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Migration, Security and Insecurity

Michael Humphrey

Post September 11 migration has increasingly been framed as a security problem. In the 2010 Australian election campaign migration was connected to security (defence of our borders, terrorism and social cohesion) and to related issues of insecurity about the future (population size, sustainability and economic growth). This framing of migration as a national issue conceals the reality that migration to Australia is part of the global largescale flow of population. This paper seeks to analyse the ‘security turn’ in migration debates in Australia and the North. It argues that the securitisation of migration signifies the transformation of security from the problem of producing national order to the problem of managing global disorder. The relationship between securitisation and the production of order are explored through firstly examining domestication and securitisation of Muslims and Islam in Western states as a strategy for their management as transnational categories of risk and secondly, the transnational management of populations as ‘hypercgonernance’, the ability of some states to intervene in and shape other states and societies as a neo-imperial project through military action, humanitarian relief, religious and secular NGOs, economic aid, development assistance, education, religious evangelism and radicalism. The paper argues that the securitisation of migration in the twenty-first century is very likely to intensify.

Keywords: International Migration; Migration Policy; Security; Securitisation; Australia; Governmentality; Hypergovernance; Transnationalism; Refugees; Racialisation

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After the international terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, international migration has increasingly been framed as a security problem in the West. Borders and entry have become first and foremost an issue of security. At national borders, immigration services no longer merely scrutinise the validity of documents and grant permission to enter but provide 'border protection' by assessing the risk of passengers as potential criminals, terrorists or visa over-stayers based on their documents, security profiling, biometrics and matrix of databanks. The security function of the state has expanded beyond national defence through military preparedness to encompass the protection of citizens through the intensification of surveillance of our organisational and technological complex societies and managing public anxiety about uncertainty. Agencies whose functions were once regarded as marginal to state security (immigration, customs and ambulance) have now become integral to it and their officers/officials are increasingly publicly encountered as security-like in their ready-for-action dress. Security has become a pervasive discourse of governments to frame and give priority to public policy targeting existential threats (Buzan *et al.* 1998, p. 25).

The securitisation of migration, the construction of migration as risk, is an expression of the globalisation of security to manage the new threats of international crime and terrorism post-September 11. Securitisation is 'a political technique of framing policy questions in logics of survival with a capacity to mobilise politics of fear in which social relations are structured on the basis of distrust' (Huysmans 2006, p. xi). It has become emblematic of the anxieties of state sovereignty seeking to manage migration as an expression of globalisation – control borders, plan population growth, promote social cohesion and support (middle class) sustainability. Each of these issues refers to the national capacity to order and regulate the population and, integral to that, to derive legitimacy from being seen to care for and protect citizens and determine entitlement. Framing migration as a 'security' issue gives it political priority and justifies extraordinary legal, policing and policy measures to manage it (Leonard 2007). By making migration a security problem, migrants are constituted as the object of policies directed at managing risk. It misrecognises structural issues such as refugee flows, urban riots, crime, unemployment and welfare dependency as the attributes of migrants which need to be policed and regulated. Blaming migrants becomes a strategy of governance to produce social cohesion, mobilise political support and claim political legitimacy. Moreover at the margins, cultural and racial differences are used to define sovereignty and delineate a state of exception for those seen not to deserve the same protection of the law.

Securitisation frames migration as a national issue concerned with determining 'who comes here' (controlling borders), enforcing visa requirements (locating over-stayers), selecting the 'best' migrants and policing social categories as risk management. However, in reality migration, the large-scale transnational flow of populations, is an international issue challenging the capacity of individual states to manage the impact of big structural questions: global inequality, transnational social mobility and displacement of the most vulnerable as a result of economic crisis, environmental

degradation and war. The ‘security turn’ in relation to migration signifies the transformation of security from the problem of producing national order to the problem of managing global disorder. Nationally, governance has combined security (policing and surveillance) with the management of citizen insecurity and public perceptions of danger. Transnationally, the state has outsourced security to other states, to security professionals, corporations, international agencies and NGOs (Bigo 2008) for them to manage unwanted immigrants through containment. This includes interception and detention en route as well as trying to keep people at home through ‘human security’ oriented development policies. This is referred to as the ‘externalisation’ of migration control (Paoletti 2010). Securitisation extends governmentality beyond national borders by providing a common language to connect diverse fields and create a shared political project by ‘shaping political identities and subjectivities’ (Risley 2006, p. 28).

