It said nothing about the mechanisms for pursuing them. The same general ideals can now be interpreted at a different level of analysis as inputs to the specification of means of delivery. This distinction is illustrated in Figure 3. This shows value rationality as the repository of those aspects of societal ideals that contribute to the design of the purposes of the economic system. It shows instrumental rationality as the arena in which choices are made about the instruments of delivery. The making of choices as a conscious act justifies a reminder here of Weber's means of distinguishing the two rationalities, noted earlier. *Wertrationalität* (the value form) may well introduce into the equation unplanned elements of factors such as traditionalism. It is, in other words, unconstrained. The design of the economic features is of necessity a connected part in a much larger framework of ideas that penetrate it. *Zweckrationalität* (the instrumental form), on the other hand, is based on planning, and thus on selection and choice of method. It is consequently shaped by some incorporation of formal rationality into its processes, a feature largely absent from the value form.

The useful distinction between primary and secondary carriers (see Figure 2) clarifies the inner workings of instrumental rationality. I do not intend here to examine in any detail the interplay between the primary and the secondary, as the complexity of that requires separate treatment, but I propose a set of examples of the secondary, from which the process of influence may be deduced. Note that these

remain in the realm of ideas, or guiding principles, and that they coincide with (and may be constrained by) some of their primary precursors, but they are more focused, in a sense more pragmatic, and more closely bound up with the institutions they sponsor. These secondary carriers of the West's ideals, which directly facilitate the creation of institutions in the context of the economy, and which serve the core purpose of material progress, are as follows:

1. The idea of the company as an instrument for ownership
2. The profession seen as a standards-setting and maintenance device
3. The grouping and expression of interests
4. The rule of law
5. Having government administration
6. The discipline of markets

Discussion

There has been much progress in comparative management in the past two decades. The key dimensions of culture and their measurement in different societies are more clearly understood. As initiator of much of that work, Hofstede has regularly maintained that much more understanding is needed of how such differences come to be formed, but also of their implications for societal structuring. Those vacuums in understanding remain to be filled, but occupy widespread attention in a number of related disciplines working empirically.

Elster points to "one of the most persisting cleavages in the social sciences" as that between the lines of thought initiated by Adam Smith, in which behaviour is guided by instrumental rationality, and those initiated by Durkheim, in which behaviour is dictated by social norms.[46] He sees three solutions to resolving the opposition between these camps: the first is to take one of the eclectic views that either (a) some behaviours are explained by one and some by the other, or (b) that both rationality and social norms are operating to influence most actions; second, to include norm-oriented action as a form of rational, or, more generally, optimising behavior; third is to reduce rationality to one social norm among others. For Elster, the distinction between

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[46] See Elster 1989, 97.

rationality and norms lies in the way that rationality is outcome-oriented and norms are not, a division that accords with that in this paper between value and instrumental rationality; although the former is labeled as concerned with ends, it is not until it comes to be operationalized through its instrumental counterpart that it could be characterized as outcome oriented.

On those grounds, it may be possible to see two advantages to the adoption of the framework suggested here. One is that it could possibly help to persuade to bring together the two approaches (rationality or norm-based) by requiring their acknowledgement of each other's contribution to a fuller analysis. This is not to say that it defines integrated methodologies, or that it gives full theoretical treatment to mechanisms of determinacy explaining linkages, outcomes, and feedbacks, but it at least divides up the causal process into units that encompass the two main paradigms.

Secondly, it may go some way toward encouraging a more complex use of the concept of rationality within the economics-based approach, and in particular the partial dismantling of the implied universalism of the *homo oeconomicus* model. Elster offers the comment that the modern Western emphasis on instrumental rationality may not be present in all cultures. "We adopt it because we are socialized into thinking in this manner, even when it is actually counterproductive in its own instrumental terms."[47] But he also makes the point that this view has not been clearly articulated by anyone so far. It was a view clearly at the centre of Weber's work, and the extreme difficulty of researching it remains visible in the complexity, and sometimes the obscurity, of his thinking about it. But that framework of basic thinking may be worthy of recall if the socioeconomics agenda is to face the challenge of placing in context the "specific and peculiar rationalism of Western culture" and its massive implications for economic behaviour worldwide. Whitley's analysis of the origins of alternative business systems remains rare in its willingness to take on that question. This addition to it is intended to encourage a focus on the role of culture specifically, but in doing so to supplement Whitley's logics, not replace them.

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[47] Elster 1989, 98.

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PART H

EPILOGUE

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BUSINESS WORLD

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THE MULTIPLE MODERNITIES PERSPECTIVE: ENRICHING BUSINESS STRATEGY

Jens Riedel

Business at the Forefront of Intercultural Encounters

Entrepreneurs and business firms have been at the forefront of inter-cultural contacts for centuries. For instance, the Medici of Florence pioneered trade routes to the Orient in the fifteenth century. On a geographically smaller scale, merchants were instrumental in creating the *Hanse* as a network of cities around the Baltic Sea in the four-teenth and fifteenth centuries. Thanks to thousands of encounters across cultural boundaries, companies have accumulated extensive knowledge about the do's and don'ts in these interactions. So why should the academic disciplines of history and sociology have some-thing new to tell business about intercultural diversity? What can the research perspective of multiple modernities explain that companies do not understand but need to?

To answer these questions, I first point out what I see as the essence of the multiple modernities approach in this book. As multi-ple modernities are not the only way to conceptualize cultural differ-ences, I briefly mention other approaches to highlight what I believe is unique to the multiple modernities perspective.