This paper examines the securitisation of migration and migrants as a national and transnational project seeking to manage global disorder by, firstly, creating a transnational border in the North through transnationally shared policies and laws to manage international migration as risk, secondly, turning particular kinds of migrants into transnational categories for transnational management – for example Muslim immigrants and refugees – and, thirdly, the hypergovernance of migrants along migration routes or in countries of origin by externalisation through outsourcing sovereignty to other states and NGOs to keep (unwanted) migrants at home or intercept them on the way. Hypergovernance refers to the transnational management of populations, the ability of some states to intervene in and shape other states and societies as a neo-imperial project through military action, humanitarian relief and the activities of religious and secular NGOs to stop conflict, bring development and support state building (Bhatt 2007).

The aim of this paper is to develop a conceptual framework to bring into focus transnationally emergent patterns of governmentality revealed in the securitisation of migrants and migration. It considers the Australian experience of the securitisation of migrants and migration, in particular Muslims migrants and refugees, and identifies parallel processes targeting these same migrant categories in Europe. The paper draws on the author’s extensive research on Muslims and Islam in Australia as well as comparative research on Australia and Europe (Humphrey 1998, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2010). Theoretically, it extends Watson (2011)’s insight about the emergence of securitisation as signifying a crisis in institutionalised forms of security by tracing the externalisation of security with respect to migrants and migration.

Securitisation and Governance

Securitisation of migration is not merely a strategy of policing and risk management, but it has become a mode of governance. Securitisation combines dispersed self-disciplining through surveillance (Foucault 1977) with collective disciplining through citizen spectatorship, and the management of fear (Debord 1977). Policing

becomes less about repression and more about constituting the politically visible through the mediatisation of society (Feldman 2004). As Feldman (2004, p. 77) argues, “the new surveillance/public safety regime requires the labor of spectator-citizenship”. Policing through the panopticon, the surveillance of all under the state’s gaze, shifts towards the ban-opticon, the constitution of risk objects by profiling under the gaze of the citizen spectator (Bigo 2008). The ban-opticon is characterised by the:

exceptionism of power (rules of emergency and their tendency to become permanent), by the way it excludes certain specific groups in the name of their future potential behaviour (profiling), and by the way it normalizes the non-excluded through its production of normative imperatives, the most important of which is free movement (the so-called four freedoms of circulation of the EU: concerning goods, capital, information, services and persons). (Bigo 2008, p. 32)

The ban-optic security lens institutes a form of governmentality based on state management of unease and by providing a ‘reassuring and protective pastoral power’ (Bigo 2008, p. 33). It moves away from trying to guarantee order to proactive policies designed to target risk categories, to anticipate future risk scenarios and to manage the population’s feelings of insecurity. The state’s aim is not primarily to make people feel safe by guaranteeing order but to govern by managing their feelings of insecurity which in turn becomes the basis of unity through exclusion of the other. The political technique of the ban-opticon displaces political order based on the social contract for ‘misgiving as a mode of ruling’ concentrating fear on a difficult to identify adversary (Bigo 2002, p. 81). It makes risks legible in the categories it constructs and identifies as the ‘enemy’ (Krasmann 2007). These social categories are produced through laws and policies which identify the dangerous/subversive behaviour attributed to them and made visible through policing social surfaces in the media witnessed by the citizen spectator. ‘This form of policing emerges with the disappearance of enforceable physical national borders and compensates for the loss of tangible borders by creating new boundary systems that are virtual, mediatised such as electronic, bio-metric, and digital surveillance nets’ (Feldman 2004, p. 74).

Securitisation involves the expansion of proactive preventive measures and practices beyond the state which draw on a wide range of agencies that manage risk which include insurance companies, private investigators, retail superstores, banks and public welfare institutions. Internationally, security becomes decentralised through outsourcing responsibility to other states, international agencies, private companies and NGOs. New technologies of surveillance facilitate the emergence of transnational bureaucratic networks and databanks created by the activities of security professionals managing fear and risk (Bigo 2008). Their professional activities and knowledge transnationalise the security field as the categories of their surveillance and policing are themselves transnationalised.

The securitisation of migration has increasingly become the securitisation of migrants whose bodies are made surrogate borders culturally and politically. The

effect of securitisation is to diminish the rights of those profiled as risk categories and to racialise or culturalise the justification for treating particular transnationalised categories differently.