Then I discuss what business could learn by looking at the world from the multiple modernities perspective or through a diversity lens. This involves, first, explaining how and in which areas the multiple modernities perspective should be applied. Second, I illustrate that the opposite of the multiple modernities perspective — that is, a per-spective that assumes the homogenization of cultures — operates as a convergence lens in many business activities. Third, I show that the convergence lens has already been questioned and replaced in some business areas. Fourth, I mention what the use of the diversity lens implies for business. Finally, I speculate on which companies might be best and which might be worst positioned in a world that is best described as consisting of multiple modernities.

What Does the Multiple Modernities Perspective Have to Say to Business?

From the preceding chapters it is clear that the "belief that modernity comes from a single universally applicable operation imposes a falsely uniform pattern on the multiple encounters of non-Western culture with the exigencies of science, technology, and industrialization."[1] In other words, modernization does not mean homogenization. The multiple modernities perspective asserts that profound differences between cultures do not disappear in the process of modernization but remain relevant to the values, interactions, and goals of individual and collective players in business and society at large. To understand the present, it is thus important to understand how the specific con-stellations of a culture have been created through historical struggles and which specific common goals have emerged.

Although diversity has been established as an important, even dominating, feature of today's reality, this does not imply a view of the world as consisting of unrelated bits and pieces. Rather, the multi-ple modernities perspective claims that modernity provides a com-mon denominator. Despite enduring and deep differences, the argu-ment goes, all modern cultures are confronted with a similar *probléma-tique.*

These claims have been supported in this book on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Eisenstadt and Sachsenmaier lay out the basic theoretical argument about multiple modernities. Duara and Juer-gensmeyer show that although modernity may be more fragmented than previously thought, it is nonetheless all-encompassing, including even self-described "antimodern" arguments or movements. Kocka and Tu demonstrate how in contrast to a priori universalisms a com-mon ground among multiple modernities could be conceptualized a posteriori through negotiated universals.

The specificity of the European and Chinese forms of modernity is demonstrated by Giesen and Kaelble with respect to European iden-tity and by Wakeman and King with respect to the Chinese struggle against the European form of modernity and for its own modernity. Whitley and Redding develop and further elaborate on a typology for overall societal institutional arrangements and business systems across cultures. Whitley, in applying institutional economics, takes a particu-

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[1] Taylor 1992, 89f., cited by Ambrose King in his chapter in this book, page 145.

larly historical and macrosociological approach. He thereby provides a connection to other academic disciplines as well as to the perspective of action-oriented decision makers.

Given the evidence presented in the preceding chapters, I accept the description of the world as culturally deeply divergent for the foreseeable future yet confronted with the same modern *problématique* as a premise for the following observations.

Is it a new argument or unique to the multiple modernities approach to question the hypothesis of a convergent global culture? Of course not. Other fields, such as international political economy and new institutional economics,[2] cross-cultural psychology,[3] and the emerging field of cross-cultural management studies[4] – mostly subscribe to the diversity hypothesis as well. But, as I briefly demonstrate, each of these approaches focuses on a specific aspect or a specific question, whereas the multiple modernities perspective asks more fundamental questions and can therefore serve as a framework for the other approaches.

Whether or not the world's societies are converging on identical practices has been a hot topic in the fields of international political economy and related social sciences for quite some time. The academic discussion on globalization has led to a majority opinion that a worldwide convergence is not happening:[5] the world-society approach in sociology has established that even "similarities of form" among nation-states do not lead to similarities of outcomes.[6] Anthony Giddens elaborates that globalization implies "uneven development": changes in various national systems do not evolve in a uniform direction.[7] These more conceptual studies have been further substantiated by analyses of both formal and informal institutions, that is, on the level of codifications in laws and regulations and on the level of culture.[8]

Cross-cultural psychology has explored the individual and group differences among humans from different cultural backgrounds and, late-

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[2] See Hall and Soskice 2001a.

[3] See for instance the *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*.

[4] See e.g., the *International Journal of Cross Cultural Management*, published by Sage since 2001.

[5] See for an overview Guillén 2001b; as well as Guillén 2001a; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 1999.

[6] See Meyer, Boli, Thomas and Ramirez 1997.

[7] See Giddens 2000.

[8] See Hall and Soskice 2001b, 12ff.; Whitley 1992; Whitley 1999.

ly, the combination of different cultural frameworks within individuals.[9] Some large empirical studies have investigated the differences among employees and managers in various countries. Hofstede's classic study of 116,000 IBM employees in 50 countries yielded four dimensions of cultural variation in values: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity.[10] The Global Leadership and Organizational Behaviour Effectiveness (GLOBE) research program collected data on cultural values, practices, and leadership attributes from 18,000 managers in 62 countries. Similarities and differences were studied in nine cultural dimensions: performance orientation, future orientation, assertiveness, uncertainty avoidance, power distance, collectivism, family collectivism, gender differentiation, and humane orientation.[11] With respect to leadership effectiveness, attributes associated with charismatic leadership turned out to be universally valued. However, this does not imply similar enactment of such characteristics across cultures.[12]

Nonpsychological business studies on cross-cultural management have explored specific intercultural business interactions, mainly in the form of case studies. These can be detailed studies of a few companies[13] or more cursory references to many[14] and often result in recommendations.

What is then the additional, specific contribution of the multiple modernities perspective, given the vast literature on cross-cultural issues only hinted at here? By linking diversity to the very condition of modernity, Eisenstadt demonstrates that diversity is not just a superficial epiphenomenon of modern life. It is intimately connected to the openness and uncertainty inherent to the modern condition or *imaginaire*.[15] Eisenstadt's argument is not primarily about actual differences between specific cultures, but about how the existence of these differences can be explained, based on the configuration and dynamic of modern societies. In a similar vein, Peter Wagner identifies autonomy and mastery (*Autonomie und Beherrschung*) as the two main forces driving modernity. He

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[9] For the latter see Morris and Fu 2001; Hong, Morris, Chiu and Benet-Martínez 2000.

[10] See Hofstede 1989. For an overview of 61 replications of his research and of the critiques of Hofstede's approach see Sondergaard 1994.

[11] See Javidan and House 2001; Riggio, Murphy and Pirozzolo 2002.

[12] See Drenth and Den Hartog 1999.

[13] See, for instance, Morosini 1998.

[14] See, for instance, the first part of Sebenius 2002.

[15] See Eisenstadt in this volume and Castoriadis 1990 for his concept of the "imaginaire."

uses these more generic terms instead of the conventional references to "market economy" and "democracy," because he deems the latter two too narrow and too bound to the Western tradition to be useful for describing the local struggles with the modern *problématique*.[16]

For international business, these abstract considerations can yield a strategic understanding of the structural features that underlie specific intercultural differences.

How Business Can Benefit from the Multiple Modernities Perspective

The multiple modernities perspective can be used by business in many ways. It could be used to position diversity as mutually exclusive or complementary to convergence, it could be used for tactics of strategy implementation and of running operations or for formulating strategies, it could be applied to the individual learning company or to the role of business in society – at large. Below I explore each of these alternatives in turn.

Convergence and Diversity

Is the multiple modernities perspective the new gospel business needs to follow, providing it with clear prescriptions for action? Does this perspective irrefutably argue that taking diversity into account is a sine qua non for business success? I don't think so. The economic arguments in favor of convergence, such as economies of scale or efficiency for instance, are not obsolete. The multiple modernities perspective provides evidence, however, that these arguments do not capture the whole picture. Thus it does not want to replace one truth with another; rather, it aspires to add another view, thereby opening up for the global manager a space for reflection and options. It enables managers to choose explicitly among different strategies to balance convergence and diversity as needed in a specific situation.[17]

A balance between two conflicting principles needs to include both

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[16] See Wagner 1999; Wagner 2001.

[17] This tradeoff is not new as such. See, for instance, the platform strategy most car manufacturers employ today: building different models on the same platform in order to reduce complexity and gain economies of scale while offering diverse options to consumers. Such considerations are not employed, though, with respect to the cultural differences that exist in, for instance, a multinational management team or work force.

Figure 1: Balance of Convergence and Diversity

and to steer clear of the negative exaggerations of each. Figure 1 illustrates this point.[18]

Convergence and diversity are here seen as positive values. Both can be exaggerated so that they become devalued or "nonvalues": the search for reasonable convergence can turn into the imposition of stifling homogenization, which tends to be the view of globalization espoused by its critics. The quest for meaningful diversity can turn into a severing of all ties, a breakdown of communication and interaction leading to separation and segregation.

In opinionated discussions, typically the false contradictions indicated by the diagonal lines in the diagram above are cited. Advocates of diversity depict their opposite as imposed homogenization or cultural imperialism. Champions of convergence can only imagine an unmanageable situation where no common endeavor is feasible. Successful action, however, incorporates again and again a balance between the two values, convergence and diversity, that reflects the exigencies of a particular business problem.[19]

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[18] For the generic structure of such a value square, see Schulz von Thun 1989, 39ff.

[19] A structurally similar call not to dissolve the tension between two opposites too early has been advocated by military strategist Carl von Clausewitz. For an interpretation with respect to business problems, see Ghyczy, Oetinger, and Bassford 2001.

Figure 2: Balance of Universalism and Particularism

If either of the exaggerations or nonvalues has become standard practice, it can be difficult to find the way back to the balance between the two values. It is no solution of course to jump from one negative exaggeration to the other one in an act of overcompensation.

The structure used here to illustrate the relationship between the diversity and convergence lenses can also be applied on a more theoretical level. As illustrated above, it can be used to gain a more differentiated picture of the universalism versus particularism dichotomy.

Both the view that Western values are universally valid as well as a view that different civilizations cannot find a common basis to avoid clashes are exaggerations of the universalism–particularism poles. "Negotiated universals" stands for a view that still takes universals to be important, but does not want to impose the universals of one culture on other cultures. Rather, a deliberative process among cultures is envisaged to result in a set of values each culture can subscribe to for its own reasons.[20] On the particularism side, different development paths of different cultures can also be seen as having a common reference point despite their differences. This reference point would

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[20] See Kocka's chapter in this book.

be the modern condition. Therefore, different cultural trajectories can be seen as different paths of modernity. A balance needs then to be found between the aspiration to identify and agree on negotiated universals and the aspiration to further develop particular paths of modernity.

Tactics and Strategy

Business encounters cultural and institutional differences on many levels: in the interaction with foreign business partners, in the form of different regulatory and legal frameworks, in different structures, contents, and values of public opinion.[21] The multiple modernities perspective is particularly well suited to show that these different levels are inherently interconnected as expressions of a culture's specific response to the modern condition. It is not necessary or possible to analyze all these and more levels in detail for each intercultural business decision or interaction. It is necessary, however, to have them in mind as potential areas where "weak signals" may be received or further investigation may be required. Only then will intercultural problems be noticed in time, analyzed and understood adequately, and dealt with successfully.

A lack of cultural sensitivity in strategy execution or in daily operations can easily jeopardize small and large deals alike. A recent example is the failed takeover of the German TV cable network by Liberty Media. Apart from other factors, a lack of understanding of German institutions by the U.S. investor and misperceptions by German regulatory authorities' of the investor's intentions was said to have contributed to the deal's being blocked by Germany's competition watchdog.[22] This is just one example of many: again and again it can be observed that companies ignore intercultural differences at their peril. The idea that managers should take cultural differences into account is not really new, though. Intercultural training courses have been the state-of-the-art preparation for foreign assignments for many years. In such courses, managers receive basic knowledge about the cultures they are to work in and a cultural survival kit of the do's and don'ts

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[21] See, e.g., Skapinker 2002 for a description of Monsanto's failure to anticipate the very different public reactions to genetically modified crops in the United States and in Europe. See Lamont and Thévenot 2001 for a comparison of French and U.S.-American "repertoires of evaluation."