Securitised Muslims and Islam in Australia

Before 11 September 2001, Muslims in Australia were stigmatised as a culturally problematic and socially marginalised immigrant community (Humphrey 1998, Dunn 2004, Dunn *et al.* 2007). According to the 2006 census, Muslims are 1.7 per cent of the Australian population (340,393, 2006 census) and rapidly becoming a second-generation Australian born population (38 per cent, 2006 Census) (DIAC n.d.). The Muslim population is culturally and geographically diverse with communities from the Middle East, South Asia, South East Asia, East Asia and Africa. However, the impact of September 11 was to transform Muslims from an ethnic/religious minority in a multicultural society to a transnational risk category, potential sources of religiously inspired extremist violence (Humphrey 2005).

The securitisation of Muslims made them a focus for targeted policing as dangerous encultured bodies nationally and transnationally (Humphrey 2010, 2007). Although implemented nationally, securitisation is the product of transnational harmonisation of policies and law around counter-terrorism, immigration and integration to manage Muslims and Islam as a transnational risk category across Western states. In general, counter-terrorism measures have given exceptional powers to the state and seen Muslims targeted as a risk category, immigration policy has made it harder for Muslims to visit, migrate and in some cases become citizens of Western countries and integration policies have policed cultural difference by supporting 'moderate' and rejecting 'extremist' forms of Muslim culture, religious leadership and community organisation.

After 11 September 2001, 44 new anti-terror laws were introduced under the Howard Coalition government between 2001 and 2007 covering 'everything from banning speech through to new sedition laws to detention without charge or trial to control orders that permit house arrest to closing down courts from public view' (Williams 2009). The political effect of anti-terrorism laws has been to create a perpetual state of emergency (reflected in the national terrorist alert status) and engender fear in Australian citizens (Aly and Green 2010). These emergency laws define terrorism broadly, proscribe political groups deemed terrorist, allow detention without trial and criminalise association with anyone belonging to a proscribed terrorist organisation, lock-down entire suburbs to conduct searches without judicial approval, and to permit the rapid deportation of non-citizen residents considered security risks (Rix 2006).

In the introduction to the National Security Legislation listed on the Australian Attorney-General's website, the government frames the legislation as part of international counter-terrorism efforts – 'Australia has long played a leading role in the development of laws to combat terrorism'(cited in Rix 2006, p. 431). Yet

because Australia has limited experience with terrorism it had limited anti-terrorism legislation, although colonial control orders regulating the Australian Aboriginal population shared similar features of detention, separation and sedition (Davis and Watson 2006). Because of the lack of anti-terrorism laws, Australia borrowed anti-terrorism laws mainly from the United Kingdom (Lynch 2008). However, international terrorism has been a catalyst for the growing international harmonisation of anti-terrorism laws, changing its status as a normal crime under national law to being an illegal act under international law (Nuotio 2006). This has occurred through the replication of laws and through its Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy launched in 2006 – however the Convention on International Terrorism is still being negotiated (UN Action to Counter Terrorism n.d.).

The harmonisation of counter-terrorism laws produces a securitised transnational space which facilitates global policing and prosecution which is reinforced by the ban-optic global media witnessing of Western publics of terrorist events. Local-global mediation of terrorist events, even at a large geographical distance, constantly remind Western spectator citizens (us) that they (we) are potential targets, thereby tying the national space into a transnationally securitised shared space. In Australia, the Haneef case highlighted the way this securitised transnational space was activated and made visible by a terrorist event in the United Kingdom. The attempted car bombings by Dr Bilal Abdulla and Safeel Ahmed against targets in London and Glasgow on 30 June 2007 resulted in the detention of Dr Mohammed Haneef, a second cousin of Safeel Ahmed, in Brisbane under Australian anti-terrorism laws (*ABC News Online* 2007). The kinship connection, the alleged evidence of a mobile phone SIM card connecting the cousins, the close working relationship between Australian and UK police and intensive Australian media witnessing of this UK terrorist event created the public perception that it was as if the event had taken place in Australia. Eventually, all charges were dropped against Dr Haneef, but the case highlighted how counter-terrorism policing could use a highly visible spectacle of terrorism to exercise highly secretive and broadly unaccountable powers to hold Dr Haneef in detention and, when the case was dismissed, continue his detention by having the Minister for Immigration withdraw his residency visa on character grounds (Pickering and McCulloch 2010).

Parallel with the securitisation of Muslims in Australia is their domestication. While securitisation essentialises Muslims as a transnational risk category, domestication establishes the line between acceptable and unacceptable migrants. In Australia, the public scrutiny of migrant ‘performance’ – fitting in, making an effort to adjust – has gone hand in hand with a mass migration programme whose aim was to select the ‘best’ migrants. For some time, Muslim migrants have been judged to be problem immigrants – unwilling to work, too bound by tradition, too controlling of their women, too slow to learn English and, most recently, too unwilling to integrate and become Australian (Humphrey 1998). However, this Australian national discourse on migrant ‘performance’ has become transnationalised in the form of ‘citizenship tests’ now fashionable in the North America, EU and Australia

(Löwenheim and Gazit 2009). These tests constitute a neo-liberal citizenship, a citizenship that has to be earned (Van Houdt and Schinkel 2011).

But the moral panic around terrorism means that social inclusion is not determined merely by ‘citizenship tests’ but by the successful performance of being recognised as a ‘good Muslim’ (Humphrey 2007). Muslim identity and Islam are made the margins of citizenship. The ‘homegrown’ terrorist attacks in London on 7 July 2005 terrorism attacks by British Pakistanis put integration at the top of the political management of Muslim communities in Australia and the EU. Muslim cultural difference was increasingly constructed as cultural resistance and signified potential ‘extremist’ views. In 2006, the former Prime Minister John Howard explicitly targeted Muslims for their unwillingness to integrate, accusing them of being unwilling to learn English and not adopting Australian values especially in regard to treating women equally (Duffy 2006, Kerbaj 2006). In a similar vein, Mr Peter Costello, the former Treasurer and Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party, declared that there would be no ‘*Shari'a*’ in Australia (*ABC News Online* 2006), making *Shari'a* signify a very essentialised view of Islam as culturally backward, intolerant and separatist. For Australian Muslims, *Shari'a* generally means the religious law concerned with family law and inheritance (Humphrey 1998).

The domestication of Islam and Muslims in Australia, and in Europe, has sought to produce ‘national’ Islams – in President Sarkozy’s phrase ‘to be Muslims of France practicing an Islam of France’ (Bowen 2004, p. 43) – and thereby build moderate Islamic leadership and institutions. Post 7 July 2005 London bombings, domestication has been aimed at preventing Islamic radicalisation amongst Muslim immigrants and their children. As a cultural classification by Western governments, the term ‘moderate Islam’ is primarily a political judgment about loyalty and values (Aly 2005, Modood and Ahmad 2007). Firstly, a ‘moderate Muslim’ is anti-terrorism and against the use of Islam as a militant political rhetoric. Secondly, a ‘moderate Muslim’ is also one who holds modern and progressive views on the religious interpretation of the *Qur'an* and *Hadith*. The idea of a Euro-Islam, a secularised Islam informed by human rights, would be viewed as the most progressive position (AlSayyad and Castells 2002). Thirdly, while it may appear to mark out a middle ground from a Western perspective, the term moderate is pejorative for many Muslims. It be interpreted as meaning a Muslim who is co-opted and represents no one or even worse is so secular that more religious members of the Muslim diaspora would regard them as lapsed ‘Muslims’.

Domestication of Islam in Australia has been particularly focused on Islamic religious leadership and organisations. The Australian state has tried to create more centralised and authoritative national Islamic organisations to counteract the historical absence of a church-like structure in Islam and the ethnic fragmentation of religious organisations and structures (Yusuf 2005). The Australian Federal government appointed a Muslim Advisory Council to regulate the appointment of clerics, especially from overseas, and the Mufti. The council’s first task was to review the suitability of the incumbent Mufti Tajad-din al Hilali, a controversial Muslim

leader based in the influential Lebanese Muslim community, to continue in his national leadership role (McGrath 2006). The Australian government also supported the creation of an Australian National Imams Council (ANIC) to create a register of imams, promote the local training of imams and to make them more accountable to the ANIC than their mosque communities.

As in Europe Muslim women have been a prominent focus of domestication in Australia. The focus on women continues an earlier colonial pattern of intervention in Muslim societies which viewed Muslim women as vehicles for cultural change (Massell 1974, Abu-Lughod 2002). Laws and policies targeting Muslim women have invariably been justified on the grounds of protection and human rights. Contemporary domestication practices in Australia also focus the veil as a symbolic marker of Muslim gender oppression. However, unlike in Europe where different forms of veiling (*hijab*) have been legislated against, in Australia the veil is 'tolerated' but nevertheless widely regarded as an oppressive symbol of Muslim patriarchy (Yaxley 2005). Other Muslim gendered cultural practices of Muslim immigrants that have been criminalised include legislation against female genital mutilation (FGM) (Crimes Act 1900, § 45) and arranged/forced marriage (Mercer 2005). Even though these laws are culturally neutral, they are popularly understood to as targeting oppressive Muslim practices against women and designed to protect Muslim women and support their fuller integration into Australian society (Family Law Council 1994).¹