[22] See Clark 2002.

when dealing with the Chinese, Germans, Arabs, or others they will encounter. All this is valuable knowledge for dealing tactically with cultural differences.

On the level of strategic decision making, however, cultural differences have only rarely been taken into account. Although they may have been invoked anecdotally to draw attention to areas of potential conflict or as a pretext to avoid necessary changes,[23] they have not been explored and integrated systematically into strategy formulation. This is where the multiple modernities perspective can add most value. It can help to make cultural differences endogenous to strategy formulation.

Individual Company Learning and Business in Society-at-Large

The multiple modernities perspective also opens up a space for exploration and mutual learning. To give up the idea that Western modernity is the one and only answer to modern uncertainty does not result only in the loss of a fixed, homogeneous future for "the West and the rest." It results also in regaining openness for numerous different reference points provided by different cultures and thereby in numerous opportunities for learning, change, and action. Apart from the past of one's own and others' histories, the present of other cultural systems becomes a legitimate source of learning impulses. Instead of being focused on a single future goal, in relation to which all cultures could be authoritatively ranked as forerunners or laggards, now all cultures become unauthoritative reference points for each other. Certain practices or features of system A might be interesting to system B and adapted to fit in with the other elements of system B. This adaptation is never a plug-and-play process but requires a very keen understanding of the workings of both systems, including what the preconditions are for a specific feature to function in system A and whether these or functionally equivalent preconditions can be met by system B.[24]

As systems start out with different characteristics, creative impulses from outside will easily lead to divergent directions of learning and change. For instance, European and American factories (re-)discovered the benefits of teamwork by learning from Japanese experiences,

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[23] See, for instance, The Boston Consulting Group 2000.
[24] See below for a discussion of the transfer of production regimes in car manufacturing from one culture to another.

whereas Japanese management bureaucracies have tried to induce more Western individualism into the working style of their companies.

Exposure to differences or learning requirements is not perceived as positive per se, though. The linkage of diversity back to the overall modern condition as provided by the multiple modernities perspective allows for a deeper understanding of some of the discontents associated with or created by global business activities. These are often closely related to the discontents with modernity itself, namely, the loss of orientation and security and the rise of ambiguity associated with the rise of individual freedom. This has obvious implications beyond the individual company. When global companies manage these tensions well or badly, positive or negative spillovers from business to society at large or even to international interactions will be the result.

Also, as Kocka and Tu have argued, ways to engage multiple modernities in a meaningful dialogue still need to be developed both conceptually and through trial and error. Business can contribute to this endeavor by building intercultural bridges if it acknowledges and deals with the profound differences among cultures.

In the following sections, I explore the implications for business of both the assumption that business practices are becoming ever more homogeneous and the assumption of the multiple modernities perspective that they are not. I refer to these views as resulting from a convergence lens and a diversity lens, respectively. First I illustrate how the convergence lens can mislead companies. As noted, the use of the diversity and convergence lenses needs to be balanced for successful action. Because the balance has been tilted toward convergence for quite some time, the following sections will show how this tilt has been misleading companies. An imbalance toward the divergence lens would be equally misleading, but at this point in history contemporary evidence is not as ubiquitous.

Although the homogenization perspective is fairly pervasive, it is not the only one employed in business. Therefore, I point out that in some business activities the convergence lens has already lost its appeal. Beyond the status quo, it is interesting to explore what the diversity lens does imply, for individual companies and for the role of the economy in society at large. Finally, I discuss which companies may adopt a multiple modernities perspective more easily than others.

The Convergence Lens at Work

The convergence lens influences business assumptions on three levels: assumptions about the behavior of human beings across cultures, assumptions about the appropriateness of organizational structures, and assumptions about constraints on strategic decision making. I will give examples for each area: the implications of uniform accounting standards for assumptions about human behavior, the overall value of conglomerates and the cross-cultural transfer of production regimes for assumptions about organizational structures, and the lessons from cross-cultural mergers, the failures of acquisitions, and joint ventures for assumptions in the area of strategy formulation.

Homogenous Human Behavior?

A very explicit drive for homogenization comes from the worldwide shareholder value movement. For the benefit of global investors, whose investments are of course desired by many companies, uniform accounting standards have been high on the agenda of regulatory reform. Whether the United States GAAP or the International Accounting Standards (IAS) are the best way to implement such uniform accounting standards is still subject to debate, but investors demand transparency. For selecting companies à la carte, it is useful to have their ingredients and price tag come in a uniform accounting language. Lately, however, the meaning of such uniformity has come under scrutiny. At a recent conference of the American Accounting Association and the German Schmalenbach Gesellschaft,[25] cultural influences on the application of any uniform standard became apparent. For instance, the rules for depreciation and the assessments required to apply them will be interpreted in different ways in the United States and Italy, in Germany and India. After all, human beings with a specific cultural background in companies with a specific cultural background will have to make assessments taking specific practices in their markets into account.

If such assessments of formally identical issues lead to different

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[25] "Cross-Border Business Combinations and Strategic Alliances," 22-25 June 2001 in Berlin with participants from auditors such as Ernst & Young or Arthur Andersen and companies ranging from finance giant Allianz to industrial firms like DaimlerChrysler or Bayer.

results in different countries, what will then be achieved by the uniform accounting standards? They may turn out to obscure rather than provide transparency. Despite the identical name of a section heading in a financial statement, the numbers may not have been arrived at in the same way and may therefore not have the same meaning. In other words, apples and pears disguised as apples may get compared, with obvious consequences for the rationality of decisions based thereon.

Consequently, prudent investors still need to rely on experts who can interpret the country-specific ways of filling in a uniform structure of accounts. Adding the multiple modernities perspective that these differences are not of a transitory nature but will remain alive for the foreseeable future, the appeal of uniform accounting standards is clearly reduced to having a certainly useful, structurally uniform starting point for further inquiries.[26]

Homogenous Structures and Processes?

Stock markets favor company practices and structures that increase transparency for shareholders. Transparency depends not only on the reporting of company activities, but also on the setup of companies themselves. Therefore, a prime target for stock markets' critique have been conglomerates spanning more than one industry. Cross-industry portfolio decisions should be left to the stock market and CEOs should focus on one industry, according to the mantra of the 1990s. CEOs who did not accept this and maintained conglomerates were punished by a 10-15 percent discount on the stock price of their company's shares.[27] Whether this anticonglomerate mood is based on a sound understanding of the U.S. or Western situation is still subject to academic debate and divergent assessments by consultants.[28]

The intercultural convergence lens comes into play when this rule is applied to non-Western contexts — and would indeed lead to faulty

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[26] In the wake of the Enron case, the question of whether it is wise to rely worldwide on any one accounting system alone and on the United States GAAP in particular has to be revisited as well. See Handelsblatt 2002; *Financial Times* 2002.

[27] See London 2002.

[28] See The Boston Consulting Group 2001. In any case it is interesting to note, that this mood is diametrically opposed to the mood of the 1970s, when conglomerates were considered to be the optimal set-up of a large company. And even today one of the most admired Western companies, GE, is a conglomerate and thereby at least an exception to the rule.

decisions in these contexts. As research by Professors Khanna and Palepu at Harvard Business School shows, conglomerates are an advantageous organizational form in developing markets. Institutional differences between "developed" and "developing" countries persist, notably the lack of specialized intermediaries like mutual funds, venture capitalists, equity analysts, auditors, executive-search firms, vocational and business schools, certification agencies, intellectual-property lawyers, and consumer activists in the developing world. The functions they fulfill in developed countries are fulfilled in developing countries by conglomerates.[29] Hence the danger of extending the anticonglomerate argument to the rest of the world.[30]

Another area in which assumptions about homogenization have played a role is the transfer of organizational practices or innovations from one culture to another. The automobile industry sought such transfers, for instance, at a time when Japanese manufacturers were still generally seen as superior to their U.S. and European counterparts. Efforts to simply copy Japanese production regimes did not work however, either in Germany or in the United States. The diversified mass production regime that requires workers to be able to perform a wide range of tasks was well suited to the cultural background of the Japanese work force, but not to those of other societies. Because the convergence lens did not show these differences fully, necessary adjustments during the implementation of the superior production regime had to be made through painful trial and error.[31]

Homogenous Strategy Formulation?

Last but not least, it is interesting to see what conclusions the convergence lens draws from the high failure rates of cross-cultural mergers and acquisitions or joint ventures.[32] Two effects can be distinguished: the underestimation of and inability to deal with cultural differences.

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[29] See *The Economist* 2002; and Khanna and Palepu 2000.

[30] This argument for the value of conglomerates could also be accepted by the convergence view, but only for a transitory period until the developing countries are fully developed. The multiple modernities perspective would claim that at least some of the differences will persist and the simple extension of the anticonglomerate view to non-Western countries will be faulty in the foreseeable future as well. In the multiple modernities view differences cannot be explained solely by the development status; the different sociocultural histories of countries are relevant as well.

[31] See Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice 2001; Streeck 1996.

[32] See, for instance, The Boston Consulting Group 2000.

An underestimation or poor understanding of cultural differences is most likely a contributing factor to the higher failure rates of cross-cultural M&As or JVs. Companies can significantly increase the rate of success for their international joint ventures if the partner has a similar culture.[33]

Although this is immediately plausible, it more or less elegantly begs the real question of how best to deal with the majority of international joint ventures, in which cultures are precisely not similar. The solution to refrain from such M&As or JVs altogether illustrates the inability to deal with cultural differences. Through the convergence lens, such failures can only be attributed to the utter irrationality of the intercultural counterparts, which makes it prudent to throw out the baby with the bathwater. If all economic indicators favor an M&A or a JV, however, it must be the goal to understand exactly why cultural differences could undermine it and how and at what cost they could be overcome, and to decide then whether to go ahead or not. Possibly a more precise understanding of cultural differences could even result in their reevaluation as an asset rather than a costly obstacle. In any case, as intelligent management of these issues does not come naturally to most companies, it is obvious that the ability to deal with cultural differences productively in the context of an M&A or JV promises considerable competitive advantages.

These examples demonstrate that the convergence lens plays an important role in a wide range of business activities, and often not to the benefit of its adherents. Although this is still the case for most business areas, there are some in which business has already abandoned the homogenization assumption and replaced the convergence lens with a diversity lens.

Application of the Diversity Lens

Marketing

There is one notable area of business that has long realized that the modern world is a very heterogeneous place and acted accordingly. This is marketing. Global, uniform brand names often serve as an umbrella for offerings that are differentiated to cater to local tastes.

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[33] See Frey and Beamish 2001.

One example is McDonald's, which represents for some the epitome of the "evil" homogenizing forces of globalization. A closer look shows that even McDonald's differentiates its famous burgers according to local preferences. Hence we have a Teriyaki burger in Japan and other localized products elsewhere.[34] Meanwhile, differentiation at McDonald's has even come full circle back to the West, where special promotions feature more or less authentic cultural variations: for example, in Germany Latin American burger varieties have been offered in a "Los Wochos" promotion campaign.