A critical aspect of the present securitising of Islam and Muslims is the way 'culture' is being constructed under globalisation. The nation state is seeking to manage Islam as a transnational cultural system within a national imaginary which is reemphasising cultural singularity to reassert sovereignty and unity. Securitising Islam represents a bureaucratic response of classification to try to manage potential threats to disorder. Hence, current racism towards Muslims (coined as Islamophobia in Europe) is not just a legacy of orientalism reawakened by international jihadist violence but has become integral to the processes of governance as risk management. Securitisation only reinforces the essentialisation of cultural difference as a strategy to make threats legible and to provide a target for public anxieties. Muslim resistance to this bureaucratic project of cultural essentialisation has provoked its counter-essentialisation in the defence of authenticity and reauthorising of tradition including Muslim revivalist and neo-fundamentalist projects of the recovery of 'pristine' Islam (Werbner 2004).

Hypergovernance of borders

Integral to the national securitisation of migration at home has been the risk management of transnational migration flows to prevent the arrival of illegal immigrants, asylum seekers and unwanted cultural and political influences from diasporas. The thrust of transnational management of unwanted migration has been to stop migration flows arriving at their borders through interception, deterrence and

local ‘stabilisation’ of communities of origin. When the Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced Labor’s new regional policy to process ‘illegal boat arrivals offshore’ – ‘A boat ride to Australia would just be a ticket back to the regional processing centre’ – she was imitating, not just the coalition government’s tough line of reintroducing the ‘Pacific Solution’² (force the processing of asylum claims offshore in the excised migration zone or neighbouring country) but the EU’s complex system of treaties, agreements and practices erecting new kinds of borders/barriers to prevent the movement of people towards Europe. The securitisation of migration flows constructs ‘illegal migrants’ and ‘refugees’ – those not arriving through the normal regulated channels – as a problem of ‘border protection’ which in Australia has been as much about managing the number of illegal boat arrivals as it is managing public worrying about too many boats arriving. In Australia, as has occurred in North America and Europe, the securitisation of asylum seekers as potential terrorists has become an added barrier to being granted asylum status.

In Europe, the securitisation of migration was linked to the political project of EU integration. Immigration has emerged as a major focus of EU harmonisation of policy and laws since the early 1990s. The Dublin Convention (1990) and the Treaty of Amsterdam and European Council (Tampere) Common Asylum Policy (2000) all aimed at the harmonisation of EU asylum and migration policies to create a common border. Harmonisation of immigration and asylum policies inside was complemented by transferring border controls to non-European states, thereby distancing the problem from EU borders (Humphrey 2002). The consequence of outsourcing was the creation of a series of concentric borders. The first circle was the EU, ‘fortress Europe’. The second circle consisted of the states aspiring to join the EU – that is, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE countries). The third circle encompassed the former Soviet Union (CIS), Turkey and North Africa. The designated role of these states was to enforce European border laws at their own borders. The fourth circle was the ‘Middle East, China and Black Africa’ where EU policy sought to eliminate ‘push factors’ for migration and refugee flows through a combination of security intervention and development assistance programmes.

The first three concentric circles have involved outsourcing border controls to non-EU governments, agencies and businesses to manage the transit of migrants towards Europe. For example, the European Commission entered into an agreement with the Libyan government to establish detention centres with the UNHCR acting as a mediator to assure their humanitarian management. Financial sanctions have been imposed on haulage contractors transporting people with invalid documents (up to US\$630,000) and the obligation to return those intercepted to the point of departure. The EU agency Frontex is an example of the decentralisation of control ‘beyond any democratic oversight, and it also enables European countries to evade the obligations that apply to their territory because of commitments made to fundamental rights’ (Morice and Rodier 2010: 8). Interception of illegal boat arrivals has become a ‘push-back’ and not a rescue exercise. The Italian navy either redirects boats away from shore under their ‘push back’ policy or transfers passengers to boats

of a collaborating country – until recently onto Libyan vessels (CPT Report 2010, p. 15, Paoletti 2010).