Another example is Nestle's instant coffee, which is available worldwide, yet produced and packaged in more than 100 variations.

CEO Rhetoric

Beyond this differentiating of specific products, some business leaders have already revised their ways of looking at the world and of positioning their companies in it. Heinrich von Pierer, CEO of Siemens, says, for instance: "If you look closely at Siemens, we are not so German. In Germany we are a German company, but if you see our operations in Brazil, you will think we are a Brazilian company. In China we are a Chinese company. This is one of our strengths. We have the ability to take in and manage the attributes of individual cultures and so become a global company."[35] It is important to note how von Pierer defines a global company. In his eyes it is precisely not the worldwide application of some universal — or German — principle, but the ability to be adaptive and responsive to specific national cultures.

In a similar vein, Jean-Marie Messier, CEO of Vivendi Universal, says, "I do not believe in a 'global culture.' On the contrary, I believe in local cultures, capable of mutual enrichment, that can bring forth universal successes or myths. It is important not to confuse two terms: if 'the global' refers to a standardized production process that one tries to impose on everybody, 'the universal' refers to a unique piece of work, created anywhere that it goes around the world. For my part, I do not aspire to construct a 'global' company, as the Anglo-Saxons have it, but to build in the culture industries a 'universal' group ... as

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[34] For a detailed study of the different acculturation patterns of McDonald's in the social settings of Beijing, Hong Kong, Taipei, Seoul, and Japan see Watson 1997.

[35] See Marsh 2002.

indicated by our name!"[36] In differentiating between "global" and "universal," Messier comes close to Kocka's negotiated universals:[37] the appeal of a local product is supposed to make it go around the world, not some kind of imposition. Similarly, negotiated universals cannot be imposed but need to appeal to the parties involved.

The marketing practices described above as well as the high-level observations of von Pierer and Messier indicate that homogenization is not implied by modernization or globalization. But what does it imply, especially about the internal operations of multinational companies (as opposed to the interface to customers and markets)? What does it imply more specifically than the mere observation that heterogeneity is a fact (von Pierer) or a vision (Messier)? These are the questions addressed in the next section.

Implications of the Diversity Lens

The first implication of the discovery of multiple modernities is that one should avoid fitting the world into one simple model based on one's own historical experience. As discussed above, a balance needs to be maintained between the convergence and diversity lenses.

Therefore, cultural differences need to be acknowledged and dealt with explicitly and actively.[38] This means first of all refraining from three kinds of denial of cultural differences: ignoring them outright, recognizing them in merely denigrating terms, and recognizing them only long enough to trivializes them as irrelevant. An active engagement with cultural difference can take four forms: it starts with an intellectual and emotional acceptance of the reality of relevant, valuable differences. Based on such acceptance, an adaptation to differences, an integration of different frames of reference into a metaframe, or the active leveraging of cultural differences can follow.

The latter two are the more active forms of engaging cultural differences. The integration of different frames of reference results in learning by importing elements from one culture into another one and adapting them. Leveraging cultural differences, for example within a multinational network of business activities, results in a

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[36] Messier 2001, my translation of the French original.
[37] See Kocka's chapter in this volume.
[38] See Rosinski 2001.

strategic "institutional arbitrage" as suggested by Peter Hall and David Soskice.[39] It induces firms to move specific operations to locations where the institutional and cultural conditions are most appropriate. The transformation of Deutsche Bank through acquisitions in Chicago and London, the revitalization of Nissan through design facilities in California, and the building of a GM engine plant in Germany are illustrations. This means taking culture-specific resources into account from the very beginning of strategy formulation and asking how these can be further developed into particular strengths and defensible competitive advantages.

A model of global economic activities that recognizes differences and identifies ways they can make valuable contributions may also have a positive influence beyond the individual company. Business has always been at the forefront of intercultural encounters. Being perceived as rolling out a uniform logic that does not take into account, let alone respect, cultural differences can turn ignorance into violence these days. By the same token, encounters that are fair and respectful may turn belligerence into mutual learning. In this sense, the multiple modernities paradigm may contribute to political stability, helping business and society at large. European politicians such as Germany's Chancellor Schröder are echoing this vision. According to him, "a climate where different cultures and identities can assert themselves" is a precondition for international security.[40]

Who Wins, Who Loses?

Business decisions that lead to the integration of cultural differences are unavoidably complex. The question is, who is best positioned to handle that complexity?

Jean-Marie Messier has a clear opinion: "We, Europeans, know how to defend our own language and work in many languages at the same time, adapting to the specific sensitivities of each country. The extraordinary cultural and linguistic sophistication of Europe, enriched by the unfreezing of Eastern Europe, has no equivalent in the world. Europe has here a fabulous trump card at its disposal, a real advantage compared with American communications companies

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[39] See Hall and Soskice 2001b, 57.
[40] Quoted by Münchau and Hanke 2002, my translation of the German original.

that have remained mostly monocultural despite the growing multi-
culturalism of American society. We should not underestimate our
chances and our capabilities! Europe can teach the world a lot. Will
we — artists, editors, distributors, public authorities . . . — know how
to intelligently make our talents bear fruit and reap profits from our
incomparable advantage in understanding cultural diversity in order
to make it shine beyond our own continent?"[41]

In other words, the status of the United States as the world's
biggest economy may turn out to be detrimental if intercultural differ-
ences are accepted as relevant. The strength of the United States may
have tempted its companies to model the rest of the world as a simple
extension of their own reality. This was highlighted at the recent
meeting of the World Economic Forum in New York. On the basis of
its recent economic success, the United States "lectures others, burst-
ing with self-assurance, completely convinced of its economic sys-
tem."[42] Paradoxically, the internal diversity of the United States
seems not to mitigate but even to reenforce this attitude.[43]

In contrast, the more peripheral status of Europe (and maybe par-
ticularly of France) on a worldwide level and its internal heterogene-
ity have always forced European businesses to take the business mod-
els and habits of the United States and those of their neighbors into
account. Thereby they have at least learned — if not always success-
fully applied — that there is more than one truth.