Since the 1990s, Australian governments have managed asylum seekers by a combination of harsh onshore deterrence policies designed to undermine their rights under the Refugee Convention and a series of regional agreements denying asylum seekers access to onshore processing and Australian courts. The features of both Coalition and Labor party immigration and asylum policies closely resemble current EU practices: long-term detention of ‘illegal arrivals’ and asylum seekers, slowdown in asylum processing of particular categories (*The Guardian* 2010, p. 12), increased use of the deportation of ‘illegals’, the enlistment of neighbouring countries in border controls, the negotiated creation of detention centres in neighbouring countries with UNHCR officials assuming responsibility for asylum assessment, the transfer of boats arrivals to neighbouring countries and the adoption of a ‘push-back’ policy for ‘illegal boat arrivals’. The arrival of boats engenders a political crisis and justifies tougher controls, a phenomenon Mountz (2010) also observes in Canada. However, the removal of processing offshore denies asylum applicants the right to appeal to an Australian court and also renders them invisible to the Australian public and therefore beyond compassion. Their individual human stories of suffering are unheard and their claims for protection as refugees are subordinated to combating crime – stopping people smugglers from making money out of their misery and endangering their lives (Humphrey 2002). Just as has occurred in the EU, the Australian government has made illegal migrants and refugees ‘the target of a discourse that justifies combating them in order to help them’ (Morice and Rodier 2010, p. 8).

In the fourth concentric circle of regions – Middle East, China and Black Africa – EU policy has focused on the containment of unwanted migrants and unwanted politics (terrorism) in their places of origin. From the early 1990s, the EU identified migration and refugee flows as key security issues in post-cold war Europe. Since then, wars and international terrorism have only reinforced this perception and intensified hypergovernance of migration and refugees – for example, the impact of the breakup of former Yugoslavia, the ongoing wars in the Middle East (Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Syria) and Africa (Somalia and Sudan), the September 11 attacks, military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, and international jihadist terrorists attacks in Europe. For this outer circle, the action plans recommended a comprehensive approach to migration policy through political, human rights and development agendas which included alleviating poverty, creating employment, improving living conditions, preventing conflict, consolidating democracy and strengthening the rule of law and addressing the rights of minorities, women and children. By targeting the main ‘refugee-producing’ countries, the EU aimed at alleviating ‘push factors’ on the one hand, and establishing the opportunity for repatriation of rejected asylum seekers on the other.

The major thrust of EU containment policy is framed by the development and security paradigm. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton summed up this relationship in the recent statement:

Development [...] today is a strategic, economic and moral imperative – as central to advancing American interests and solving global problems as diplomacy and defence. It is time to elevate development as a central pillar in all we do in foreign policy. (Bunting 2010, p. 19)

The equation for peace is based on the proposition that ‘poverty causes conflict and development brings peace’ and ‘modern warfare is not fought around people but among them’ (Bunting 2010, p. 19).

After September 11, security took priority over development and ‘narrowed on strategic regions, sub-populations and programmes with a direct security outcome; including helping ineffective states to better police their borders and peoples’ (Duffield and Waddell 2004, p. 3). However, rather than the recovery of state authority, human security is increasingly the outcome of a new ‘assemblage of governance’ which seeks ‘to promote choice and opportunity for the world’s peoples through intervening, acting upon and regulating the economic, social and political contingencies of life’ (Duffield and Waddell 2004, p. 5). But, as Duffield and Waddell (2004, p. 5) asks, “How do you secure humans in an insecure world?” The expansive nature of the human security project can be gauged by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s report *The Responsibility to Protect* combining humanitarian intervention with ‘complex forms of global coordination and centralisation necessary to regulate the conflict, post-conflict, migratory, economic, health and educational contingencies of life’ (Duffield and Waddell 2004, p. 5).

The development and security paradigm is designed to prevent further population flows and to permit the repatriation of rejected asylum seekers to their countries of origin. One dimension of Australian government participation in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as a member of a US-led coalition and NATO force, respectively, was containment of conflict by regime change and the resolution of the refugee problem of these two key ‘refugee-generating’ countries. It added military-humanitarian intervention as an instrument in Australia’s refugee containment and repatriation strategies. By joining in the war to overthrow the Taliban government in Afghanistan, and subsequently Saddam Hussain in Iraq, the Australian government expected to simultaneously eliminate the ‘push’ factors for Afghan and Iraqi refugees and close down the transnational terrorist sanctuaries of groups threatening to export the ‘new terrorism’. In response to the ongoing arrival of Tamil refugees by boat during 2009 with the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka, the Australian Labor government entered into an agreement with the Sri Lankan government designed to stop the refugee flow at source. The asylum claims of the Tamil refugees were transformed into a problem of states cooperating to combat people smugglers. The agreement also committed Australia to help with post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction (Smith 2009).

Asylum policy and illegal boat arrivals are hot button policy issues in Australian politics. However, the symbolic importance of 'stopping the boats' to assert territorial sovereignty is far greater than the impact of the actual numbers arriving. Between 2006 and 2011 around 11,000 asylum seekers arrived by boat and around 850,000 arrived as permanent settlers making asylum seekers about 1.4 per cent of arrival in that period if all asylum claims are accepted (DIAC 2012).