This is even more so the case for the economies of Asia (with the pos-
sible exception of Japan). Asian entrepreneurs have built empires with
their own specific characteristics: be it Ayala in the Philippines, the
Tata Group in India, or Li Ka-shing in Hong Kong. They have not
only refused to submit to Western pressure to give up their conglomer-
ate structure, they have invented a way to manage their conglomerates
in a Western venture capitalist style, but with additional sensitivity to

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[41] Messier 2001, my translation of the French original. Despite this pro-European
rhetoric, Messier alienated France's elite by declaring the end of French exceptional-
ism (see Gordon 2002).

[42] Münchau and Hanke 2002, my translation of the German original.

[43] This may be due to — until recently — prevalent melting pot ideology or to the
association (except in academia) of diversity with poor immigrants or nonperforming
communities. To what extent the recent rise of Asian-Americans will change this atti-
tude remains to be seen. Also, the necessary and successful existence of common legal
and institutional frameworks for the many different immigrant communities within
the U.S. may lead to the misconception that these could be easily extended to the rest
of the world.

and know-how for dealing with cultural differences.[44]

Maybe Jean-Marie Messier is right to assert that European companies are better positioned than their U.S. counterparts to benefit from the trend toward multiple modernities because they are more used to cultural diversity and more adept in dealing with them in an understanding and nonhomogenizing way. Asian entrepreneurial conglomerates may, however, be more willing and able to experiment with different forms of organization and interaction to accommodate cultural differences. In any case, in a world of multiple modernities, the United States — paradoxically — does not seem to have the best starting position.

But, of course, in the end outcomes count, not starting positions. The multiple modernities perspective can help everybody who wants to use it to get a better picture of reality — and to act accordingly. As the ability to act in new ways, to implement radical change, has been more readily displayed by U.S. companies than by their European counterparts, it remains to be seen who will first be able to build competitive advantages by balancing the diversity and convergence lenses.

Conclusion

The multiple modernities perspective provides business with a language and logic to describe and understand parts of today's reality that can be ignored only at one's own peril. Much work still needs to be done, though, to capture more of the potential of this perspective for concrete business applications. Until now it has been much easier to point out how the convergence lens can be misleading. How the diversity lens can be used in practical terms largely remains unexplored.

So far, analyses from the multiple modernities perspective and of international political economics have mostly focused on the system level of nations, cultures, and civilizations. At the other end of the spectrum, cross-cultural psychology has focused mainly on individuals. All this provides a firm foundation for further investigations. Such investigations can focus on different levels. They can focus on specific business interactions, which cultural factors play a role in them, and

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[44] See *The Economist* 2002.

to what extent they limit or broaden strategic choice.[45] On a more structural level, one can explore the implications of institutional differences among business systems for strategic arbitrage.

The exploration of how companies can optimize their activities under the conditions of multiple modernities is still nascent. Such exploration is promising for academia and business alike.

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[45] See for this strand Sebenius 2002 for research on intercultural negotiations.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

PRASENJIT DUARA received his degrees from Delhi University and Harvard University. He is professor in the departments of History and East Asian Language and Civilizations at the University of Chicago. His work, which has been translated into Chinese and Japanese, includes *Culture, Power and the State: Rural Society in North China, 1900–1942* (1988, 1991) and *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (1995, 1996). He has recently completed a new book entitled *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern.*

SHMUEL N. EISENSTADT is Rose Isaacs professor emeritus of Sociology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem where he has been a faculty member since 1946. He has served as visiting professor at numerous universities, including Harvard, Stanford, MIT, Chicago, Michigan, Washington, Oslo, Zurich, Vienna, and Hong Kong. Among his many books and articles are *Paradoxes of Democracy: Fragility, Continuity and Change* (1999), *Japanese Civilization — A Comparative View* (1996), *Power, Trust and Meaning: Essays in Sociological Theory and Analysis* (1995), and *Multiple Modernities* (editor, forthcoming, based on the 2000 issue of *Daedalus*).

BERNHARD GIESEN is professor of Sociology at University of Konstanz, Germany. He has held visiting academic positions at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy; the University of Chicago; New York University; University of California, Los Angeles; the Stanford Center of Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, California; and Yale University. He has published several books on collective identity and on social theory, including, with J. Alexander, R. Münch and N. Smelser (eds.), *The Micro-Macro Link* (1987). His latest publications in English are *Intellectuals and the Nation. Collective Identity in a Geman Axial Age* (1998); *European Citizenship. National Legacies and Transnational Projects* (2001) with K. Eder (eds.); and *Cultural Trauma* with J. Alexander, R. Eyerman, and P. Sztompka (forthcoming).

MARK JUERGENSMEYER is professor of sociology and director of global and international studies at the University of California, Santa Bar-

bara. He is author or editor of more than a dozen books, including *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (2000) and *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (1993), which was listed among the best books of the year by the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and the *Los Angeles Times*.

HARTMUT KAELBLE has taught social history at the Humboldt University of Berlin since 1991. From 1971 to 1991, he was professor for social and economic history at the Free University in Berlin. He was research fellow or guest professor at Harvard University; St. Antony's College, Oxford; the Erasmus University, Rotterdam; the Maison des sciences de l'Homme, Paris; the Sorbonne, Paris; and the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris. His recent books include: *A Social History of Western Europe, 1880-1980* (1989, also in German, French, Italian, and Japanese); *Der historische Vergleich* (The Historical Comparison, 1999); *Europäer über Europa. Die Entstehung des modernen europäischen Selbstverständnisses im 19. und 20.* Jahrhundert (European Self-Understanding during the 19th and 20th Centuries, 2001); and *Wege der Demokratie. Von der Französischen Revolution zur Europäischen Union* (The Democratization of the European Nation-States and of the European Union, 1957-2000, 2001).

AMBROSE Y.C. KING is the pro-vice-chancellor and chair professor of Sociology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He has been visiting fellow at the Center of International Studies, MIT, and visiting professor at University of Wisconsin and University of Heidelberg. In 1994, he was elected as Fellow (Academician), Academia Sinica. Professor King's books include *Salient Issues of Chinese Society & Culture* (1992), *The Politics of Three Chinese Societies* (1988), and *From Tradition to Modernity: An Analysis of Chinese Society and its Change* (1978). Articles on the development and modernization of Chinese societies have appeared in journals such as *Asian Survey, British Journal of Sociology, Modern Asian Studies,* and *Daedalus.* He has been an editorial board member of several journals including the *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* and the *China Quarterly.* Professor King has been an advisor to several agencies of the Hong Kong Government.

JÜRGEN KOCKA has held a chair for the History of the Industrial World at the Free University of Berlin since 1988. He is President of the Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) and has published

widely in modern history, particularly social and economic history of the eighteenth to twentieth centuries. He has also written on theoretical problems of history and the social sciences. His books and articles include: *Facing Total War. German Society 1914-1918* (1984); *Industrial Culture and Bourgeois Society. Business, Labor, and Bureaucracy in Modern Germany* (1999); and *Das lange 19. Jahrhundert. Arbeit, Nation und bürgerliche Gesellschaft* (2001).

BRUCE MAZLISH is a professor of History at MIT. Among his publications are *The Uncertain Sciences* (1998), *The Fourth Discontinuity: The Co-Evolution of Humans and Machines* (1993), and *A New Science: The Breakdown of Connections and the Birth of Sociology* (1989). He has also published many articles on new global history. He is the editor of C*onceptualizing Global History* (1993).

BOLKO VON OETINGER was educated at the Freie Universität of Berlin and the Stanford Graduate School of Business, and is a senior vice president of The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) in Munich and the director of the firm's Strategy Institute, which he founded in May 1998. His professional experience has been in the fields of strategy, innovation, and renewal. He directs the Kronberg Conferences, the BCG top management forum in Germany. He is also a guest lecturer at the Otto Beisheim Graduate School of Management (WHU) in Germany. Dr. v. Oetinger has published numerous articles on strategy and is coauthor of several books on strategy and innovation, including *Das Boston Consulting Group Strategiebuch* (1993, 2000), *Clausewitz on Strategy* (2001) with Tiha v. Ghyczy and Christopher Bassford, and *A Passion for Ideas* (2002) with Heinrich v. Pierer, CEO of Siemens AG.

GORDON REDDING is senior affiliate professor of Asian Business at INSEAD. He was previously founder and director of the Business School at the University of Hong Kong. His main research interest is Chinese capitalism, and, more generally, the comparison of capitalist systems. After an early career in business, he took a doctorate at Manchester Business School and also holds an honorary doctorate from the Stockholm School of Economics. His main book is *The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism* (1993).

JENS RIEDEL is a manager in the Hamburg office of The Boston Consulting Group. Previously, he worked for DaimlerBenz in Germany, the United States, and China. He studied political science, sociology, philosophy, and economics at the Universität Tübingen in Germany at SUNY-Stony Brook, and at the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research in New York. With BCG he has consulted to leading companies in the high tech, consumer goods, financial services industries. His consulting focuses on strategy and organization and human resources issues. He is about to publish a book on executive coaching, which is based on his PhD research.

DOMINIC SACHSENMAIER is a research scholar at Harvard University and a scholar at the German National Research Foundation. He has published on Sino-Western Relations, the history of cultural transmissions, and Overseas Chinese identity patterns. His publications include *Die Aufnahme europäischer Inhalte in die chinesische Kultur durch Zhu Zongyuan* (2001). Currently he is working on transculturally comparative 20th century history.

TU WEI-MING is professor of Chinese history and philosophy at Harvard University and director of the Harvard-Yenching Institute. He also taught at Princeton and Berkeley. In addition, he has been involved in many public projects, including the Copenhagen Social Summit. He is the author of numerous books, including *Humanity and Self-Cultivation*; *Way, Learning and Politics: Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity*; and *The Living Tree. The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today*.

FREDERIC WAKEMAN, JR. is the Haas professor of Asian Studies in the Department of History, University of California, at Berkeley. He has held this position since serving as president of the Social Science Research Council and the American Historical Association. His last book, *Shanghai Badlands*, was a study of the Japanese occupation of Shanghai from 1937 to 1941. His most recent work, *Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service*, is being simultaneously published in Chinese and English. Professor Wakeman is also a specialist in Ming and Qing history, and is working on a new book about political corruption in eighteenth-century China.

RICHARD WHITLEY is professor of Organizational Sociology at the Manchester Business School, University of Manchester and has held visiting appointments at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, International University of Japan, the CNRS, Paris, the University of Hong Kong and the University of Amsterdam. Recent books include *The Multinational Firm* (2001), *The Intellectual and Social Organization of the Sciences* (second edition, 2000), and *Divergent Capitalisms* (1999). He has recently served as president of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-economics and chair of the European Group for Organization Studies. He is currently studying how firms, including multinationals, develop distinctive competences in different institutional environments.

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