Australian development agency (AusAID) policy documents on its projects in Afghanistan highlight the connection between security (military patrols and training), development assistance and refugee solutions (AusAID n.d.). Australia participates in military operations in Afghanistan under the United Nations mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Australian involvement has been in Oruzgan Province with the aim of 'improving agriculture and rural development, improving basic service delivery, supporting good governance and supporting vulnerable populations' (AusAID n.d.). An important development outcome mentioned in the report is the successful repatriation since 2002 of more than five million Afghan refugees from neighbouring Pakistan and Iran under the UNHCR's voluntary repatriation programme and the return home of around 500,000 internally displaced Afghans. Nevertheless, over 2.6 million registered Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan and Iran.

The hypergovernance of migration is also linked to the domestication and securitisation of Muslims and Islam at home through refugee policy becoming racialised as well as criminalised in public discourse. In Australia, refugee is becoming code for 'Muslim' because the overwhelming majority of illegal boat arrivals have brought Muslims from Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan (DIAC 2011). The arrival of Tamils from Sri Lanka between 2010 and 2012 has been the exception. The logic of the 'war on terror' was the dismantling of radical Islamist militias, especially al Qaeda, in failed states in order to prevent further terrorist attacks in the cities of the North. After the 7 July 2005 attacks against the London transport system conducted by radicalised 'homegrown' British Pakistan Muslim youth, counter-terrorism began to target the export of radical jihadist politics. Military intervention to defeat Islamic militants in conflict zones became part of the expanded hypergovernance of migrants at home. The perceived increased risk of radicalisation of diaspora Muslims has only intensified the securitisation and domestication of young Muslim males as a terror risk category. The geographical focus of the state 'anti-radicalisation' programmes is on 'jihadi corridors', the space linking diaspora and homeland politics constituted by the experience of training, ideological indoctrination and fighting for Islamist causes (Kashmir, Afghanistan, Chechnya and Bosnia) by different *jihadi* militias (Bhatt 2010).

As the hypergovernance of the crisis of postcolonial states grows more difficult, the international agenda for peacekeeping, peace-making and nation-building becomes more expansive. Lakhdar Brahimi, an Algerian statesman and UN veteran envoy to Afghanistan, commented:

"[the plans] become more ambitious and multifaceted, seeking to promote justice, national reconciliation, human rights, gender equality, the rule of law, sustainable economic development, and democracy, all at the same time. From day one, now, immediately, even including in the midst of conflict" (Rashid 2008, p. 402).

Hypogovernance as a strategy of transnational governance of populations appears to be becoming more complex and never-ending. If the development and security paradigm do not lead to the recovery of the authority and legitimacy of postcolonial states, then we will very likely see the intensification of securitisation and hypogovernance of migration concerned with interception, detention and repatriation, a recycling of displaced and transient populations based on local deals with states of origin or transit ones.

Conclusion

The patterns of securitisation, domestication and hypogovernance pursued by the Australian state in the contemporary management of migrants and migration are embedded in a web of international practices emerging in the North. Australia not only borrows laws and policies from the North and extends transnational governance through the adoption of UN conventions and treaties but also shares the transnationalised security objects – especially Muslims and refugees – and the collective gaze of the spectator citizen. While migration is usually strongly framed as a national question, it is increasingly being managed in the North as an international one.

Nation states are increasingly confronting the limits of their sovereignty in managing the impact of globalisation. The securitisation of migration and migrants represents a strategy by which states in the North now seek to manage population flows from the South and to internally police the impact of migration on their own societies. The bodies of migrants have been made surrogate borders on which the state inscribes its sovereignty through inclusion or exclusion. As social control, securitisation involves a shift from the punishment to the prevention of crimes, from a panoptic lens (the logic of totalising control under the gaze of the state) to a banoptic lens (the management of threats under the gaze of the citizen spectator). But securitisation of migration also represents a mode of governance based on policing social categories of threat and risk to produce social cohesion/consensus as a way to manage the problems of globalisation.

The securitisation of migration has emerged as a political project of spatial integration through the harmonisation of policy and laws managing risk across states of the North. As Watson (2011) argues, securitisation is best thought of as being at one end of the security spectrum between non-institutionalised and institutionalised practices. The emergence of securitisation is an expression of the inadequacy of institutionalised forms of international and national security to manage new risks and threats that have emerged with globalisation. Perhaps securitisation represents an emergent pattern to be institutionalised? Yet, the very shift from panoptic to banoptic forms of disciplining suggests that this is the new pattern of transnational security

which prioritises policy, and with it politics, on the latest risk objects. Even humanitarianism has assumed this form of prioritising discourse for urgent political attention on the referent object of human suffering (Watson 2011).

The transnationalisation of migration policy in the North constitutes a sphere of overlapping sovereignties. The transnational management of migration and migrants has been an important mechanism for EU political integration through the harmonisation of laws and policies. Securitisation has reinforced the EU project of integration but it has also led to a wider harmonisation of laws and policies as a shared project of the North. Securitisation has accelerated the process of constituting a form of transnational governance focused on risk management by producing transnational categories for shared regulation – refugees, irregular migrants, terrorists and Muslims. In the area of migration, the Inter-Governmental Consultations (IGC) on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe, North America and Australia is a good example of high-level discussion and forum for policy transfer and harmonisation (Humphrey 2002). The bureaucratic exchange of policies and laws is also referred to as ‘best practice’ (Mountz 2010). Securitisation has emerged as a mode of governance to produce social cohesion/consensus around a threat. It combines technologies of surveillance, states scrutinizing the conduct of risk categories, with technologies of normalisation, the policing of social surfaces through the mediated circulation of images watched by spectator citizens. The profiling of risk categories has led to cultural essentialisation to make risks/threats legible and thereby gain political legitimacy by visibly policing them. Racism is being entrenched by the optical logics of securitisation.

Securitisation is an expression of hypergovernance, the transnational management of populations beyond state borders to contain threats at a distance. In the case of migration, this has involved intercepting unwanted migrants – illegals and asylum seekers – before they arrive at the border and trying to keep them at home. States in the North have consistently sought to distance asylum seekers victims from voters by de-humanising them, denying their rights through exceptional laws (especial deny them access to national jurisdictions), criminalising them by association (their resort to people smugglers), and even producing a discourse claiming to save them in the name of combating people smugglers by denying them their rights. In other words, interception beyond the border makes refugees and asylum seekers politically and legally invisible and allows the state to avoid legal and moral responsibility to address asylum claims.

Reaching beyond the state also involves outsourcing sovereignty by getting other states, NGOs and private companies to assume responsibilities for managing migration flows. States from the North are increasingly negotiating the abdication of their responsibilities towards refugees and asylum seekers (treaty obligations, international law) by unloading responsibilities onto others on the basis of coercion or inducement – accession to the EU; development loans; trade benefits; regional security agreements. But, as the situations in Afghanistan and Pakistan reveal, it is no longer enough to keep problems at a distance by exporting

development and security programmes. ISAF's hypergovernance of a failed state like Afghanistan is in practice contested by Islamic forms of hypergovernance projected by religious movements connected to the Saudi state's regional ambitions for influence (Humphrey 2012). There are competing patterns of the franchising of sovereignty to Western secular as well as Islamic religious NGOs (Bhatt 2007). What is at stake is not just local disorder or the reach of *salafi jihadist* millenarianism but the very future of postcolonial states in crisis.

The impact of the securitisation of migration in the twenty-first century is on course to intensify with the growing anxiety in the North about the South. By juxtaposing national order with global disorder, the impetus for intervention at a distance, hypergovernance, will increase resulting in the reconfiguration of societies and states, but unlike in the era of western domination, contested by new counter-imperialisms. If this is the scenario unfolding, we will see greater displacements and more large-scale migrations.

Notes

- [1] Given there are first generation migrants from Egypt, Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan, African countries with some of the highest levels of FGM, the practice certainly continues in Australia (Mathews 2011).
- [2] 'In September 2001, Parliament passed the *Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Bill 2001* and *The Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Bill 2001*, giving legislative effect to the Pacific Solution. The Bills amended the *Migration Act 1958* to excise Christmas, Ashmore, Cartier and Cocos (Keeling) Islands from the migration zone. As a result, any unlawful non-citizen attempting to enter Australia via one of these islands was now prevented from making a valid application for a protection visa unless the Minister for Immigration determined that it was in the public interest for that person to do so. On 19 September 2001, Australia signed an Administrative Agreement with Nauru to accommodate asylum seekers for the duration of the processing of their applications. This was replaced by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed on 11 December 2001. Australia also signed an MOU with Papua New Guinea on 11 October 2001, allowing the construction of a processing centre to accommodate and assess the claims of asylum seekers on Manus Island. The centres were managed by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM)' (Phillips and Spinks 2010).

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